

# THE ROUND TABLE

*A Quarterly Review of*  
**BRITISH  
COMMONWEALTH  
AFFAIRS**

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*Contents of Number 203*

**A LEAF FALLS  
THE BEAM IN THE EYE  
SOUTH AFRICA DEPARTS  
LAOS DISPUTED  
WASHINGTON'S SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURS  
THE CHOICE FOR CENTRAL AFRICA  
NEW HOPES ON CAPITOL HILL  
TRANSITION IN KENYA**

*And Articles from Correspondents in*

**UNITED KINGDOM IRELAND PAKISTAN CANADA  
AUSTRALIA NEW ZEALAND RHODESIA AND NYASALAND**

June 1961

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BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

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## A LEAF FALLS

### SOUTH AFRICA OUTSIDE THE COMMONWEALTH

THE decision of Dr. Verwoerd's Government to withdraw the Union of South Africa from the family of nations that has sheltered its growth to maturity, and go out alone into a manifestly antipathetic world, should be a matter for regret to the whole Commonwealth, and in a peculiar degree to those who have tried to serve the Commonwealth through THE ROUND TABLE. The genesis of this review was in the Closer Union Societies, which fostered the movement to unite the four colonies of British South Africa into a single nation destined to early sovereignty; and some of its founders believed that in the process they had discovered a model for the future development of the British Empire itself. The march of events soon proved that hope to be illusory; but THE ROUND TABLE has never ceased to take a particular interest in the fortunes of the country in which its roots were struck, and will not soon or lightly learn to think of it as an alien land. South African affairs will continue to be recorded and criticized in these pages, on an equal footing with those of the remaining members of the Commonwealth, and with equal goodwill, for so long as the group of citizens of the new Republic who have been responsible for the treatment of these affairs for half a century remain willing to co-operate. They testify in the present issue that the news of a breach was received with pleasure by few, and with anxiety or distress by very many of their countrymen. They themselves desire no change in the mode of their intercourse with their colleagues in London and elsewhere.

It need hardly be said that the decision to adopt republican forms, in accordance with the vote of a small majority at the recent referendum, has nothing directly to do with the termination of the Union's membership of the Commonwealth. When India was accepted, by the Prime Ministers' Conference of 1949, as the first member not professing allegiance to the Crown, Dr. Malan was a principal advocate of the new precedent; and it was tacitly recognized that he had in mind the fulfilment of the long-cherished ambition of the Dutch-descended majority of white South Africans to return to the constitutional system with which the heroic legends of their race are entwined. That this republican idealism was a lasting factor of estrangement from their English-speaking compatriots, who are equally incapable of forgetting their own inherited loyalty to the ancient Throne, was a cause for regret; but it was understood. The sole significance of the change to a republic for the London Conference of 1961 was that, according to precedent, it required the formal assent of the other Prime Ministers to the seating among them of the representative of the new State where hitherto the chief South African servant of the Queen had sat. Thus it was an occasion to seek a positive affirmation by each and every member of his desire for

association with the Union, where hitherto a tacit acquiescence in the customary co-operation had sufficed to preserve the relationship.

Thus only was the nature of the South African polity brought into debate; and thus it came about that the determining issue was not the new departure, the creation of the republic, but the whole social order of the country, which was old, whether it turned upon the general policy of segregation of races, dating from their first meeting in the seventeenth century, or upon the particular theory of this segregation, dating, under the name of *apartheid*, from the general election of 1948.

Now whatever doctrine of extreme democracy may be proclaimed by the more recently emancipated States of the Commonwealth in Asia and Africa, their seniors have never thought it an intolerable anomaly that one of their number should be constituted as an aristocracy of race. Many nations have passed through such a phase, not excluding England. Admittedly that was long ago; but that should be a reminder that for the Transvaal and the Orange Free State the date corresponding to 1066 is 1838, and that it is unfair to expect of a nation so young a mental and emotional outlook identical with one that has forgotten for seven centuries that it once had a problem of integrating a conquering with a subject race. In carrying racial privilege into the twentieth century South Africa is not by any means unique. It is as normal in a Commonwealth of nations as in a family of human children that some are more mature than others. Throughout the half-century of association between the Union and Great Britain it has been frankly recognized that South Africa is a country in which the races are socially segregated and politically unequal. It was as known representatives of such a society that the South African forces were gratefully welcomed as brothers-in-arms in two world wars, both fought professedly in defence of liberty and human rights. In full recognition that this was a legitimately organized community the fruitful intercourse of peace has been founded, and a close-knit web of friendship and kinship preserved between the peoples. That inequality of the races was inevitable for their time was taken for granted by all responsible South African statesmen from Rhodes to Smuts; and none of their colleagues in other sovereign regions of the Commonwealth as it then existed saw in this any obstacle to collaboration with them. So long as inequality meant that the white man led along the path of advancing civilization and the black followed, but the path itself was open to all, there was no irremediable clash of principles.

#### From Smuts to Malan

THE great change can be exactly dated to the general election of 1948, when the Nationalist Party triumphed on a programme of *apartheid*, which they explicitly declared to be something different from, and more fundamental than, the old *segregasie* which both the principal parties recognized. The new term was at that time criticized by its opponents as vague and ambiguous; thirteen years of Nationalist rule have since filled out its content. Even after a decade of increasingly harsh discriminatory legislation, it is still possible to interpret the theory of *apartheid* in the comparatively



favourable terms to which the old friends of the Union should be predisposed. The project of Bantustan, for example, the idea of disentangling the races so completely that the question of equality or inequality between them would not arise, is in abstraction morally unexceptionable. For economic and demographic reasons, however, the abstraction cannot be made concrete. It is impossible to challenge the judgment expressed in Parliament by Lord Brand, speaking with continuous knowledge of South Africa from days before the Union came into being:

While *apartheid* in South Africa is not, in my opinion, wrong in principle, if it could be worked out with justice to both races, the trouble is that it is quite impracticable and cannot be achieved. For both black and white races are now too dependent on one another.

This is the essence of the matter. *Apartheid* in theory merely acknowledges that indigenous and European-descended Africans belong to different races, have different needs, and may have the best chance of attaining their fullest natural development if they are kept apart; *apartheid* in practice necessarily involves injustice to those of the dark-skinned races who have to live or work in the areas where the white man is supreme. The black man is not regarded as a being who will, in his own person or his descendants, rise and be helped to rise without limit; he and his are denied in perpetuity any escape from the status of inferiority. In contrast with Rhodes's "equal rights for all civilized men", each individual of the race is born with an inherited curse, which cannot be lifted whatever his personal qualities or attainments. If this is not the meaning of *apartheid*—and it must be said in all fairness that it is denied not only by some of its advocates but by some friends of South Africa who do not share the creed—Dr. Verwoerd undoubtedly failed to convince the Prime Ministers in conference that it was a misrepresentation. Their reaction, and especially the reaction of those representing nations in Africa and Asia, was not against racial discrimination as a phase through which South African society is passing, but against the belief, out of which they could not be argued, that this discrimination is held by the Nationalists to be good in itself and intended to be maintained in perpetuity. This, as Lord Hailsham said for the United Kingdom Government in the debate already cited, is the change that has come about in the Union's prevailing doctrine of race in the decade since Smuts died:

It is not that a social convenience, a temporary but unavoidable evil, has been tolerated, but that it has been advertised as a permanency, erected into a social philosophy, lauded as a virtue, almost exalted as a religion.

If that image of *apartheid* could not be dispelled, it was scarcely conceivable that African and Asian Ministers could be persuaded to make positive affirmation of their desire to renew association with the country in which it was professed as a fundamental philosophy—at any rate when they were given a lead by the Prime Minister of so senior a member of the Commonwealth as Canada. The allegation has been made that Dr. Verwoerd had no sincere desire that his application to remain in the Commonwealth should be

accepted, and deliberately manœuvred for a position in which he could withdraw it with dignity and in the mode of remonstrance. That charge, as is shown by the contribution from South Africa on another page,\* has been satisfactorily refuted; and indeed, if there is one fault of which Dr. Verwoerd can never be accused, it is insincerity. It is the terrible single-mindedness of the Nationalists that causes these irremediable estrangements. To quote Lord Hailsham again:

What brought about the present crisis was not so much *apartheid* itself as the complete inability of its advocates to admit, even to the smallest possible degree, the possibility of compromise or relaxation.

Undoubtedly it was under the dictation of conscience, and not by political calculation, that Dr. Verwoerd felt compelled to decline any offer of compromise and to force the issue of principle; and with equal inevitability it had to be made plain to him that the principle he professed was repudiated by the Commonwealth with such finality that it was impossible for the Union while adhering to it to continue in membership.

### No Victimization

THAT proposition having been affirmed, the temptation to extend it into unnecessary corollaries should be resolutely resisted. The problem of colour presents itself in many shapes in many lands: it would be scarcely an exaggeration to say that it is the world's gravest social dilemma in the twentieth century. The Commonwealth has rejected one proffered solution; it must not be led into any self-righteous assertion that it or any of its members has yet solved the problem in terms that can be exported, or in any terms that even locally can be considered final. For the United Kingdom, under the pressure of negro immigration from both hemispheres, the crucial testing time may be still to come. For Australia it is a problem in foreign relations rather than in domestic adjustment. Indeed, the argument has already been heard that the self-exclusion of South Africa in consequence of the condemnation of *apartheid* leads to the logical consequence that the Commonwealth ought to intervene against the "White Australia" policy. That is surely a fallacy: the government in the Union has a moral responsibility for all the races that dwell within its bounds, but the government of the Australian Commonwealth has no comparable responsibility for or to those races which petition from outside for admission. Nevertheless, the essential point is this: in deciding that the solution of the colour problem proposed by the Government of South Africa is unacceptable within their association, the other nations of the Commonwealth will be ill advised to assume any judicial authority to condemn. None of them has yet proved that the problem is soluble. It behoves them all to recognize that the factors involved in its South African form make it uniquely intractable. "The native problem", said Smuts himself, "is so difficult that I am glad to think I have to leave it to others to decide." So far from wishing to follow up the dissolution of the bond with any action tainted with the motive of revenge or punishment, the

\* See p. 238.

remaining nations of the Commonwealth are bound to watch the progress of the new republic with the active hope that their help may some day be welcomed in working out some better mode of life between the races than that which finds favour with its present rulers. Though a breach has opened between us and the Nationalist Government, it is more important to remember that the people of the Union, of all races, remain our friends—a large section of them our kinsmen. Without reservations, we wish them and their country well. Perhaps the outstanding mission of the Commonwealth in the latter part of the century is to take the lead in drawing Africa into the main stream of world civilization. On that work the Union, in or out of the Commonwealth, cannot fail to exert a powerful influence. We need to maintain communication with those elements in the country which are able to think and work in harmony with the more liberal thought of the Commonwealth. Though henceforth we can speak to these only across the gulf of political separation, we shall look forward to the day when they win over the majority of the electors to their side. A century and a half of shared history and intimate association are not obliterated by the stroke of a constitutional lawyer's pen. The Commonwealth already has its precedents for creating a special nexus of relationships between some members and some who have renounced their membership. The story of fruitful intercourse between Great Britain and the Union is not closed: a new chapter opens. In that belief, THE ROUND TABLE wishes the South African Republic *Tot Siens*.

# THE BEAM IN THE EYE

## COMMUNIST IMPERIALISM IN ASIA

THE Statement and Appeal of the eighty-one World's Communist Parties issued from Moscow last November may be studied from more than one aspect. Certain leading features of what may be regarded as the more positive theme of these documents were subjected to a penetrating analysis in an article "Two Pillars of Communism" published in the March number of this journal. These features relate mainly to the dispute between the Soviet Union and China for leadership of the Communist world, more particularly over the question whether or not war is regarded as inevitable in order to attain the triumph of Communism. The article mentioned refers in passing to the inevitable competition between Russia and China for the allegiance of the "colonial" world, as a part of the struggle for leadership, but refrains from any attempt to analyse what may be seen as the more negative side of the Communist thesis, namely the unsparing denunciation of "imperialism" and "colonialism" with which the Statement abounds. It is the purpose here to look further at this negative aspect, to see how it is bound up with the positive theme and finally to consider how far Russia and China, so insistent on their own unblemished record in this respect, are justified in posing as the champions of oppressed and exploited peoples. For strangely enough the Communist propaganda theme directed against the "imperialists" and "colonialists" has had a marked effect on uncommitted thought in Asia and now in Africa, and appears to have won some support in unexpected quarters even in the West. It is not too much to say that under the hammer-blows of Communist propaganda both words as now applied have acquired a pejorative sense, and both connote a more or less ruthless domination by one people or government over another people, the dominant power having descended on the subjected people from across the sea in ships.

Much has been spoken and written of the establishment of Soviet satellite States in Eastern Europe, a subject familiar now for some fifteen years and given a sharper edge by the events in Poland and Hungary in 1956. But in the judgment of the present writer, however abhorrent to Western minds may be the system imposed on parts of Europe through the presence of the Red Army, it cannot be denied that to Asians, Africans and even Latin Americans the occupation and counter-occupation of European territories by this or that European power (a category to which Russia is assigned by the inhabitants of other continents) are not matters of immediate emotional concern. Indians, for instance, who give such things any attention would tend to regard the Russian occupation of any part of Central Europe as an event in the straight line of European history, a sort of repetition of Napoleonic, Austrian, Tsarist or German annexations, and a more or less inevitable result of two major European wars and the defeat of Germany. If we are to scrutinize effectively the Communist claim to be free of the taint



of "imperialism", we shall do well to make some endeavour to look at the case in an Asian focus and with the eyes of Asia. Ultimately what instructed minds in Asia think will count for much in Africa and Latin America, and is likely to influence thought in Europe and the United States also. In this regard the territories of Central Asia, both Turkic and Tibetan, are of special relevance.

### Rivals for Leadership

WE should first clear the ground by briefly referring to what is here called the positive side of the theme of the November Statement, namely its outward resolution of a dispute over leadership, which is really unresolved, and its doctrine that war is not inevitable. This is necessary, for the constructive and destructive aspects of this propagandist essay are dovetailed together. Take first the question of leadership. It is not possible to read between the lines of the Statement without endorsing the conclusion that there is a dispute over leadership which remains unresolved between the two main contestants. Soviet Russia is determined to assert an unchallenged leadership in the most arrogant fashion, and China is nowhere: For instance:

The (81) Parties unanimously declare that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been and remains the universally recognized vanguard of the world Communist movement, being the most experienced and steered contingent. . . .

and perhaps more significant, for here the first two actors appear in juxtaposition:

The Soviet Union is the first country in history to be blazing a trail to communism for all mankind. It is the most striking example and most powerful bulwark for the peoples of the world. . . . The people's revolution in China dealt a crushing blow at the positions of imperialism in Asia and exerted tremendous influence on the peoples, especially of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

(It is worth noting as a straw in the wind that the Statement's opening paragraph refers to the 1917 Great October Revolution with a capital R; China's revolution has to be content with the lower case.)

No Chinese Communist could read this document and not feel he is being patronized under a paper patching of unity. Moreover an uncomfortable consciousness that the universal Communist camp cuts across national patriotisms and antagonisms is evident in the most closely argued portion of the Statement. This is concerned to adjust the universal idea with particularism, and states:

There are no objective causes in the nature of the socialist system for contradictions and conflicts between the peoples and states belonging to it. The interests of the socialist system as a whole and national interests are harmoniously combined. . . .

But, conversely:

Disregard of national peculiarities may lead to the party of the proletariat being isolated from reality. . . . Manifestations of nationalism and national

narrow mindedness do not disappear automatically with the establishment of the socialist system. . . .

and the last word, the solution :

The Communist Parties tirelessly educate the working people in the spirit of socialist internationalism. . . . Solid unity of the Parties are [*sic*] the main source of the strength and invincibility of each socialist country and the socialist camp as a whole.

Throughout the argument there persists a sense of unease and a consciousness of the need for special verbal papering over of irreconcilables. The reason for labouring this exposition in the context of the rivalry of Russia and China is that it is in precisely similar contradictory terms that the Soviet Union seeks to justify its own rule over non-Russian, and particularly Asian, peoples within the U.S.S.R. And it is the difficulty of sustaining a very unconvincing case that inclines the writers of the Statement to roll up their positive conclusions in much easier and more welcome denunciations of the system Communism, as they affect to believe, is destined to overthrow.

We need not long be detained by the other positive theme, the conclusion that war is not necessary to ensure the triumph of Communism. It is not germane to the present issue, except in so far as, even when the dove of peace is brought out, the language is that of antithesis and peace is described in terms of warlike effort. Thus the Statement insists that "peaceful co-existence is a policy of mobilizing . . . vigorous action against the enemies of peace and does not imply renunciation of the class struggle . . . favourable opportunities are then provided for the national liberation of the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries. . .". Thus there is to be no slackening of cold war efforts either among those people who are emerging to independence in the non-Communist world, or in the uncommitted regions. To this there is a clear riposte. There are dependent peoples under Communist sway, awaiting relief.

There is a final trumpet-call appended to the section on peace and co-existence, reaffirming Russian leadership: "The socialist system with the Soviet Union as its main force uses its steadily growing . . . might to curb the actions of imperialism and handcuff the advocates of military gambles."

### Colonialism Denounced

NO more than a third of the combined document is devoted to the positive message. The remaining 25 pages are devoted to sustained denunciation of "imperialism" and "the colonialists". Britain of course comes in for her due share of the attack, but the Founding Fathers would be surprised to find the words that "the United States is the mainstay of colonialism today", and to read of "U.S. imperialist domination" not once but many times. In these 25 pages the offending "-isms" reappear some 150 times, reminding the reader of a phrase appearing in a recent American statement on events in Cuba—"the monotonous and implacable din of Communist propaganda". It is as if words were being thrown into a machine, a flow of factitive or causative abstractions strung together on a feeder-belt, with a surface clatter

behind which it becomes impossible to detect the rhythm of real life. It is odd that so many should seem bemused by all these abstractions; a more human reaction would be that of the Persian proverb—the dog barks, the caravan moves on.

Nowhere is any attempt made to define what is meant by “imperialism”, or “colonialism” and it seems well, therefore, to turn to the definitions included in the *Soviet Dictionary of Foreign Words used in Russian*. In words reminiscent of Dr. Johnson’s definitions of *Whig* and *Patron* the Soviet lexicographer dismisses *Imperialism* thus:

The culminating and final state of capitalism on which the latter entered at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. Imperialism is monopolistic, decaying and dying capitalism, the precursor of the world socialist revolution.\*

For *colonialism* there is no Russian word, but it is apparently regarded as synonymous with *colonization* (*Kolonizatsiya*), which our lexicographer defines as:

the seizure of a country or region by imperialists accompanied by the subjection, brutal exploitation, and sometimes annihilation of the local population.

It will be evident that the assaults on “imperialists” and “colonialists” in the November Statement, and the definitions above, are in tune, and set out to support one another—in other words the dictionary definitions are a distillation of the charges brought by Russia, and now by China also, against the West.

### Succession to the Tsars

IT is not the purpose here to defend the true record of the West, and of Britain in particular, in a sphere of imperial rule in which not only the traditionalists among us take a justifiable pride as in a mighty liberating force. Those of us who have been closely concerned with the transformation of an Empire into a Commonwealth of free nations are entitled to believe that history may acclaim as the greatest contribution of Englishmen to constructive politics that they brought West and East together in a synthesis of civilizations of which the whole is finer than the parts. And having performed that great work in Asia Britain set her hand to bring an Africa which for the most part enjoyed no civilization into the stream of contemporary social and political life. Beside those achievements, and hearing the splendour of

... a voice whose sound was like the sea,  
Pure as the naked heavens, majestic, free ...

the vituperative utterances of Moscow and Peking come to us as empty, sub-human chatter. Let us rather turn to consider the beam that is in the Communist eye, taking Central Asia as the chosen field, for both the Soviet and the Chinese Empires.

\* This definition follows Lenin’s famous thesis on imperialism as the last phase of capitalism. “Someone”, says Mr. Jaya Prakash Narayan, “should write another thesis on communism as the first phase of a new imperialism” (Address to All-India Tibet Convention on May 30, 1959).

A number of books have been written on the Russian empire in Asia,\* but the most recent and succinct account available in English is to be found in an article "Colonialism and the U.S.S.R." by Geoffrey Wheeler,† published in the *Political Quarterly* for June 1958. The present writer is indebted to that article for much of the factual side of what follows here, though the conclusions are his own.

The Soviets after the 1917 Revolution inherited the Empire of the Tsars. This had been created by Russian expansion right across Asia from the Urals to the Pacific, between the seventeenth and the end of the nineteenth century by which time Russia was established on the Afghan frontier along the Oxus and in the Pamirs within a very few miles of the frontier of what was then British India. This vast dominion comprised more than half the total area of Asia. The immense northern belt of Siberia contained few indigenous inhabitants, but in Central Asia, then known as Turkistan, there was an oasis cultivation and a renowned centre of Turco-Iranian Muslim civilization grouped around the Khanates of Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand. These were brought under Tsarist domination in the second half of the nineteenth century, and finally absorbed in the Soviet Empire after the Revolution.

Like other empires the Russian was created by conquest and annexation and included people of race and culture entirely different from that of the new-comers. But it differed in a marked respect. Central Asia is a part of the same continent with European Russia; one passes into the other with easy gradations of climate, soil and population. This meant that it was easy to colonize and has in fact been colonized by millions of Russians and Ukrainians, until today there are more Russians than Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, and in the other four Central Asian republics from 15 to 30 per cent of the population is Russian. In other words it is not an oversea empire but contiguous with the Russian homeland. Just as Mongols and Tatars in the Middle Ages spread over Russia, so did Russians later reverse the process and spread over Asia. They have in fact come to regard Central Asia as an integral part of Russian territory. And they have done the same, and take the same attitude, in the Caucasus. "Oversea empires are easy to spot, but why should it be so difficult to discern the reality behind the land empires, whose contiguous territories create the illusion of a single nationhood?"‡

It is instructive to note the inconsistencies of Soviet references to the empire of the Tsars. The first edition of the *Soviet Encyclopedia* castigates Tsarist Russia for cruel exploitation of colonial possessions; the second edition makes no mention whatever of Russia's having now, or ever having had in the past, any colonies. There is of course no doubt that colonialism in the sense of the Soviet definition was in fact practised by the Tsars; it is sufficient to cite the well-known maxim of the Tsarist commander Skobelev, known to the Turkmans as Göz Kanli—Bloody Eyes:

\* Notably *Russia and her Colonies* by W. Kolarz, 1952, and *Soviet Empire*, by Olaf Caroe, 1953.

† Director, Central Asian Research Centre.

‡ Mr. Jaya Prakash Narayan, in his Presidential Address to the Afro-Asian Convention on Tibet, April 9, 1960.



I hold it a principle that in Asia the duration of peace is in direct proportion to the slaughter you inflict upon the enemy. Strike hard, and keep on striking till resistance fails; then form ranks, cease slaughter and be kind to the prostrate enemy.

The Soviets have been glad enough to inherit undiminished an empire so established, and in their plunder of Bukhara in 1920 adopted similar methods.

The Soviet definition of colonialism, as we have noted, mentions annihilation of populations. Later in their own practice they added mass deportation. Towards the end of World War II the entire populations of the Crimean Tatar, Kalmuk and Chechen republics, amounting to about one million persons, were uprooted from their homes and deported to other parts of the U.S.S.R. For over ten years there was no mention of their fate; they just disappeared. The first edition of the *Soviet Encyclopedia* had given a glowing account of their loyalty and achievements; in the second post-war edition they are not even mentioned as having existed. It was not until 1955 that this act, reports of which were previously dismissed as "imperialist fabrications", was at last admitted as one of Stalin's errors of judgment. It is not surprising that Soviet writers think it necessary to cover up such "mistakes" by continuing to charge the West with crimes which beside this pale into insignificance.

There is another tale of sorrow, equally appalling, the outline of which can be seen even in Soviet census figures. Between the Soviet censuses of 1926 and 1939 nearly a million Kazakhs disappeared during a time when the other peoples of Central Asia, Uzbeks, &c., showed an increase. This decrease is accounted for by the compulsory suppression of nomadism and the introduction of collective herds, which was not achieved from 1929 onwards without a mass destruction of animals, sometimes by the despairing herdsmen themselves, and a vast loss of life. It has been calculated that during some ten years one Kazakh in three perished, while large numbers were driven into the towns by starvation and violence. Three-quarters of the original herds were lost on the steppe. The place of Kazakhs and their animals was taken by Russian and Ukrainian agricultural colonists, so that today there are more Slavs than Kazakhs in the republic of Kazakhstan. Apart from the census figures themselves, carrying a clear inference, Soviet writings and those of local observers establish the stark facts of what happened in those terrible years. Perhaps the most convincing comment is that of Littlepage, an American mining engineer in Soviet employ at the time, who described both points of view:

The nomads were among the principal sufferers when the second Communist Revolution started in 1929. But the nomads were dirty and superstitious, and I could understand how the Communist reformers believed that they were doing them a favor by breaking up their old forms of life and persuading them, by the use of force, to adopt a manner of life considered more sensible. On this trip however in 1934, as we pushed through these pastured plateaus, my sympathies went out to those nomads who had forcibly resisted their conversion into proletarians. I even began to understand how they might be willing to fight for this mode of existence if someone threatened to take them away from it.

A few, a very few, escaped by way of Sinkiang and Tibet to find their way, a sad remnant, into the northern corner of Kashmir in 1944. Hundreds of thousands died.

### Big Brother

**I**N the face of these deportations and decimations of non-Russian peasants and herdsmen the official Soviet line is that they have broken away from the old Tsarist colonial system and set up a new and enlightened one under which the hitherto subject peoples enjoy complete freedom and sovereignty. The impression sought to be given to the outside world is that these peoples are satisfied with their present lot, regard themselves as fully independent, and look up and defer to the Russians, as their "elder brother". Soviet writers are at pains to emphasize the love which the people of Asia have felt for the Russians since they first met them over a century ago. "And it is true", writes Wheeler, "that there are few outward signs of discontent in the Asian republics, and it is probable that the material achievements are respected and appreciated, and the people believe they are better off than the people in neighbouring Muslim countries. But passive acquiescence and expressions of loyalty, even if sincerely felt, do not necessarily indicate a state of freedom and independence".

How then did the Soviets transform the Tsarist empire into the non-Russian republics on their periphery? At first under Lenin's inspiration there was much lip-service to the principle of self-determination, and suggestions for the formation of a loose form of federation which it was hoped might later embrace Afghanistan, Persia and Turkey. But this was abandoned partly owing to the conviction, already referred to, that the vast area enclosed by the Urals, the Oxus and Pacific was in some sense an integral part of Russia, to which Russians had a prescriptive right, and partly because the Kremlin was not prepared to tolerate separatism in regions on which the economy was dependent for such products as oil and cotton. A solution was found rather on the lines of the false synthesis already described between the universal and the particular, and the "nationalities" policy was established in 1924. Central Asia was divided along ethnic divisions into Uzbekistan, Turkmenia, Kirghizia and Tajikistan, to which in 1936, after the suppression of nomadism, Kazakhstan was added. Similar republics were set up in the Caucasus. Much emphasis was laid from the beginning on the theory that these were self-governing units on national lines, enjoying the privileges of self-determination. Each constituent republic had, and still has, the formal right even to secede, a right enshrined in Article 17 of the 1936 Constitution. To this right reference is often made in proof of the essential liberalism of Soviet policy. What is the true assessment?

Let us first examine Stalin's own writings. Stalin first stated that the indigenous peoples of Asia possessed no proletariat, which must therefore be set up with the aid of the Russian proletariat (speech to 12th Congress, April 23, 1923). From this first principle he proceeded as follows:

There are instances when the right of self-determination comes into conflict with the higher right—the right of the working class . . . the former must give

way to the latter. Nations have the right to preserve their national institutions . . . but that does not mean that the Party will not combat and agitate against the pernicious institutions of nations and their inexpedient demands. On the contrary it is the duty of the Party to conduct such agitation and to endeavour to influence the will of nations so that they may arrange their affairs in the way which will best suit the interests of the proletariat.

The national question is a subordinate question.\*

In plain words here is a doctrine enforced by the party on people without a proletariat, and overriding any right of secession. And of course it is well-worn ground that the real rulers everywhere are the Communist Party, and that the administration in each republic is on the standard Soviet pattern, geared to Moscow and bearing no trace of local tradition. It is usual to find the First or Second Secretary of each republic is a non-native, usually Russian, and the same applies to the vital office of Chairman of the Committee of State Security and many other key posts. The recent removal of the two highest ranking Tajiks from office in Tajikistan on grounds of "deviation" is a reminder that Stalin's principles are still observed in practice.

There is more to say. The people of the Central Asian republics have no control over their economies; they were not consulted over oil or coal extraction, or when it was decided to give over their land to cotton cultivation in place of food-crops—a policy which has on occasion brought famine to the land. They abut on foreign countries of the same Turco-Iranian stock, but are not allowed to have diplomatic or cultural relations with them. They have now no national armies, the Red Army being cantoned in their midst. There is a systematic campaign against their religion and even their languages. They speak varieties of Turkic and Persian; both have been regimented by means of a Cyrillic script, a Russian loan vocabulary and even grafts of Russian grammar and syntax. Higher education is impossible without a knowledge of Russian.

Mention of armies is a reminder that in the course of the last war some 250,000 men from the Asian republics deserted to the Germans in the hope that a new allegiance would bring them freedom from their "elder brother". They were organized in military formations by their new masters, thousands of them losing their lives at Stalingrad. The survivors were handed back after the Yalta Agreement, and their fate is unknown.

Finally, where in the Soviet empire are the Gandhis, the Jinnahs, the Nehrus, the Tunkus, the Nkrumahs? Where even is there a Makarios? The Maulvis accorded rank as Shaikh-al-Islam in Soviet Russia are mild bespectacled old men, who are allowed no part in the new organizations, social or political.

Yet the Russians have had extraordinary success in the face of facts in persuading others, and even their own segregated subjects, that they are free from all taints of colonialism. The dog has barked so persistently that its noise is taken for granted. "Imperialism" and "colonialism" come only in ships; the rigorous overland variety is never shown up. Perhaps this explains the strange twist by which Central Asian literature in Russian is today

\* *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, by J. Stalin, English edition, 1942.

obsessed by the subject of imaginary British ambitions in that region. The theme is that Russian conquest was justified on the ground that it saved Central Asia from the worse fate of domination by Britain. Even were this a fair deduction, the answer should be that, had Bukhara and Samarkand followed Peshawar into the British orbit, they would today be independent States. "As it is, how many realize that the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union, described as fully sovereign states, have never had, and show no prospect of ever having, any impact on international affairs whatever?"\*

Lest it be supposed that Stalin's treatment of the colonial question has been relegated to the past, and has given way to an enlightened policy of real freedom for the non-Russian peoples, one may refer to recent essays in multi-nationalism, much emphasized of late and evidently prompted by the fear of particularist nationalism and the evident contradictions between it and the universal State. A long article on the subject appeared in the *Vestnik* of the Leningrad University, no. 20 of 1960. The theme is an insistence on *sliyaniye*, or merging, as the ultimate aim of Communism in the Soviet Union. It is said that Lenin adopted the federal system only as a temporary measure with the reservation that the merging process would eventually make the self-determination of nationalities unnecessary. The article is written by I. Ya Kopylov, and the key sentences are here quoted:

It does not follow that Lenin considered federation to be the best and only form of state system. He was of opinion that where the opportunity to build a united centralized multi-national state on the basis of territorial autonomy exists, it is imperative to make use of it. [The author then cites Communist China, Vietnam and Czechoslovakia as examples of what he means.] At the same time . . . in our state it is necessary in every way possible to consolidate and develop federation as a transitional form of state system, aiming at an even closer unification of the working masses of different nations . . . a form which guarantees the strengthening of co-operation among the workers of different nations, their still closer unity, and their joining together in the future into a single whole.

Therefore the further consolidation of the Soviet federative state is at the present time the most important task confronting the C.C.S.U. and all Soviet people. And the Communist Party is coping successfully with this task. [The author proceeds to cite Khrushchev as behind this policy, and finishes with an example of that complete contradiction in terms which forms the staple of so much Communist writing, seeking to reconcile the irreconcilable by including contradictory concepts in a single sentence.] An example is the successful realization of the instructions of the C.P.S.U. These instructions concerned the further consolidation of the U.S.S.R. and, in particular, the carrying out by the Communist Party in the last few years of a string of measures devoted to the extension of the rights of the Union Republics—measures which have made vast contributions to the work of consolidating the Union of the S.S.R.

It stands to reason that no temporary political structure such as a national republic will be allowed to slip away from what is planned as a multi-

\* Wheeler, from article cited.



national unified State. The right of secession is so hedged round with qualifications that, even on paper, and rigorous suppression apart, everyone knows that it could never operate.

### Painting the Map Yellow

THE Chinese absorption of Tibet was the subject of a recent article in this journal,\* and it is unnecessary to repeat the story in detail here. It will be recalled that Chinese relations with Tibet date from about 1720 in the time of the Manchu Empire; they were dependent on an old State-and-Church nexus not unlike that which once existed between the Holy Roman Empire and the Papacy, the Dalai Lama acknowledging a distant temporal overlordship of the dynasty at Peking in return for the recognition of his local sacerdotal-cum-temporal claims in and around Lhasa itself. The Manchu Emperor never interfered with the Tibetan way of life and, although he gave the Tibetan ruler military assistance against outside aggression and maintained representatives in the Tibetan capital, he allowed the Dalai Lama to conduct his own administration of the country. This arrangement collapsed with the fall of the Manchu Empire in 1911, when Tibet in common with Mongolia, Nepal and certain other territories declared itself independent of the Chinese republican régime which followed the revolution. Mongolia with Russian—eventually Soviet—encouragement made good its independence, as did Nepal with British encouragement from India (Nepal's relations with China had never been more than tenuous; as a cis-Himalayan State it is included in the Indian world). Britain endeavoured to define the international status of Tibet by inducing republican China to agree to attend a tripartite conference in Simla in 1913, in which agreement was sought for a factual Tibetan autonomy under the Dalai Lama in return for a recognition by Tibet of China as a suzerain, who would not have any rights of administration or control in Tibet proper beyond the presence of a representative. The same convention also sought to lay down Tibet's frontiers, both towards China, and towards India along the Himalaya.

The Chinese declined to ratify this agreement, not on the constitutional ground of the relationship proposed to be set up between China and Tibet but because Peking would not accept the frontier proposed towards China. The other two parties to the conference, Britain and Tibet, thereupon signed the document together with a declaration to the effect that, so long as China withheld ratification, they for their part would not recognize her as entitled to claim any of the benefits (such as Tibetan recognition of suzerainty) to which she would have been entitled had her signature been forthcoming.

So much recital is necessary to establish Tibet's claim not to have been in the past an integral part of China. The practical result that followed in the field was that, while republican China never renounced her claim that Tibet was included in China, the Tibetans maintained a *de facto* and complete independence from 1911, the date of Manchu collapse, until 1950,

\* See "The Challenge of Tibet", in THE ROUND TABLE, no. 195, June 1959, pp. 218-32.

when a Communist Government, having been established in China, proceeded to make the conquest of Tibet its first objective. Since that date the Tibetans—under duress as the Dalai Lama declares—have made an agreement acknowledging their “liberation”\* by China; and India in 1954 followed suit by enshrining in a treaty with China an admission, never made before, that she regarded Tibet as an integral part of the Chinese dominion.

Three points may be taken from this account and stated as incontrovertible:

- (i) The Tibetan people are separate from the Chinese, ethnically, linguistically and historically. Chinese overlordship during the Manchu period down to 1911 never impinged on local autonomy or the Tibetan way of life.
- (ii) From 1911 to 1950 the Tibetans enjoyed complete *de facto* independence, recognized by Britain in a formal treaty and declaration.
- (iii) In 1950 Communist China invaded Tibet and compelled the Tibetan authorities in 1951 to acknowledge an “Agreement for the Liberation of Tibet”.

For nearly nine years the Dalai Lama remained in Lhasa, while the Chinese posted troops about the country, built roads, began the introduction of collectivist measures. Then in 1959 came the Tibetan revolt and the Dalai Lama's flight to sanctuary in India. The revolt still smoulders, and news comes through from the thousands of Tibetans who continue to cross the Himalaya to refuge in India. The Chinese occupation has been followed by encroachment at various points on India's Himalayan frontier, which has led to loss of life, and to large claims by China for thousands of square miles of mountain territory hitherto regarded by India as indisputably Indian (before China occupied Tibet she maintained cartographical claims which had never been taken seriously as being unenforceable). The result has been for the first time in history—save for a single Chinese expedition against Nepal in 1792—to bring China and India into direct geographical and political juxtaposition. Until 1950 a peaceful Tibet, the home of Mahayana Buddhism, had intervened.

### In the International Forum

THESE world movements have led to the deployment of Tibet's case against China before the United Nations and to a two-volume report on the whole subject by the International Commission of Jurists. Before the United Nations Tibet obtained 46 votes for, 9 against (the Communist States), and 26 abstentions. The United Kingdom was included in those abstaining. The resolution was in general terms condemning China for violation of human rights and was sponsored by Ireland and Malaya; it is irrelevant here to give the reasons for the British abstention. But it is to be hoped that when Tibet's case comes again before this forum it will be taken

\* “Liberated from whom?” is Mr. Nehru's comment.

on the more substantial ground of self-determination, and will avoid the juristic issue of the extent to which Tibet is an international entity and is, or is not, within the domestic jurisdiction of China.

A more realistic treatment has been accorded by the International Jurists' Commission who appointed an *ad hoc* committee to hear evidence, and have produced a lengthy report supported by a mass of evidence. Briefly the committee found:

- (i) That the Chinese had committed genocide against Tibetan Buddhists. They had set out to eradicate the faith, had killed religious figures and transferred Tibetan children to China to prevent their having a religious upbringing.
- (ii) That the Chinese had violated human rights in Tibet as laid down in sixteen separate Articles of the General Assembly's Declaration on this subject. They supported the finding by massive evidence of murder, rape, torture, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, and general suppression of freedom of thought, conscience, expression, assembly and religion.
- (iii) That Tibet was at the least a *de facto* independent State up to the time of the Communist conquest, and therefore was fully justified in repudiating the 1951 Agreement with China, on the ground that the Chinese had violated all the undertakings they had given thereunder.

The evidence and argument on which these findings are based covers over 200 closely printed pages.

The Secretary General of the I.C.J. (M. Lalive) concludes:

The events in Tibet, as shown in the findings of the committee, are in breach of what jurists everywhere would understand by the Rule of Law in its elemental meaning of a government of laws where human dignity is respected. . . . The only force at the Commission's disposal is the force of ideas; the only sanction which these findings possess is that same force of ideas. This force may or may not ultimately prevail, but it is with the conviction that it must be tried that this Report is presented.

There were nine jurists on the *ad hoc* committee, of whom seven were from Asia, one from Ghana and one from Norway. The Chairman and two others were eminent Indian Justices and Advocates.

The most superficial knowledge of Chinese history suggests that it may be seen as a succession of waves, each dynasty rising ruthlessly to a peak, before it falls in turmoil to be succeeded by another. The People's Government of China may best be seen as yet another dynasty determined in its early years to dash all obstacles aside and to roll onward as far as the Chinese tide has ever gone. During the period of British rule in India a breakwater was provided, with outer works behind which weak outposts could take shelter. That time is gone, and in the Tibetan tragedy we are seeing a frightening example of a pitiless expansionism on an old Asian model—a type of conquest which the word "empire" is too noble to match. We stand at a critical moment in history: on one side this reminder of the Mongol

hordes, on the other the well-tried and eclectic liberalism of India and other lands on Asia's seaboard. Which will prevail?

### Conclusion

**T**HIS article started with a premise that all is not well between the two giants, the U.S.S.R. and China. The Russian obsession with the dangers of nationalism gives a fair indication of where Soviet fears lie. The arrogance of the Russian claim to be the leader, spear-pointing and directing every movement, is likely to be matched by an equal and perhaps more patient Chinese arrogance, rooted in the thoughts of a people accustomed to regard all others as barbarian.

The Soviet colossus stands over the old North-West Frontier of India (now Pakistan) and its pressures are felt in all the lands around the Persian Gulf which are the free world's power-house. The millions of China now overhang, without barrier, the traditional Olympus of India and all the little States of South-East Asia, already colonized by many Chinese. The two giants meet somewhere on the Pamirs, close to Kashmir where India and Pakistan also meet. Both have been largely occupied with maintaining or extending their domination over other peoples just at a moment in history when the tide of the Western empires has ebbed. The time is coming when the new independent States of Asia and Africa must face the fact that their new status, won or in near prospect, is in danger from the rising tide of Russian and Chinese domination. This new power does not come over the sea in ships; it is not a champion of freedom, however fair its words.

The truth may not appear until, as seems likely, there comes a fundamental divergence of interest between the European and the Asian leader of the Communist world. That such differences are bound to come is a safe prophecy. For, national arrogance and interests apart, the end has not been seen of such matters as the Mongolian or the Manchurian questions.

Meanwhile it is for the uncommitted to help to expose the Communist assault on the "imperialists" as a smoke-screen and to see the truth. This is that both Russia and China are the most ruthless exponents of colonialism of all time. The beam is in the eye of both.

It is Jaya Prakash Narayan, the great Indian socialist and no mean prophet, who has said, in the Presidential Address already cited:

Mr. Nikita Khrushchev of Russia goes around the world impressing upon everyone that history was on his side and that communism was the ultimate destiny of mankind. The Russian leader does not realize how dated he has already become and how in his own country the human spirit is asserting itself and the faint rays of a new enlightenment have begun to pierce through the pervading darkness. History will soon prove that communism, instead of being the final flowering of human civilization, was a temporary aberration of the human mind, a brief nightmare to be soon forgotten. Communism, as it grew up in Russia and is growing up in China now, represented the darkness of the soul and imprisonment of the mind, colossal violence and injustice. Whoever thinks of the human race in these terms is condemning man to eternal perdition.



# SOUTH AFRICA DEPARTS

## FUTURE OF THE NEW REPUBLIC

THE announcement on the evening of March 15 that South Africa was OUT was received with shocked surprise which within hours turned to anger and within days to resentment. There was, almost literally, not a single person in South Africa who until that moment thought that the confused reports of the proceedings of the Prime Ministers' Conference were leading to this shattering climax.

The outcome of the republican referendum towards the end of the year had been accepted with varying degrees of reluctance, but it could be said that, among the white community at any rate, the electoral decision would not be challenged. The decision, it will be remembered, rests on a majority of 80,000 votes in an electorate enlarged by the inclusion of 18-year-old whites and reduced by the exclusion of coloured voters. This tiny and sectional majority determined the constitutional future of 15,000,000 people and was acceptable only because there was almost total certainty that the new republic would be safely within the Commonwealth. In other words, the republic was accepted because it was thought that not much more than a formal change was involved, that the Governor General would be changed to President but that in all essentials there would be no important difference between the South Africa of before and after May 31.

It can be asserted categorically that if the referendum had offered a choice between the *status quo* and a republic outside the Commonwealth, the republican proposal would have been devastatingly defeated. If there had even been a significant consciousness that the republican decision could be followed by exclusion from the Commonwealth, there is no doubt at all that Dr. Verwoerd would have been soundly defeated.

That was why surprise that such a thing could happen was followed by anger and resentment. In the course of the interminable post-mortem examination now being conducted inside and outside Parliament there is much analysing of pre-referendum speeches and much assessment of the meaning of qualifying phrases. There is not much profit in examining the point in detail, for there is no doubt that the impression was created—whatever may or may not have been the precise words of government spokesmen—that continued membership was assured. Throughout the campaign Sir De Villiers Graaff, the leader of the Opposition, emphasized that the republican move was fraught with the risk of exclusion from the Commonwealth. The unanimous retort of government speakers was that Sir De Villiers's fears were unfounded; as these extracts from ministerial speeches indicate.

DR. VERWOERD: "I know we are not putting our membership in jeopardy."

DR. DONGES: "There is no question of South Africa's having to make application for re-admission to the Commonwealth. . . . South Africa could not be expelled from the Commonwealth."



MR. FOUCHE: "To him, the English-speaking person, I want to say: 'Leave your monarchy and I assure you you will remain in the Commonwealth'."

MR. VORSTER: "It is clear that remaining in the Commonwealth has become a pure formality."

MR. SAUER: . . . gave the assurance that the republic would remain in the Commonwealth.

In addition Dr. Verwoerd, in a personal letter to the electors in the referendum, started off: "Dear Friend, A democratic republic within the Commonwealth . . . deserves support."

The effect, if not the intention, of this electioneering was to give the impression that continued membership was a foregone conclusion.

### The Reaction

IN broad outline it can be said that the news of our exclusion was received with pleasure by a small and not very significant group of Nationalists; with real anxiety by the large number of Nationalists; with a feeling of deep distress and bereavement by the English-speaking section; and with mixed feelings by most of the non-white inhabitants.

The existence of a small Nationalist group, centred chiefly on the Transvaal, who for years have been talking of a "really free" republic outside the Commonwealth, led almost inevitably to the suggestion that Dr. Verwoerd went to London with a very accurate appreciation of the situation and knew (and welcomed) that the inevitable result must be exclusion. Force was given to this interpretation by some curious words used by the Prime Minister on his return to South Africa—something about the exclusion as being a "miracle". Dr. Verwoerd later explained that what he was really talking about was the "miracle" that South Africa could be out of the Commonwealth and still retain the friendship of Great Britain. The suggestion that Dr. Verwoerd grossly over-called his hand was supported by some responsible Opposition politicians, but can be regarded as disposed of as a result of an incident in Parliament. This arose when Sir De Villiers Graaff (who, it is common knowledge, did much behind the scenes in London to press South Africa's continued membership) was accused by a government backbencher of having worked secretly for South Africa's exclusion. He demanded a privilege committee to investigate the attack on his personal honour, and in the discussion Dr. Verwoerd acknowledged Graaff's services and the backbencher apologized. Sir De Villiers in return accepted categorically that the Prime Minister had not gone to London with the deliberate intention of getting South Africa out of the Commonwealth. This acceptance of the Prime Minister's good faith did not modify the force of Graaff's general attack, which was that Dr. Verwoerd should have known what he was up against and should not have gambled recklessly with the country's future on the strength of a narrow and sectional referendum majority.

The general Nationalist anxiety comes from an assessment of the external and internal position. Externally, it was rude evidence of South Africa's isolation in the world, an isolation which they know does not mean insulation. Internally, the jubilation of the extremer elements among the

non-whites has been noted, and many Nationalists genuinely deplore the set-back to Afrikaner-English relations and the set-back to the republican ideal which until March 15 had shown some promise of being accepted by the English-speaking section.

Although not very articulate the sense of bereavement of the English-speaking section is very real. The cultural and sentimental ties with Britain have always been strong and if anything have tended to become stronger with the rise of Afrikaner political domination. In addition, the physical ties are numerous and very close—many South Africans have British relatives and many more have British friends, they go to Britain for holidays, their children go there to work and study, their business associations are numerous and intimate. The cutting of the formal relationship leaves a sentimental and emotional gap and to this is added concern for practical matters like nationality, passports, scholarships and the like.

The reaction of the more extreme articulate non-white opinion was immediate and unmistakable. South Africa's exclusion was welcomed by this section, in spite of the letter of the Archbishop of Cape Town in *The Times* urging that South Africa should not be expelled. The Archbishop, a warm friend of the non-white people, argued that most non-white South Africans were against exclusion because of the hardening of opinion against them to which this could lead on the part of the white people, but some non-white spokesmen declared roundly that exclusion demonstrated the strength of Commonwealth opposition to race discrimination and, by isolating and further weakening South Africa, would bring nearer the day when a fundamental constitutional, political and social change would be brought about.

Since there is no trustworthy method of ascertaining non-white opinion in South Africa, it is difficult to know to what extent this opinion is representative. Many observers are convinced that the majority of the non-white people, particularly the coloured people, share in general the reaction of the non-Nationalist sections of the white people.

### A New Realism

THE break with the Commonwealth has had one marked effect, which is to make all South Africans of all political opinions realize as never before the part played by race policy in our affairs. It is generally accepted that we were excluded from the Commonwealth because of race discrimination, that our entire international position is a function of our race policy and that any escape from isolation is dependent either on a change in our race policy or on gaining some moral and intellectual support for it. This might seem to be a statement of the obvious, but until the emphasis given by the London Conference many South Africans found an explanation for external enmity in suggestions of anti-Afrikanerism, Communist machinations, British traditional hostility and the like.

The result has been a hardening of the formal lines of policy in all the recognized political parties and of the political opinions represented by the non-white groups.

Dr. Verwoerd for the Nationalists has reiterated his "granite wall" attitude.

His party is as firmly committed as ever before to the doctrine that the Africans must find their political expression and ultimately their political independence in their own geographically defined areas. He feels that the slightest relaxation, the appearance of the smallest hole in the wall of the dike, will be followed by a flood which will overwhelm the white man.

This inflexibility is taken to its logical conclusion and Dr. Verwoerd has firmly rejected tentative suggestions from some of his own followers for immediate extension of political rights to, for instance, the coloured people.

The United Party has developed its ideas to what is loosely called a "racial federation". This is a proposal (a) to give all races a share in government; (b) to protect the rights of groups and geographical units by the introduction of federal elements into the constitution; and (c) the grouping of the preponderantly white and preponderantly black areas as political units for administrative purposes. The Progressive Party, within the framework of a federal constitution and with safeguards of the type of a Bill of Rights, proposes the elimination in principle of racial discrimination. The non-whites are formulating demands for a fully representative National Convention which would be charged with producing a constitution based on universal suffrage.

In form, therefore, the break with the Commonwealth has had the result of hardening controversy on pre-existing lines; but it has also brought an intensified sense of urgency to the whole debate. And perhaps below the surface there can be detected a new tendency to find points of agreement and, on the part of some Nationalists, a plea for "adaptability" and for a real attempt to translate the principles of theoretical *apartheid* into facts and figures which will convince the world of Nationalist sincerity and political morality.

The big question mark left by the London conference is whether the shock which was then administered will galvanize this country into a fundamental change in racial thinking and whether this change is possible without a radical reformation of the present parliamentary alignment. Although the shock was administered from outside, the stimulus to rethinking is coming from the realization of the gravity of the internal situation. There is little hope expressed anywhere that South Africa's return to the Commonwealth is a matter of practical politics. Before March 15 it was probable that a colour policy on the lines of the United Party's would have been liberal enough to keep us in. It is accepted today that a policy as advanced as the Progressive Party's will be insufficient to get us readmitted.

### The Consequences

IT is difficult to be informative at this stage about the consequences of South Africa's withdrawal. On the one flank Dr. Verwoerd is expressing the hope that South Africa will have the substance if not the form of Commonwealth relationship and that ties of friendship with Britain in particular might even be strengthened. On the other flank Mr. Duncan Sandys has said flatly that South Africa cannot expect to be treated like Eire, and African leaders like Tom Mboya are saying that to continue to grant South Africa the

benefits of Commonwealth preference would be to undo the "good work" done at the London conference. What will actually happen must await negotiations between Britain and South Africa, which will be conducted in the breathing-space provided by standstill Bills which will be passed by both countries. For the purpose of this survey nothing much more can be done than to indicate the subjects which are affected:

*United Nations.* There is evidence that South Africa's isolation has come as something of a "shot in the arm" for South Africa's opponents at United Nations. South Africa for years has been under continuous fire from three batteries—South-West Africa, *apartheid* and the treatment of South African Indians. We have been fighting a rearguard and losing battle all these years; but within a week or so of the London Conference a General Assembly resolution on *apartheid*, in fairly menacing terms, was adopted by 95 votes to one (Portugal). The significant development was that for the first time Britain and Australia voted instead of abstaining. Dr. Verwoerd has claimed that this change is independent of the events in London; but while there is some evidence that this might be so as far as South-West Africa is concerned, a vote against *apartheid* with the implied rejection of the clause prohibiting interference with a member's domestic affairs seems a new development. South Africa's position at United Nations, particularly on the issue of South-West Africa, is critical and is likely to demonstrate in the most striking form the diplomatic weakening which is an obvious consequence of formal severance from our friends of the Commonwealth.

*British nationality* is likely to be the matter of the most practical importance. South Africans have enjoyed British nationality by virtue of Commonwealth citizenship and all this means in the way of easy entry into Britain, the protection of British diplomatic and consular services and so on.

*Defence* poses a number of questions. Does the South African Government contemplate that the army, navy and air force shall operate alone? What is the future of the Simonstown Agreement, at present formalized only in an exchange of letters? Where will weapons come from? The South African Government's allegiance in the cold war is beyond question, but what will be the international opinion of South Africa's stability in the event of trouble? Will South Africa continue to be kept in the international military picture? What strategic information are we likely to get?

*The Protectorates.* The Prime Minister at one time indicated that one of the defects of Commonwealth membership is that certain non-Europeans can enter the Union as of right. Bechuanaland, with an outlet to Rhodesia, and Swaziland with an outlet to Mozambique, are possibly viable territories but Basutoland is in an exposed position and largely dependent on the Union for economic existence.

*Diplomatic contact.* The Commonwealth High Commissioners will presumably become Ambassadors, and whether they fall under the Commonwealth Relations Office or the Foreign Office does not seem to be important. But will South Africa continue to be represented by the British diplomatic service in those many areas where we do not have our own representatives?



*Commonwealth trade.* All the significant trade arrangements are governed by bilateral agreements which are independent of Commonwealth membership. But this does not mean that these agreements cannot be changed. Some of South Africa's keenest competitors in the British market are Commonwealth countries like Australia and the West Indies, and in the ordinary course of politics it is doubtful whether trade rivals will tolerate favoured treatment for a competitor who is not even in the Commonwealth.

*Gold.* Experts seem to be of the opinion that there need be no change under this important head.

*Scholarships.* South Africa derives considerable benefit from institutions like London House and William Goodenough House, and would have benefited from the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan, an enterprise on government level which involves 500 students a year. Allied with this is the question of reciprocal recognition of qualifications for doctors, architects and accountants. South Africa has derived great advantage from the Commonwealth Press Union\* and the outstanding achievement of that body, the Commonwealth penny press rate.

The answers to the questions under most of these heads lie in the future measured by the life of the standstill Bills. The answer to more fundamental questions depends on whether the stimulation of mental activity by surprise and shock will be followed by action in the field of race policy. For the moment it can be said that there is little sign of the wide changes in political allegiance which could be expected to follow an event of this magnitude. We are probably in a state of uneasy equilibrium—the tendency for Afrikaans- and English-speaking people to get closer together to face menace from without is probably balanced by a conviction that South Africa can only retrieve international and Commonwealth respectability by getting rid of Dr. Verwoerd's Nationalist Government.

\* The Council of the Commonwealth Press Union, on which THE ROUND TABLE is represented, has reluctantly concluded that its Articles of Association preclude the Union from permitting the continued membership of newspapers outside the Commonwealth. There is hope, however, of maintaining some measure of co-operation with the South African press.—*Editor.*

South Africa,  
May 1961.



# LAOS DISPUTED

## HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF A SCHISM

WHEN the French explorers Lagrée and Garnier ascended the Mekong from Cochin-China in 1866 the kingdom of Laos was indeed the "back of beyond": a thinly inhabited inland country hidden away behind Siam and Cambodia and divided from Annam (the modern Vietnam) by a jungle-clad mountain range. It could hardly then have been foreseen by anyone that it was destined to become within less than a century a storm-centre of world-affairs. Its acquisition as a protectorate by the French was a mere afterthought to the French empire-building in Vietnam and Cambodia, designed to round off the French territorial domain in Indo-China with a frontier along the Mekong. At the time of the creation of the French protectorate Laos had already virtually lost its independence; it had been a weak buffer State between Vietnam and Siam, but the Siamese had taken advantage of the weakening of Vietnam through the latter's defeats by France, and of a Laotian appeal for help against bands of freebooters from China called the Ho, to send troops into Laos and bring it under the control of Bangkok. The French compelled the Siamese to withdraw in 1893 and substituted their own influence over the Laotian monarchy, which had its capital at Luang Prabang in the extreme north-west and exercised a very loose authority over a number of semi-independent principalities in the centre and south of the country.

By language and traditional culture the Laotians are closely akin to the Siamese and to the Shans of Burma; indeed, on the principles of nationality prevailing in the modern world it would be quite natural for all these three peoples to unite in one State, and certainly the incorporation of Laos in Siam, which was prevented by the French, would have been ethnically a more suitable development than its close association in the French-constituted Union of Indo-China with Vietnam, a nation of entirely different antecedents. Within this Union Laos retained its own monarchy, but this was subject to the authority of a French Resident, who was subordinate to the Governor General of Indo-China, and the country was more and more integrated with Vietnam and Cambodia by French administrative and economic policies. As long as the French maintained an unchecked colonial rule, all the three nations were equally subject to it, but as soon as there was any prospect of self-government in Indo-China, the Cambodians and Laotians, both relatively sparse and economically backward peoples, found themselves in danger of being dominated by the more numerous and efficient Vietnamese. Nationalism, therefore, in Cambodia and Laos, when it finally emerged—and it was still very weak at the time of the outbreak of the Pacific war—sought independence not only from France, but also from Vietnam, even at the cost of disrupting the unity of administration, customs area and communications which the French had built up. As in India, there was with the departure of the French not only transfer of power,

but also partition. Laos under its king regained its independence, but it was as a very weak and poor country that it entered the world of international politics as a recognized sovereign State.

It entered in fact with something less than complete sovereignty because two of its provinces were not under the authority of its government, but were held by rebels supported from outside its frontier. During the long struggle between the French and the Communist-led Vietminh forces in Vietnam—which went on from 1946 to 1954—Vietminh guerrilla forces crossed the mountains from Tongking into Laos and were joined by a Laotian left-wing faction which called itself the Pathet Lao. The Pathet Lao, though originally an extreme nationalist rather than a Communist organization, was brought, like the Vietminh itself, under Communist direction, and its followers were indoctrinated along Marxist-Leninist lines; they were also instructed in the technique of guerrilla warfare which the Vietminh had learned from the Chinese Communists. When the Geneva conference in the spring of 1954 brought about a termination of the war in Indo-China, this could only be on the basis of the existing military situation. The French had just sustained the major disaster of Dien Bien Phu and were in no position to demand the withdrawal of the Vietminh from any territory it held; the most that could be obtained was a “regrouping”, whereby forces on both sides which had been mixed up with each other in a war with definite “fronts” were sorted out and concentrated in specified areas. In Vietnam this meant partition of the country into two separate States, each with its own Government and political system, the Vietminh holding Hanoi and the North, while a new independent anti-Communist régime, taking over from the French, held Saigon and the South. Provision was made in the Geneva agreement for elections to be held within two years to produce a single Parliament and Government for the whole of Vietnam, but the South refused to hold the elections on the ground that the North, with a larger population and a completely totalitarian political order, would have an automatic majority. The two States have thus, as in Korea and as also in Germany, continued to exist, dividing the nation in mutual enmity but without further open armed hostilities; each State has considerable economic resources and port facilities and can be regarded as viable given economic aid from outside, which has been given to North Vietnam by Russia and China and to South Vietnam by the United States. Each army has obtained military training and equipment from the appropriate source.

### Regrouping

THE development in Laos has been different because, although the original situation there was very similar, there has never until recently been any recognition of the existence of separate governments there. By the “regrouping” agreed on at the Geneva Conference, Vietminh forces were to be withdrawn from Laos, but the Pathet Lao were to retain their armed units and local administration in the two provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua on the Vietnam border. As in Vietnam, elections were to be held later to resolve the political issue. The situation in Laos after the armistice differed

from that in Vietnam, in that the Pathet Lao did not have the resources possessed by the Vietminh for setting up a revolutionary political régime. In Vietnam the city of Hanoi, one of the two largest in Indo-China, was handed over to the Vietminh together with the port of Haiphong and the rich plain of the Red River delta, so that the Vietminh were able to organize their Government with all the accessories of an independent State, even though South Vietnam was not yet under their control. The Pathet Lao, on the other hand, was not in a position to play the part of a separate State. The territory they controlled consisted mainly of mountain and jungle and they held no large town. In 1950 the newly formed Chinese People's Republic had given formal diplomatic recognition to the Vietminh régime under the title of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Soviet Union had followed almost immediately afterwards. The Western Powers subsequently recognized the Government formed in Saigon under Ngo Din Diem, so that both the North Vietnam and South Vietnam Governments had diplomatic recognition from groups of foreign nations. No such recognition, however, had been given by the Communist block to the Pathet Lao, so that the revolt could still be regarded as an internal affair of Laos in which Moscow and Peking were not formally committed to support of a Communist régime.

Laos was nevertheless faced with the task of somehow integrating the Pathet Lao into a unified civil and military state administration, and this proved to be easier said than done. After a year of intermittent fighting, a truce was arranged in October 1955 with a view to holding the elections promised in the Geneva agreement, but there was a deadlock over electoral procedure, and the elections could only be held in the areas controlled by the Government. In the end, however, a pact was made with the Pathet Lao whereby they were free to enter parliamentary politics throughout Laos as a party under the name of the Neo Lao Haksat while a body of their troops was to be incorporated in the Laotian regular army. But the incorporation did not work; the Pathet Lao troops tried to perpetuate their own distinct organization and loyalties within the national army; finally they mutinied and fled back into the jungle, taking their new equipment with them. Civil war was thus renewed in Laos and the Pathet Lao rebels again received supplies from across the border of North Vietnam, but until the *coup d'état* of Captain Kong Lae in August 1960 it did not appear that the new revolt was likely to be more than a nuisance to the Laotian Government.

### Diplomacy of SEATO

LAOS had been prohibited by the Geneva agreement from entering into foreign military alliances; on the other hand, the SEATO group of Powers formed after the Geneva Conference by Britain, France and the United States, and including Siam, declared its intention to aid Laos if it should be the victim of external aggression. France was, moreover, allowed to retain for the time being a small garrison in Laos and perform the task of training a Laotian regular army, which had not existed as long as Laos

was under French rule. But France tended to lose interest in Laos once French authority in Vietnam had been brought to an end; moreover, the new war in North Africa began to absorb all the surplus military energies of France, so that neither instructors nor equipment could be found for Laos. The function of training the Laotian army was therefore transferred to the United States, and Americans replaced Frenchmen in Vientiane, the town which the French had made the administrative capital of Laos in preference to the more remote and inconvenient Luang Prabang, where the King continued to reside. The change from French to American influence, however, had the effect of intensifying the international tensions converging on Laos, particularly with regard to China. The Chinese, under both the Kuomintang and Communist régimes, had been hostile to French power in Indo-China, and the material aid from China had been decisive in bringing about the great French defeat at Dien Bien Phu; the French, however, were regarded as a colonial Power on its way out, and a small residue of their former presence in Laos could not cause any alarm in Peking. It was different with the Americans, who figured as the great adversary of Communist China and already had alliances with Japan, South Korea and the Chinese Nationalist régime in Formosa. Whether or not Laos had a formal alliance with the United States, a preponderance of American influence there would mean that the United States would have an outpost on China's southern land frontier—which Laos touches for a short distance—hitherto covered by the Communist possession of North Vietnam and the neutralism of Burma. From the American point of view, on the other hand, it was essential to build up Laos against Pathet Lao subversion, for if Laos succumbed, Communist power would be established directly on the northern and eastern borders of Siam, while to the south it would be in contact with Cambodia and outflank the defensive strategic position of South Vietnam as established by the 1954 armistice. A genuinely neutral Laos would probably have been acceptable to Washington as a buffer State covering the approaches to Siam, Cambodia and South Vietnam; but how to ensure the stability of Laos as a buffer except by making it strong enough to suppress a persistent Communist insurrection? Yet the endeavour to do this inevitably drew Laos into the American orbit and enabled the Communists to rally support both locally and internationally under the banner of neutralism.

Communist China refrained from any overt intervention in the affairs of Laos and appears throughout to have preferred to let Ho Chi Minh and the North Vietnam Government play the hand there. The Vietminh retained close connexions with the Pathet Lao, which it had originally sponsored and built up. On the other hand, quite apart from the French or American concern with Laos, Siam had a most lively interest in what went on there. Geographically as well as ethnically, Laos was inclined towards Siam rather than towards Vietnam or China; Vientiane was on the Mekong within sight of Siamese territory on the other side of the river, and the bulk of the relatively sparse population of Laos lived on or near the Mekong and not in the highlands towards the Vietnam frontier. A number of leading Laotians had Siamese family connexions, including General Phoumi Novasan who



emerged as the most important figure in Laos on the anti-Communist side. In Bangkok it was feared that a Communist revolution in Laos would have serious repercussions in Siam, and Siamese influence in Vientiane was exerted to strengthen the will of the Laotian Government to crush the Pathet Lao.

Disaffection, however, developed within the new Laotian army. It is still not clear what exactly were the grievances that led to the mutiny in August of last year of the parachutist force in Vientiane led by Captain Kong Lae, nor is it certain whether he was already working in concert with the Communists; the ostensible aim of the mutineers was to restore Laos to its proper neutrality which had been compromised by the acceptance of American military aid. To realize this policy the mutineers set up a new Government headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma, the half-brother of Prince Souvanna Vong, the titular leader of the Pathet Lao. The National Assembly, meeting in Vientiane under the guns of the mutinous garrison, confirmed the appointment, which was also accepted by the King. But meanwhile General Phoumi Novasan had rallied a body of troops in southern Laos to oppose the new Government, and Siam gave him indirect support by an embargo on trade with Vientiane, which depended economically on communications through Siamese territory. General Phoumi persuaded Prince Boun Oum, an influential personage in southern Laos, to head a rival Government which he set up in the town of Savannakhet, some 300 miles down the Mekong from Vientiane. A majority of the members of the National Assembly gathered in Savannakhet and confirmed the nomination of Prince Boun Oum as Prime Minister. General Phoumi's troops now advanced on Vientiane and captured it after some hard fighting. Prince Souvanna Phouma and several of his Ministers fled by air to Cambodia, while Captain Kong Lae and his followers openly came out on the side of the Pathet Lao and moved north to join them in their mountain strongholds.

### Moscow Intervenes

FOR the moment it seemed as if the anti-Communist cause had been victorious in Laos in spite of the anti-Siamese and anti-American swing of policy produced by the Kong Lae mutiny. But the Soviet Union now began to take a hand in the game. Prince Souvanna Phouma, soon after forming his Cabinet, had entered into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and received a Soviet promise of economic aid for Laos. After the Souvanna Phouma Government was overthrown, the Soviet Union continued to recognize it as the legal government of Laos and declared Boun Oum to be a usurper, regardless of the fact that Souvanna Phouma likewise had come to power through an act of military force. This claim to be supporting a legitimate government put the Soviet Union in a much stronger position politically than if it had been openly backing the Pathet Lao insurrection. In fact, however, Souvanna Phouma in exile in Cambodia no longer had any authority in Laos, and in rendering economic aid to Laos (which took the form almost exclusively of military supplies) the Soviet Union now dealt



directly with the Pathet Lao leaders, whose forces had been merged with the remnant of Kong Lae's mutineers. By the end of the year a massive Russian airlift through China had been organized to give support to the Communist cause in Laos.

The moment was internationally significant because of the stage which had been reached in relations between Moscow and Peking. The bitter ideological controversy between the two leading Communist Powers, which had been carried on since April of 1960, was finally brought to debate before the assembled representatives of all the Communist Parties of the world behind closed doors in Moscow in November.\* The Soviet Union was able to muster a majority in support of its policies but had to make certain concessions to Chinese pressure, and the agreed declaration which was published after nearly three weeks of wrangling qualified its endorsement of "peaceful co-existence" with some very militant revolutionary language. Russia had in effect been accused by China of betraying the cause of international Communism in order to bring off deals with capitalist countries, and it had become expedient for Khrushchev to take some action which would demonstrate to Communists all over the world, and to the Chinese in particular, that the heirs of the October Revolution had not lost their zeal for the advancement of the Communist cause if it could be done on a respectable pretext and without risk of a major war. Laos offered an excellent opportunity for such action. Remote from the frontiers of the Soviet Union, it was of direct concern, not to the Soviet Union, but to China; on the other hand, in view of the state of Chinese-American relations and China's lack of nuclear armaments, open Chinese Communist intervention in Laos might well bring the American reprisals against China which had been threatened at the time of the siege of Dien Bien Phu. The Soviet Union by contrast, as a great nuclear Power, had no need to fear American retaliation except on an issue far more vital to America than Laos, and could thus undertake an enterprise which would both increase Soviet prestige and put China under an obligation at the same time. The Soviet airlift operated from Chinese bases and some of the material transported was of Chinese origin, but the aircraft and their pilots were Russian.

#### Dilemma for the West

AS the civil war in Laos continued, with the scales tilting against the Boun Oum Government, the SEATO nations had to make up their minds whether to take any action to prevent a Pathet Lao victory. The United States could continue to furnish arms, equipment and training to the Laotian national army, but after the disruption which had already taken place—Kong Lae's men had been American-trained—it appeared doubtful whether this would any longer be sufficient. The possibility of intervention by SEATO forces came under consideration; the American Government was reported to be in favour of it as a last resort to prevent the capture of Vientiane or Luang Prabang by the Pathet Lao, but to be opposed by the British and French Governments, who feared involvement in a repetition

\* See THE ROUND TABLE No. 262, March 1961, pp. 151-3.

of the Korean war of 1950-53. The use of Siamese troops only was also contemplated, but there was doubt whether the Siamese without American reinforcement would be strong enough to overcome the Pathet Lao and their defeat might lead to a collapse within Siam itself.

The alternative to armed intervention and counter-intervention in the Laotian civil war by the Western and Communist power blocks was negotiation between the latter for a diplomatic settlement. The nature of the settlement, however, would necessarily depend not so much on argument at a conference table as on the fortunes of war in Laos itself and the relative strength of the parties at the time the settlement was made. A cease-fire in the civil war was obviously a desirable preliminary to a conference, but it was in the interest of whichever side was winning to delay the cease-fire as long as possible, so as to obtain the best possible bargaining position for the negotiation. The successes of the Pathet Lao rendered them and their Russian and Chinese backers reluctant to agree to a truce, or to put one into effect, until further gains had been made. The Western Powers, on the other hand, were eager to arrange a truce because further decline in the military position in Laos threatened to face them with a dilemma between either undertaking a direct military intervention—on which they could not agree among themselves—or letting the Pathet Lao obtain total victory, which would leave nothing to negotiate about. In this situation the chances for the Western Powers to avert a complete disaster in Laos depended first on the extent to which they could bolster up the resistance of the Laotian Government forces with supplies of arms and technical assistance, and secondly on the degree to which they could persuade Russia and China that in spite of their hesitations they might intervene if they were pushed too far. To some extent also the attitude of Moscow might be affected by the desire to make a favourable impression on world opinion; an absolute refusal to join in working for a cease-fire in Laos might be too flagrantly in contradiction of the principle of peaceful co-existence proclaimed in all Soviet propaganda.

Suitable diplomatic machinery for a negotiated settlement was ready to hand, for the international status of Laos had been established by the decisions of the Geneva Conference, of which Britain and Russia had been co-chairmen, and the conference had set up a commission composed of representatives of India, Canada and Poland to supervise the armistice in Laos as well as in Vietnam and Cambodia. The Laotian Government in 1958 had refused any longer to grant inspection facilities to the commission on the ground that there was no longer any need for it—in fact because, it was alleged, the Polish member of the commission had been acting as a contact man for the local Communists. The commission, however, remained legally in being, and could be reactivated. The British Government therefore approached Russia with a diplomatic initiative for a settlement in three stages: first, a cease-fire to be imposed on the contending parties in Laos by the joint recommendation of Britain and Russia; second, the verification and supervision of the truce by the revived armistice commission of Indian, Canadian and Polish representatives; and third, a conference to be attended by all the Great Powers, including Communist China, by the three nations represented on

the armistice commission, and by all the neighbours of Laos—North and South Vietnam, Cambodia, Siam and Burma.

### The Problem of Legitimacy

ALL this left open, however, the question who was to represent Laos itself. The Communist States, as already mentioned, refused to recognize the Government of Prince Boun Oum, which was actually installed in the capital, and maintained that the only legal Government was that of Souvanna Phouma in exile in Cambodia. But since Souvanna Phouma had originally taken office, not as a Communist partisan, but as a neutralist, and since President Kennedy had declared that the United States accepted the idea of a neutralized Laos, it appeared that he was the right person to head a new coalition Government which would be acceptable to both sides. He was invited to come to Paris and London and it was agreed that he should also go to Moscow and Washington to discuss possible solutions of the Laotian problem. At first he kept up an appearance of neutrality in the international cold war, but as the Pathet Lao continued to advance in Laos, he threw in his lot definitely with the Communist camp, cancelled his visit to Washington on the pretext that the Secretary of State would not receive him on the date he proposed, endorsed a violently anti-American declaration on Cuba, and went to Peking, whence he returned to Laos across the Chinese frontier and set up his Government afresh in a town under the control of the Pathet Lao as their acknowledged leader. It is still a matter for speculation whether Souvanna Phouma was already secretly committed to the Communist side before he set out on his tour of Europe, or whether he only made up in his mind to go over when he became convinced that the Pathet Lao were winning and that there would be no Western intervention against them. Whatever his calculations or motives, his return to Laos as the figurehead of a Communist-controlled régime meant that there were henceforth two rival governments, one Communist and the other anti-Communist, on Laotian territory, just as there were in Vietnam, China, Korea and Germany, and that the Western Powers, or at least Britain and France, had put themselves in an embarrassing position for future negotiation by according him a quasi-recognition. At the time of writing, a cease-fire appears after long delay to have been arranged in Laos, but the conference has yet to meet, and it remains to be seen whether the diplomacy of the Western Powers will be able to obtain anything better than legalization of a Communist preponderance in Laos behind a façade of neutrality and coalition government. What has happened in Laos has been the partial, if not yet complete, Communist capture of a very "under-developed" Asian country by an extremely skilful operation making use of all local internal discontents and counting on the reluctance of the West to proceed to measures of armed intervention.

# WASHINGTON'S SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURS

## LATIN AMERICA AND THE KENNEDY RÉGIME

UNITED STATES relations with Latin America reached a nadir toward the end of the Eisenhower Administration. The most overt and striking reflection of the failure of American policy was the break of diplomatic relations with Cuba. It caught the attention of an angry United States Congress and surprised an unaware American public opinion. But a growing anti-American feeling had been churning under the surface throughout Latin America for some years and it was surprising to find, on a recent visit to that hemisphere, how deep-rooted it had become.

Basically it is due to a realization, which has spread around the globe since World War II, that every country is entitled to what is called today "economic growth". There is a "growth-rate" race in the world, and Latin America began to feel that it was not holding its own in this race and blamed the United States for it. First, Latin Americans watched with envy the huge sums that Washington injected into the European economies under the Marshall plan; later it became jealous of the attention that was paid to countries in Asia, such as India, Pakistan and Thailand; and now it is Africa that seems to have become the centre of interest in the United States. "Look how much money the United States wasted in Laos, for instance," the visitor was frequently reminded.

Actually the figures show that Latin America has enjoyed a period of unprecedented growth since World War II, that its growth rate in terms of total output has been higher than that in the United States and Canada, but lower than the expansion that has taken place within the Soviet block. And the rate of capital formation has also been high, at least high for low-income countries. But statistics, as Roberto Campos the leading Brazilian economist says, are like bikinis: they reveal the interesting parts, but conceal the essentials, and they no doubt look better in comparison to those of such highly developed countries as the United States or Canada because of initially low standards from which these countries are trying to pull themselves up. Also there are definite indications that during the last four years economic growth, instead of improving, has slowed down and stagnation has set in. Inflation, the drop in coffee prices, the withdrawal of foreign capital from Venezuela, the neglect of agriculture and the lack of expert skill in economic management, are all contributing factors to this decline. Latin Americans, whose self-confidence is on the increase, are blaming the United States for this.

"Underdeveloped countries have a right to be irrational", I heard many leading statesmen say in this or another form, but they would probably be more introspective if the United States had shown greater sensitivity towards



their inferiority complexes, which are very similar to those one finds in any former colonial territory. These leaders are very well aware that the United States is the deciding factor, but they want at least an outward appearance of equality in consultations. From Honduras to Argentina one heard the complaint that whenever important decisions were involved, such as the economic development programme or the order to the United States Fleet to patrol the waters between Cuba and Guatemala, there was usually no advance consultation.

Another complaint was that the United States was pursuing a policy which fundamentally was designed to preserve the *status quo nunc*, that it did not approve of reforms that could be considered socialistic. As an illustration Dr. Paz, the President of Bolivia, mentioned the refusal of the Government of the U.S.A. to finance the rehabilitation of the nationalized tin mines, at least until the Soviet Government offered to do the job. The fact that the United States under the pressure of a Soviet loan reversed its stand did not bring it any kudos with the Bolivians; for they felt that they had been given the money, not for their sake, but to keep the Soviet Union at bay.

### The Cuban Revolution

AND then there is, of course, American policy toward Cuba. This is mentioned after the above points because of a conviction that the effect of the Cuban revolution on Latin America has been exaggerated. For Mr. Khrushchev the rise of Castro, of course, came like manna from heaven. He had not paid much attention to Latin American affairs till then; it had only been a subsidiary front for his agents. But now that Cuba has fallen into his lap, he obviously sees new and tempting opportunities to exploit the American predicament and to pursue one of his fondest aims: the turning of the imperialist rear into an anti-imperialist front.

The Cuban revolution has given the Communists a much-needed vehicle and they are beginning to exploit it wherever possible. In Central America, which is closest to Cuba, it has had its impact. Central America is a century behind the rest of Latin America. But in general it is surprising how relatively little progress Communism has made so far on the ground, considering its opportunities.

The Communist capture of Cuba created a new mood. It has shown to the Latin Americans that the United States is in a predicament that they can exploit, it has forced all the governments to think more actively about reforms in the social and economic fields, and it has engendered certain resentment about American pressure to force Latin America to take collective actions against Cuba. A policy of sanctions never succeeded in the League of Nations, it foundered in the United Nations and it also failed in the Organization of American States. The United States by applying pressure to isolate Cuba created opposition even among those who would have liked to demonstrate their anti-Communist sentiments, but who could not afford to admit that they are acting under American pressure. Only seven small countries have broken relations with Cuba, namely, the Dominican Republic,



El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru. The others refused to do it, partly because they consider this a quarrel between Cuba and the United States and partly because it gives them a welcome opportunity to show their independence of the United States. Fear of serious Communist protest moves have probably only influenced the governments of Venezuela and Bolivia in their refusal to follow the American example, though both presidents, Dr. Betancourt and Dr. Paz, are openly anti-Castro.

A newspaper proprietor who considered himself to be a friend of Castro asked him on a visit to Havana some six months ago whether he thought he could survive the various pressures the United States is or may be applying to his régime. Castro, according to him, replied that he thought he could cope with the economic sanctions imposed, and that he could also cope with any counter-revolutionary activities short of an invasion by American military forces. "And if somebody killed you—what would then happen to the revolution?" the publisher asked. "There would still be my brother Raul," Castro replied. But, the publisher thought, there is a consensus of opinion that brother Raul lacks the popularity of Fidel and could not maintain himself in power. Whether Castro falls or not, he certainly will continue to live in the minds of many Latin Americans as the symbol of their aspirations. He has already become something of another Bolivar.

This feeling seems to be strongest among university students and professors. Both feel that they represent the conscience of Latin America and that they are responsible for a better future for their countries. They want higher living standards for themselves, their fellow citizens and their children; and if evolutionary progress continues to be too slow they will seek more drastic means. In two attempted revolutions in San Salvador and Venezuela late last year the students, and to some extent the professors, played an important part. They seemed to be the fuse that caused the explosion. But in retrospect they also showed that they are still novices at that game. In San Salvador the revolution they sparked off was of short duration, probably premature. In Venezuela, where it failed, it forced the hands of the Communist underground, as one Communist fellow traveller regretfully complained, and thus gave away the actual weakness of the Communist organization which had no choice but to give the eager students fighting support.

The idea that progress can be achieved only by revolution still prevails, though *coups d'état* which are simply the grabbing of power by one dictator from another begin to look old-fashioned. Today there are more and more experiments being undertaken to prove the existence of at least a semblance of democratic elections, and in some cases they are having encouraging results.

The elections in Argentina, in Brazil, in Venezuela have shown a new taste for democratic government and even in a country like Guatemala the opposition leaders say that their country is making progress in this direction. The leader of the moderate socialists there is confident that he will win a majority in the next elections, but when asked whether this would also mean that he

would be able to assume power, he replied with a smile: "No, we shall have to use bullets."

### Land Reform

**M**OST Latin American governments, under the prodding of American economic experts, have begun to introduce various schemes of land reform. In Guatemala, for instance, President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes showed proudly a stack of land titles he had just signed as part of a gradual scheme for the distribution of government-owned land among higher-class peasants. This scheme is financed by government loans and American aid, and so far some 30,000 titles have been sold on credit over about two years. Similar schemes are being introduced in Honduras, Venezuela and some of the other States. A really drastic land reform is in force only in Bolivia, but it is still difficult to determine to what extent these reforms are contributing to raising the living standard or to a better distribution of income. The necessary social changes are very slow in coming and a very uneven distribution of income and wealth is still the traveller's outstanding impression. This does not mean that there are not some encouraging signs of a growing commercial middle class. American efforts, it seems, have in this respect been more successful than the British efforts in the Middle East used to be, and if a real acceleration can be accomplished under the Kennedy Administration social and political stability will improve. But what can be accomplished with economic aid is limited. One of the disadvantages most Latin American governments are suffering from is an inadequate system of administration. Most of them are unable to collect income tax and instead impose an export tax, which at least enables them to recover some of the profits exporters, as a habit, prefer to keep in foreign banks for safety. All of them have an inadequate educational system and all of them are plagued by corruption, by excessive military budgets, by primitive agricultural methods, by the simple lack of trained administrators and economists.

Therefore President Kennedy, when he emphasized that only through the determined efforts of the Latin American nations themselves can they bring success to the aid effort he was right in saying so, but even if there is the will to do that it will not be easy with the defective administrative means of these governments. The idea that "special attention" will be given to those nations who are "most willing and able to mobilize their own resources, who undertake the necessary social and economic reforms and engage in long-range planning in order to reach the stage of selfsustaining growth", as the President wrote in his foreign-aid message to the United States Congress, is sound and bound to have some effect in creating a certain competitive spirit and in spurring these efforts onward. In Latin America the countries which the United States plans to single out for "special attention" are Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. These three countries are quite obviously in a much more advanced stage of development than any other Latin American country. Brazil especially hankers for a "Big Power" status. But both are now in the process of trying to put their economic house in order. Here the Argentine has a head start. President Frondizi for the last two years, with the advice of the International Monetary Fund, has introduced some severe

deflationary measures, and some definite progress is being made despite growing political opposition towards them. President Frondizi has also had the courage to violate what has become a sacred political taboo through most of the hemisphere: he invited foreign oil companies to return to Argentina to help his country to achieve self-sufficiency in oil. In Brazil, for instance, where a desperate oil search is still going on, this taboo remains untouched. Argentina, meanwhile, has become virtually self-sufficient in oil and consequently is saving vital hard currency. But the sins of Peron continue to plague the Frondizi régime. It is not easy to cut the over-generous welfare programme Peron introduced for the workers, who were his strongest political backers, and to restore the hard currency reserves which disappeared from the Treasury when Peron left the country. If President Frondizi proves politically strong enough to persist in his deflationary policy, the assumption is that Argentina will again become a trustworthy risk country and regain an inner political stability which for the time being does not exist. Apart from having been bankrupt economically, it is also troubled by having allowed its roads, railways and agriculture to deteriorate to a point where in this deflationary phase, it has been impossible to improve them. This continues to be a drag.

Brazil, under its new President Janio Quadros, has hardly started the struggle towards solvency. The inflationary policies of President Kubitschek have caused a swift surge of growth and development. But the emphasis on industrial expansion and, above all, the fantastically costly construction of the new capital Brasilia distorted the country's economy and brought it close to bankruptcy. Just as President Frondizi won with a great majority when elected, so did President Quadros, and like Frondizi he seems to be prepared to risk unpopularity by a stiff belt-tightening operation. The Brazilian President has a longer road ahead of him, but his country has greater economic potentialities, greater untapped riches and a more vigorous, more enterprising populace to help him. São Paulo, which is the business capital of Brazil, has an air of purposefulness like Chicago. It is a hard-driving city, eager to move ahead as no other city in Latin America.

Caracas, the capital of Venezuela, has all the outward symbols of progress, new wealth and the experiences of prosperity. But, in fact, it is a city which got drunk with its oil and investment boom, over-extended itself, and instead of using the profits wisely for long-range development is now heavily in debt. So much so that American aid money is used to balance the budget, which only goes to show how badly some of these countries are managed. The transition from simply repairing mismanaged economies to reshaping them to the needs of social and economic progress will not be an easy task.

### Call for a Marshall Plan

**L**ATIN Americans like to talk about their need for a Marshall plan, and the fact that President Kennedy limited himself, at least for this year, to the financial promises made by President Eisenhower has undoubtedly

created some disappointment. The words "Marshall plan" have only one meaning in this part of the world and that is large and generous aid appropriations. Philosophically, of course, the Marshall Plan was designed to help Europe recover from the ravages of war. Latin America's problems, on the other hand, are rooted in the crisis of the old social order, which is unable to meet the demands of an impatient people.

When one points out to Latin Americans that the European governments gave the United States the most extraordinary rights to control and inspect the use of all aid money they frankly admit that it would be difficult for some of their governments to accept such conditions without being accused of subservience to the United States. This is indicative of the state of mind in these countries and the complications the United States faces in advising them politically.

The Kennedy Administration is facing three basic problems in Latin America: how to help introduce economic and social reforms; how to improve the psychology of its relations and how to bring about a change in the régime in Cuba. These are formidable problems, and so far the Kennedy Administration has only nibbled at them.<sup>9</sup> The requests for 500 million dollars plus 100 million for earthquake-ridden Chile, which Mr. Kennedy has submitted to Congress, are a beginning, but none the less inadequate. Even the more lenient use of various loan organizations will not be enough. As long as the United States is using aid money for political reasons, to help balance budgets in countries like Venezuela, Guatemala, Bolivia, it will not get its money's worth in economic development. And as long as such subsidies are necessary to ensure political stability, private investment will be hesitant to move into such countries. The political instability, also fed by the Cuban crisis, has in fact caused a loss of American private capital investment of over 100 million dollars between 1958 and 1959 and, it is estimated, the rate of loss may have been even greater between 1959 and 1960. West German and Japanese investment, on the other hand, has been increasing steadily. Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Bolivia are facing the worst economic problems. Peru, Columbia and Mexico have relatively bright prospects.

Without larger-scale American financial aid, however, it will be difficult to achieve the kind of acceleration of economic development this area needs. At the present rate of expansion not even part of the expected additional labour force of 65,000,000 can be absorbed; consequently unemployment will grow and such potential areas of unrest as the north-east in Brazil, where living standards are subhuman, could become hotbeds of trouble.

President Kennedy in his speech on Latin American affairs also pleaded for the formation of larger economic units on the model of the European Common Market. They would help to avoid costly duplication of industrial projects in adjoining countries and start a flow of trade among these countries which is virtually non-existent. President Ydigoras of Guatemala is one of the most ardent advocates of a Central American Common Market, but most of his neighbours are suspicious that he does it to enhance Guatemala's own position. Some minor projects as a tire factory for the region have been



initiated, but in most of the other Central American countries little appetite can be discerned for such a grouping; there is too much jealousy as yet for this to assume any practical significance.

In South America seven nations created a Free Trade Association in February 1960, the so-called Montevideo Treaty, but so far it is not in force. Only the Congresses of Paraguay and Peru have ratified it.

In the easier but very important field of "public relations", however, President Kennedy has made progress. He is very conscious of the psychological approach and, having a fine instinct for tact, he is a master in this field. He has the ability to make people feel that he cares about them, that he is interested in big as well as small complaints, and there is some convincing evidence that Washington is really paying much more attention to Latin America.

President Kennedy's election was tremendously popular throughout Latin America. Ever since Franklin D. Roosevelt Latin Americans consider the Democratic Party the more sympathetic, the more generous. The Eisenhower Administration seems to have confirmed the impression that Republicans are guided chiefly by a cold banker's mind with little concern for humanitarian affairs and not enough understanding of the trends to the left which are inevitable in Latin America. President Kennedy therefore had a basic reservoir of goodwill even before his inauguration and the question is, How well he will use it.

He certainly propped up the ego of Latin American diplomats in Washington when he asked them to the White House and used this opportunity, not for polite diplomatic talk, but for a well-thought-out, serious policy speech. He underlined his desire to get the best and latest information by sending Mr. A. A. Berle, who used to be an Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs under Roosevelt, Professor Arthur Schlesinger, one of his special assistants, and the head of the Food for Peace Mission, George McGovern, to consult with various Latin American governments.

He was careful to seek the advice of Munios Muniz, the Governor of Puerto Rico, who enjoys much respect among various Latin American leaders, especially those who spent some time in exile in Puerto Rico, and to comb Puerto Rico for good men to represent the United States in Latin America. Perhaps the most important appointment he has made so far was that of Teodoro Mossoso, the chief of the remarkable economic development programme in Puerto Rico, as ambassador to Venezuela.

Venezuela today is the most unstable spot in Latin America, and because of its strategic position in the Caribbean it is also the most dangerous. A Communist régime there could not only threaten America's control over the Panama Canal but cause real havoc throughout the area. It is for these reasons that the United States Government keeps an anxious eye cocked at Caracas. President Betancourt, who was once considered a dangerous radical by the United States, today is considered the best hope of saving Venezuela from Communism. As a moderate socialist he seems to be politically the most effective barrier to it, but his economic outlook, though he has greatly moderated his socialist ideas, continues to create suspicion and uneasiness

among big business and American investors generally. Hence while his socialism is an effective defence against Communism, it is also an obstacle to economic recovery and thereby to greater political stability. For this reason right-wing groups are constantly plotting to overthrow him in the hope of restoring confidence in Venezuela's economy. The Communists in their last abortive attempt to overthrow the government proved to be weaker than was expected, but continue to hope to take advantage of the current economic crisis. There is no reason why it should be beyond the wit of shrewd economic planning to restore Venezuela's solvency. It is potentially a rich country, its monthly income from oil alone is 100 million dollars and its population is relatively small, 7,000,000 inhabitants. Caracas, which is the only city that counts, is impressive-looking, somewhat reminiscent of Dallas, Texas. It has modern skyscrapers, elegant shops, two luxurious hotels, broad avenues, perhaps the worst traffic jams in the world, extravagant residential areas and only one interest: that of making money. It went on a crazy spending spree during the boom, and when President Betancourt was legally elected business confidence collapsed and both an economic and a political crisis set in. The United States and most of big business are against a *coup d'état* from the right. They are afraid that this would throw Betancourt into the hands of the Communists and ultimately sweep them to power. It is still a harassing game of tight-rope walking, and it will last at least as long as the economic recession continues to plague Venezuela.

Cuba is not the inflammation Venezuela is, but a boil that goes on festering and, no doubt, will become even more poisonous since the American-backed counter-revolution ended in complete failure. It is hazardous in our time to seek short cuts and replace policy simply with action. But there was a growing nervousness on the American side because of a feeling that the longer Castro succeeds in maintaining himself in power the more difficult it will be to unseat him. And to unseat him had become a firm American aim. To understand the gnawing impatience of the powerful United States with little Cuba one must remember that every American is brought up on the Monroe Doctrine, which decrees something like automatic immunity for the Western Hemisphere from unfriendly outside intrusion. Today, with ideologies knowing no frontiers, it has become very difficult to preserve the letter of the Monroe Doctrine. Yet President Kennedy, in his first speech immediately after the Cuban fiasco, said: 'Cuba is not an island unto itself' and thereby reaffirmed it.

In view of this tradition few Americans, including the United States Government, saw anything wrong in actively promoting and organizing the Cuban invasion. Yet in the end it was the existence of the "American conscience"—at least with President Kennedy—which caused the failure of this covert paramilitary adventure. President Kennedy, torn between cancelling the whole operation and giving it the full support of American military power, finally decided on a middle course which he thought would satisfy his conscience and also bring success—he left the counter-revolutionaries to their own resources.

The full effect this failure has had in Latin America is still difficult to assess.

But it is already clear that President Kennedy's appeal for new concerted action against Cuba by "all free nations in this hemisphere" has not had the desired galvanizing effect. This is partly due to the fear by various leaders that it would give added strength to their opposition on the Left, Communist and non-Communist, and also because of their reluctance to give the impression that they were obediently following an American command. In the case of Brazil's new President Quadros, who privately says he would prefer a Cuba without a Castro, it would mean the sacrifice of his policy of moderate neutralism in favour of actions which he assumes are unlikely to be effective in seriously weakening Castro.

What remains uncertain is whether Castro's victory has substantially strengthened him in Latin America or whether it has helped to fan the fears of Communism. What seems clear, however, is that the Organization of American States, to which Mr. Kennedy is appealing for action against Castro, has certainly, in American eyes, been further weakened by its inaction. Also the need, not only to accelerate American economic assistance, but to increase it substantially next year has become imperative. And in the long run American policy will have to rely less on the "*alliance of progress*", as President Kennedy has defined the new relationship, but on a new approach somewhere between this "*alliance*" and the policy the United States is now applying to the countries of Africa.

# THE CHOICE FOR CENTRAL AFRICA

## CHANGES IN NORTHERN RHODESIA

**K**NOWLEDGE of changes in the world outside, and in neighbouring territories, has made the small minority of educated and part-educated Africans receptive to the ideas of nationalism, of an African personality or way of doing things. Like young adolescents they must assert themselves: their dignity demands it. The world must recognize their identity. They are men. "Seek ye the political kingdom", preaches Dr. Nkrumah, and the rest will follow. If they are blocked from obtaining political power through existing constitutions, then those constitutions must be scrapped.

These are the angry young men up and down Africa demanding more than they expect to get. Their initial surprise at how ready metropolitan Powers have been to take them at face value is after the first encounter replaced by confidence that their "demands" will be met. They gain self-assurance as concession after concession is made; and as their appetite rises so do they promise more to their equally ambitious hangers-on who hope for pickings for themselves. The large-scale development plans introduced in all African territories since 1945 have jostled the mass of the populations out of their torpor. So long as their lives were largely undisturbed by governments they took little interest in who ruled, and acquiesced in foreign administrations. But now they see some of their own kind treated as future political leaders. It becomes clear also that the authorities have no effective counter to intimidation. They draw their own conclusions as to who will be their future rulers and accommodate themselves as best they can to a new order.

This stage has been reached in Africa at a time when few Africans have memories of the conditions of hunger, disease, tribal wars and slave raiding which prevailed before European administrations imposed peace and trade. Life, such as they have known it, seems to be assured. They assume that conditions will go on improving, and do not entertain the idea that they might get worse.

Such are the circumstances under which the literate few can appeal successfully to the masses for their support on grounds of identity of viewpoint and interest against a beneficent régime established by an alien race. Nor does it help a study of current problems to play down the differences between the races or to underestimate the strength of feeling of awakening peoples determined to assert themselves.

With this introduction as background let us examine the principles on which the 1958 White Paper (Cmnd. 530) outlining a new constitution for Northern Rhodesia was based. Up to that time British Protected Persons (i.e. virtually all Northern Rhodesian Africans) had not been eligible for



registration as voters in territorial elections unless they took out British citizenship through payment of a fee of £5. African representation had been provided by two Europeans nominated to sit in Legislative Council to represent African interests, and by four Africans from Provincial representatives sitting in an African Representative Council as an electoral college. They were there specifically as racial representatives.

The 1958 proposals aimed at providing a framework which could be adhered to over a decade as more Africans qualified for the voters' rolls. British Protected Persons were made eligible as voters. Separate representation of African and European interests was ended. A single common voters' roll was to be the permanent basis of the qualified franchise, though temporary provision was made for voters with much lower income and educational qualifications for a period of years, until such voters were not less than the number of ordinary voters, after which no more would be registered on the lower qualifications.

The aim was to provide that candidates of whatever race should have as constituents voters of all races; and that voters should feel that the man elected was their member, responsible to them whether he belonged to their race or not. It was hoped thereby to develop political divisions on non-racial, instead of on racial, lines. The framework was to provide for the needs of Northern Rhodesia "as part of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland committed to a policy of partnership between the races".

The intentions were admirable. In view of the constitutional changes made in 1945, 1948 and 1954 it was stated in the 1958 White Paper that

the basic lines of constitutional advance now to be settled should therefore be durable, and not subject to drastic change every few years. Moreover, the constitutional arrangements should ensure that the government of the country will continue to rest in the hands of responsible men, men with understanding and of sufficient education and experience of affairs to be able to reason and to exercise judgment between alternative courses of action. The electoral system must encourage the return of men and women who are prepared and indeed disposed to consider and balance the interests of all racial groups, and who are prompted primarily by a spirit of public service to the whole community; it must discourage the return of extremists who would look to sectional interests alone.

### The White Paper Tested

HOW did it work out in the 1959 territorial election, which implemented the 1958 White Paper? The proposals indicated the probable election of fourteen Europeans and eight Africans. This did not satisfy the African Nationalist politicians, who thereupon boycotted the registration of voters. One Nationalist faction decided rather late to participate, with the result that about one-quarter of those Africans eligible to register did so and a majority of those who registered voted. Of the eight Africans who were elected, two belonging to the United Federal Party won seats in constituencies in which European votes prevailed, two belonged to the Central African Party (under European Liberal leadership), three won who stood as Independents and the leader of the African National Congress Party won a seat.

Of the fourteen Europeans elected, eleven belonged to the United Federal Party, two to the Central African Party in constituencies in which African votes prevailed, and one to the (extremist) Dominion Party, who succeeded because African votes were given to him by direction of the African National Congress so as to defeat the United Federal Party candidate.

Statistically it could be said that the proposals succeeded in discouraging the return of extremists "who would look to sectional interests alone". But because of the boycott it failed to provide adequate representation of the African National parties. The number of seats to be won on lower-roll votes was too few, leaving the mass of Africans without representatives of their choosing. The Executive Council included the first two African Ministers, one belonging to the United Federal Party who had been elected through European votes and the other nominated by the Governor from among the Independent members. To the African Nationalist parties the general election had not given a share in political power and voting went on racial lines.

Perhaps this illuminates one of the differences in thinking between Africans and Europeans. The latter are indoctrinated with the concept of its being normal for a party to be in a minority and in opposition—until its turn comes. Africans are simple realists who believe in being in the majority—because that carries power. They have no use for being in a minority, which they consider a powerless position—which it is in their tribal organizations. To them constitutional proposals likely to give them less than half the elected seats are of no interest.

Nor is it realistic to think of constituencies in the African context as liable to swing to one party or another through vagaries of the floating voter. Voting will be racial in pattern and is reasonably predictable, once the composition of the registered voters in a constituency is known. It is the delimitation of boundaries and the franchise qualification that decides the issue. These factors determine, therefore, the central battlefield when discussing constitutional changes. That being so, it behoves the Protecting Power, on whom ultimate responsibility lies, to decide what balance of forces they wish to result from the constitutional changes and then to fix franchise qualifications at a level designed to return responsible representatives likely to maintain a fair balance of interest between the various sections in the community.

Many changes have taken place in Africa since 1958, but none more decisive than the change of outlook within the Conservative Government in Britain regarding Central Africa. In 1953 the Conservative Party created the Federation with confidence. By 1960 the Conservative Government seemed to be without policy or purpose in this area, except to shed responsibility as gracefully as possible. It still declares that it would be a tragedy were the Federation to break up; that it wishes to preserve it in some refashioned form; but it appears to lack the courage to maintain in Northern Rhodesia a majority of the Legislative Council in favour of a revised Federation with the reduced powers recommended in the Monckton Report.

Now we have come to the heart of the problem. Nyasaland has been given a constitution under which a majority of members in the Legislative Council will be elected by African Nationalist parties. The Malawi Party, which is

expected to win that majority through voters on the lower roll, will demand that Nyasaland should secede from the Federation. There is no provision in the Federal Constitution for any of the territories to secede. But if anti-Federation parties were also to win a majority of elected seats in the Northern Rhodesian Legislature it would be embarrassing, to say the least, if the governments of the two Northern territories under African Nationalist leadership refused to co-operate.

If the British Government are determined to keep the two Rhodesias linked together in a multi-racial experiment they must impose a constitution in Northern Rhodesia under which at least half the elected seats are held (not necessarily by Europeans) by people who support that policy. It has been suggested that even if under the new constitution an African Nationalist majority opposed to Federation were returned, the balance in favour of a modified Federation could be maintained through Official Members appointed to the Legislature. Moreover, it is also argued that the Executive Council, in which the African Nationalists would be allowed only minority representation, would remain advisory to the Governor. It would be an illusion to rely on such devices to maintain the Federation. If the British Government has not the courage to refuse such a majority of elected members hostile to Federation, then it will not be there to frustrate the wishes of that majority once it has been conceded.

### The New Proposals

THE White Paper of 1961 (Cmnd. 1295) envisages forty-five elected members in the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council, one-third to be elected by voters on an upper roll, one-third by voters on a lower roll with lower qualifications, and one-third by voters on each roll voting separately. Of these it can be predicted with fair certainty that those elected by voters on an upper roll will be European; and those elected by voters on a lower roll will be African. The remainder will contest a substantial number of "national" seats in which cross-voting will take place. To be elected a candidate would have to win a certain minimum percentage of votes cast by each of the upper- and lower-roll voters. If in any constituency no candidate receives the minimum percentage support from each roll of voters, a by-election will be held once. If that fails to elect a member, then the seat will remain vacant. What are the elements which have to be taken into consideration to forecast who, if any, may win these seats?

It is as well that people in Britain should be aware of the resources at the disposal of African Nationalist parties. They are not dependent for finance on local support. Large sums have been made available from countries behind the Iron Curtain. The United National Independence Party in Northern Rhodesia has equipped all its divisions with Landrovers, loud-speaker equipment and duplicating machinery. Electioneering is organized by full-time paid branch officials. Finance on this scale from outside and hostile Powers is a new development. The Western democracies have not faced such a challenge nor considered how to counter it. The cold war is being fought in these ways under their noses while they still think in terms

of old-fashioned political contests fought by parties dependent on financial support provided by private persons. Subversion is no less subversive because it is practised with a modicum of subtlety.

Upper-roll voters may, if the White Paper proposals are implemented, include 25,000 Europeans, 2,000 Asians and 3,000 Africans. It is well known in other African countries that Asians mainly dependent as merchants on African trade, and aware of African hostility to them, support African Nationalist demands, even to the point of one man one vote, in the hope of being allowed to continue in trade when the Africans attain political power. Therefore candidates opposed to Federation who are "approved" by African Nationalist parties could expect to receive about 15 per cent of the upper-roll votes in these "national" seats. Lower-roll voters will be virtually entirely Africans. They will be organized, with and without intimidation, to support only candidates "approved" by Nationalist parties hostile to any form of continued Federation. This will render it impossible for any candidate in favour of a modified Federation to receive so much as 10 per cent of the lower-roll votes.

Thus if the minimum percentage required for election were 15 it would be possible for anti-Federation candidates to secure the requisite number of upper-roll votes with no more than fringe European support, whereas even if the minimum percentage required were as low as 10 no pro-Federation candidates would be able to secure the necessary lower-roll votes to be elected. Is that the fair balance of interest laboured for so hard in the 1958 White Paper? It would be regarded by the European community as a betrayal by the Protecting Power, and a mockery in that it would be known that the result would be a total majority favouring a dissolution of the Federation.

The Protecting Power must face the issues at stake. Virtually everyone accepts that political power will pass at some time from the British Government to a self-governing Northern Rhodesia in which Africans will predominate. Experience has shown in the Congo that it is no kindness for the metropolitan Power to withdraw prematurely, leaving a vacuum and chaos. Africans will accept rule by the strong if they know that they will come into power in their own right in the not too distant future. They will not accept rule by people who have been weak enough to concede to them the majority, and then try to deny the majority its political rôle.

In finally determining the new Northern Rhodesian Constitution the British Government must first decide two questions. Has the time come for the Protecting Power to withdraw from its responsibility of holding a fair balance between all sections and races who live there? Will it accept responsibility for breaking up the Federal experiment in Central Africa? If the answer is "no" to both those questions the Constitution of 1961 should be so drawn as to ensure that at least half the members to be elected to the Legislature shall be supporters of a modified Federation. If the answer is "yes" then it should say so and not hide behind a smoke screen of fine phrases.

The details of the Northern Rhodesian Constitution were expected to be announced by the end of May. The referendum in Southern Rhodesia on



the Sandys Constitution is expected to be held at the end of June. It is considered that the prospects for a continued Federation may decide how the voting goes in Southern Rhodesia. The voters in the latter country will judge those prospects by whether the Northern Rhodesian Constitution is devised to hold the balance between pro- and anti-Federation forces. If it is clear to them that the result will be a majority for the anti-Federation forces, they will draw their own conclusions as to what will best serve their interests.

It will be appreciated, therefore, that the details of the new Northern Rhodesian Constitution will determine far more than merely the number of black or white faces in the Legislature. They will determine whether to all intents and purposes political power passes now into African hands. They will determine as well whether a reformed Federation is given a further lease of life for the economic advantage of all who live in Central Africa, particularly the African who so desperately needs increased social services dependent on industrial prosperity. They will determine whether this last remaining experiment in Africa in partnership and the ideal of a non-racial community is doomed to early death, to be replaced by racial governments tolerating in their countries non-Africans residing as foreigners and earning their living there so long as their activities are useful to the rulers. A Bill of Rights or other safeguards for minorities can at best prevent certain abuses of power, they cannot influence where the seat of power may lie. By the time this is published the choice—for there is a choice—will have been made.

# NEW HOPES ON CAPITOL HILL

## "A SPACIOUS ENVIRONMENT OF FREEDOM"

PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY is now in a position to signal all ahead full on a course toward one of his most cherished objectives, the attainment of a broader, stronger and more meaningful unity among the governments and peoples of the Atlantic Community. From early April until the end of May he was navigating sinuous and in some respects even hazardous channels, outward bound, to be sure, but feeling his way. This was the period of talking with, getting to know, and getting to be known by Prime Minister Macmillan, Chancellor Adenauer and at last President de Gaulle. In all of those conversations, the objective of an improved Atlantic unity was in the foreground of this thought. He made some preparatory moves. For example, he exposed to a responsive British Prime Minister the intensity of the United States interest in seeing a closer economic relationship between Britain and the European continent, and made the point that it could be fostered better under a developing unity spanning the Atlantic to embrace the United States. With the West German Chancellor he ratified a formula for fair shares in the work of developing new and poorer nations, a formula workable only in the context of multilateral alliance among the industrialized States. (It was highly sophisticated, and contemplated a dividend in an easing of balance-of-payments deficits and a leveling off of surpluses within the alliance.) With respect to General de Gaulle, the identifiable preliminary move by Mr. Kennedy was to assign Vice President Johnson to deliver at SHAPE a speech carefully vetted by Mr. Kennedy himself, in which the shape and size of the frame of unity, if not the details, were set forth within earshot of the Elysée Palace. But Mr. Kennedy deliberately deferred the formulation of detail until he knew the views of all three: Macmillan, Adenauer and de Gaulle. The conversations have been held. The channel has been navigated. The journey to a new horizon can begin.

The spirit of the President's enterprise is disclosed in a paragraph from the speech by Vice President Johnson:

Our end goal—"that remote and ideal object" of which Lord Acton spoke, "which captivates the imagination by its splendour and the reason by its simplicity"—should be a true Atlantic Community in which common institutions will increasingly be developed to meet common problems.

The vision is not new, nor has there been any lack of diligence in seeking to attain it in the postwar period. The judgment may be ventured, however, that the Kennedy administration brings something new to the quest for realization: a perfectly practical belief that historical reality and logic, not vision and idealism alone, are working on the side of fulfillment; that acknowledged interdependence is changing into an imperative of unity; and, in fact, that small national States have outlived their usefulness and inevitably must join.

The Kennedy Administration possesses a talent for simplicity (which is different from simplification and certainly different from over-simplification) and has employed that talent to define principal required elements of the new unity.

They include higher rates of growth in laggard Atlantic countries, a more effective trans-Atlantic economic coordination; more, and more intelligent, aid to underdeveloped countries, shared out more equitably along the industrial rim of the Atlantic; and a sharing of the burden of the defense of that community.

Such goals are immensely valuable singly and as a combined purpose. Beyond their value to the Atlantic Community internally, however, they have an immeasurable potential in terms of the pattern of power. The Kennedy goal implies a more effective marshaling than ever before of hundreds of millions of people possessed of the most advanced social, political, economic, technological and scientific instruments the world has known, so surpassing in its strength, as an entity, that it need fear no challenge and accept no adverse terms.

### Men Round the President

FROM where does the drive for such a splendid purpose arise? Its origins cannot be precisely traced, but some relevant circumstances may be noted, which add up to an interesting speculative possibility. Mr. Kennedy has close around him a number of men who regard developmental work in the beginning States as exciting for its own sake, although it is fair to say that they share also the motive of wishing to improve the condition of mankind. Walt Whitman Rostow, a deputy assistant whose office window looks across narrow West Executive avenue to the presidential office wing of the White House, is one of the world's foremost expositors of the theory of rearing infant national economies to independent maturity. David Bell, the director of the budget, whose yes or no applies weightily to oversea spending programs as well as all others, has a solid record of experience as an adviser in developmental economics and planning in Pakistan. Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, conducted such enterprises while head of the Rockefeller Foundation on a scale which might make many a sovereignty blush for envy. Chester Bowles, Under Secretary of State, second man in that establishment, brings an intense passion to his wish to improve the lot of men generally, and out of his experience as ambassador to India and in other tasks, has formed a special interest in the Afro-Asian nations. Thus, the administration was, so to speak, congenitally committed to developmental work. Now, continuing the speculation, it is quite clear that very early in the effort to discharge the commitment there would be encountered the hard fact that all the disposable resources of the United States put together could not finance the requirements of development; moreover, the administration found itself staring into the face of the fact that the program in its existing dimensions was levying a drain on United States resources which showed up in the balance-of-payments deficit. Dead set against saying "We can't do it", the administration instead asked itself, "How can we do it?" For the answer, it turned to

the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, George W. Ball, the third man in the State Department. Ball possesses a superb grasp of the political economy of Western Europe. Before entering the government he was a lawyer in international practice whose clients were, as it might be said, the economic institutions of Europe. He was particularly close to the OEEC, the Common Market, the Coal and Steel Community and Euratom. It was Ball who, in the transition period between Eisenhower and Kennedy, headed a Kennedy task force on international economic policy for the new administration; that policy was hammered out not in government buildings or academic cloisters, but on cluttered desk tops in odd corners of Ball's law office in downtown Washington. Ball had certain firm ideas: emphasize economic development in foreign aid; lay stress on long-term rather than short-term assistance and financing; redistribute the burden more equitably among the industrialized nations; resort more readily to multilateral aid programs; insist upon internal economic policies within the partner nations compatible with the health and growth of the alliance; raise the level of international trade generally. The wedding of these ideas with the compulsive urge for oversea development among the other men near Kennedy accounted for a large sector of what is emerging as the Kennedy foreign economic policy. Upon review, it will be seen that the elements in this part of the policy really insist, for their fulfillment, on a degree of coordination, collaboration, cooperation and plain ordinary reason and understanding which might as well be carried forward into a state of unity. The speculation in sum, then, is that the need of means for developmental work led by logical progression to a broad design for "a true Atlantic Community in which common institutions will increasingly be developed to meet common problems". One might even make explicit the implication of all this, that in the context of developmental requirements, the United States itself had to be classed as "a small national State" which had "outlived its usefulness", to the extent that its individual capability fell short of meeting the obligation.

### Calls on the Partner Nations

THE collaborative program, of course, requires rigorous exactions by the partner nations from themselves. It is certainly an intent of the Kennedy policy, for example, that Germany shall reduce her balance-of-payments surplus by her efforts in behalf of development abroad. This is the sophistication in the formula referred to at the start of this article. Part of the capital exported by Germany, it is reasoned, will be transformed into imports by underdeveloped countries from the United States and other nations, abating their deficits and the German surplus at the same time. Washington does not shrink, either, from betraying a wish that the Germans would undertake other internal steps tending to decrease the German price advantage in third markets. It is a sign of the realism which infuses Project Unity that Washington is quite willing the Germans should know this is Washington's intent.

President Kennedy's mind, as is well known, is political in an all-encompassing sense. He understands reflexively that rigorous self-imposed exactions



require, first, last, and always, the political support of the governed. He has rather consciously undertaken, therefore, to assist the partner governments in finding politically acceptable ways of doing what needs to be done. Under Secretary Ball spent a week in mid-March holding informal conversations in Bonn, Paris and London to make it clear that the United States understood the domestic political problems involved and would apply its imagination to finding means of easing them. This consciousness on Mr. Kennedy's part accounts in large measure, in fact, for the turnabout in economic relations between the United States and West Germany. He was dissatisfied with the tone, mood and approach in the bilateral talks between Washington and Bonn last fall on the U.S. balance-of-payments problem. To him, it seemed that the West German Government was being asked to ask its people to give money to the rich Americans, and he instinctively realized that this was politically unworkable. It was his own idea, it is said, that the problem was pervasive within the alliance, and must be settled on alliance principles; that approach opened new methods of dealing with the problem. Asking the Germans to discipline themselves as part of a multinational effort was much more manageable than asking them to hold up their end of a bilateral relationship in which, however well they were doing, they were bound to feel that the Americans were on top.

Whether Mr. Kennedy has in mind new institutions for improving Atlantic unity and making it functionally more versatile, or has in mind extensive remodeling of existing institutions such as NATO, is not known at this writing. It is certain, however, that he will rely greatly upon the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. From observation here, it is possible to conclude that Mr. Kennedy's intentions for the OECD are not clearly grasped outside the rather restricted circle of men who can be classified as specialists in its charter and its possibilities. In terms of United States policy, OECD was, of course, an initiative of the predecessor administration. Its principal American architect, Douglas Dillon, who initialed the agreement as Under Secretary of State in the Eisenhower government, has been brought over, Republican label and all, to the Kennedy administration as its Secretary of the Treasury. That move helpfully gives the OECD a bipartisan base in American politics which it needs. But the Senate hearings on OECD preceding ratification of the treaty of American adherence were short, almost *pro forma*, and attracted almost no public attention. One may wonder if the other member governments, outside their economic ministries, have a true measure of the importance of OECD in Kennedy policy. It is not necessary to wonder at all whether the prospective beneficiaries in the underdeveloped world realize its promise; they certainly do not. Rarely has any venture so ambitious been so little advertised. But Mr. Kennedy surely intends to use it as an instrument of American leadership, including, importantly, leadership toward unity. His intention was visible in the arrangement by which the chairmanship of what will be the Development Assistance Committee of OECD was in effect reserved for a United States officer. The purpose of unity will be served, for example, in the prospective use of OECD as a forum in which the United States can influence a resolution of

what in the Washington view is the historical accident of competition between the Common Market and the Free Trade Association—a resolution surely contemplating, as earlier noted, a full commitment by the United Kingdom to not only the economic but the political constitution of the EEC. It is only fair to say that the United States hardly intends to busy itself in such marriage brokerage without pronouncing some vows of its own. It must also be said, in fairness, that Mr. Kennedy has been careful to publish no more than highly generalized banns; it is not certain that the parental sensitivities of Congress would welcome the match. But Mr. Kennedy is acutely aware that the old days when Europe sneezed if America caught an economic cold are over; that the economic behavior of Europe directly influences the economy of the United States; that to influence the economics of Europe it is necessary, so to speak, to purchase a seat upon the European Exchange; and that such involvement is inescapably two-way.

### The Strategic Element

THE military element of the pattern of unity poses hard questions at the moment, but in the Washington view the specifics of the answers have an importance secondary to the nourishment of the concept of unity in its non-military aspects. An extensively elaborated structure of military unity exists in NATO. The raising of the level of conventional capability (as a means of raising the threshold at which resort to drastic nuclear counter-measures becomes unavoidable), and the endowment of NATO with some sort of proprietorship in nuclear capability, are technical questions, and it must be confessed that Washington does not regard them as of such primary urgency that they must be settled overnight. In military affairs, the full involvement of the United States in Western Europe is explicit and regularly reaffirmed; trouble with housekeeping does not seriously shadow that fact. If the worst happened, the NATO command could, if it had to, enact an *ad hoc* amendment of the by-laws in a split second of decision, and leave the litigation until later. The Kennedy concept of Atlantic unity may, in fact, be regarded as assuming a shift in emphasis from military to economic and political considerations.

The task which President Kennedy has set himself—and his colleagues at the head of associated governments—involves much more than creating a structure of economic cooperation or drawing up an organic act for political unity. Vice President Johnson, numbering the sacrifices which must be made by all sides, included “sacrifices of ancient concepts”. That shoe would fit many feet; perhaps it was sized with President de Gaulle especially in mind. But one thing may be said: If de Gaulle’s canons of national grandeur are viewed as part of a problem, they are not rancorously dismissed. President de Gaulle is viewed within this government as a leader truly possessed of greatness, a man not barely in equilibrium with his times but the repository of assets more than marginally exceeding the exactions the times make upon him; the problem becomes one not of excising his faults, but of profiting from his creative political imagination. In international politics as in American party politics, Mr. Kennedy knows and avoids the strategic error of setting

his face against a man who may vote against him on a specific issue but is basically on his side.

The problems and the frictions impeding progress toward unity extend beyond the boundaries of the Atlantic Community. The United States attitude toward colonialism, firmed up now by Mr. Kennedy as a wish to see maximum acceleration of the process of "decolonialization", vexes relationships with Portugal and the Netherlands and even, in more moderate degree, with the British. The changing pattern of United States policy in the United Nations, evolving a greater solicitude for new and still dependent nations, inevitably means a lesser solicitude for European parent countries bereft or soon to be bereft of their oversea offspring. But it is certainly part of the Kennedy concept that no member of the nascent union should compromise historic moral principle for the sake of a specious cordiality; Vice President Johnson included nothing of that sort in his catalogue of sacrifices. To do so would not only be expediency of the most empty sort, but bad politics in the relationship of the new community *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world, friends and antagonists alike.

### The Alliance in Disarray

MR. KENNEDY himself has said that the alliance is in some "disarray", a phrase which unhappily recalls the infelicitous and woefully premature judgment of the late Secretary Dulles, after a political convulsion in Moscow, that a condition of "despotic disarray" had come about there. Curiously, Mr. Kennedy seems in this case not to have tuned in on the true mood in Washington. There are always pessimists, of course, but the judgment may be made that the dominant mood in Washington in respect to the prospect of unification is optimistic. On net balance, the whole postwar record of the West appears to demonstrate a rather solid progress (the true optimist would credit this to a law of nature) toward the goal Mr. Kennedy has set. If nationalism has evolved so readily into regionalism, is it impractical to expect that regionalism will evolve into—what shall it be called? Atlanticism?

In one passage Vice President Johnson described the purpose of United States policy as the creation of a "spacious environment of freedom" in the Atlantic Basin. It is a splendid phrase, and a splendid purpose. As to the possibility of its realization, the governing circumstance may well be that Mr. Kennedy is not addicted to rhetorical vacuities. His expressions intend consequences in action. The peoples and the heads of government in the neighbourhood he wishes to incorporate as a community may proceed upon the assumption that they are not hearing just more speeches, but the signal to set sail.

United States of America,  
May 1961.

# TRANSITION IN KENYA

## A CONTINENT IN REVOLUTION

TO the future historian of Africa, 1960 may well appear much as 1848 does to the twentieth-century writer of history. There is a certain resemblance between the chain reaction of nineteenth-century revolutions in Europe and the series of African events of last year. Yet those events only accelerated a process already started and already impossible to stop. That process was the transfer of power in one African country after another from the metropolitan government to a local and independent government.

In the future this process of transfer on the African continent will probably be seen in two parts. The first part will be in those countries, notably West Africa, where Europeans have gone for their working lives only. The other part will be in those other countries where there are settled and established European and Asian communities. The wise government will be seen as that which has avoided dogged resistance to all change after the manner of the South African Nationalists and which has, also, refused to be stampeded into sudden and thoughtless flight as were the Belgians last year. The one cannot succeed for any great length of time. The other endangered the admirable economic work done in the Congo—far exceeding that in the less-developed British colonies—and has caused great suffering.

Historians will write that for the metropolitan countries the task of the last few years has been that of organizing the transition of power. The test will not be whether a particular metropolitan government or country has, in 1961, gained a perhaps transitory popularity with the more impatient and vocal African Nationalists in its colonies. It will be much more whether the metropolitan country has given as good a chance as was possible in the circumstances to a new and independent government to succeed. In this context, success means the ability to keep law and order, to maintain and to improve the existing standard of living and, perhaps we can hope, to ensure at least some rights to the individual.

Judged in this way, Great Britain has achieved considerable success in West Africa through a planned and ordered transfer of power over a period. This has been seen both in a large country such as Nigeria and in a small one such as Sierra Leone. The process of transition never stopped. Yet there was no sudden and unplanned increase in the pace. Great Britain has not always been so successful. Few will now deny that she was right to leave India in 1947; yet had the process of transition been slower by a few months many lives might have been saved, and the gulf between India and Pakistan might have been less wide than it is now.

At this moment of time, with the Indian lesson behind her and with considerable successes gained in West Africa, Great Britain faces the second part of her African problem. This is the transition of power in countries with settled European and Asian communities and with other features which distinguish them from West Africa. In East Africa the task is thus more



difficult than it was in West Africa. First, the association with Europeans is far shorter than it was in the West, and consequently the number of educated people from whom the Ministers and Civil Servants can be drawn is fewer. Secondly, as the Royal Commission on Land and Population in East Africa made plain in their report a few years ago, East Africa is fundamentally a poor region. It is less rich than West Africa in natural resources, in minerals and in the valuable crops grown in areas of high rainfall. Thirdly, though the Europeans in Kenya have developed the country far beyond the limit it would have reached had they never settled there, yet, as everywhere else on the continent where there is European settlement, they have caused the growth of a land grievance; and grievances over land are usually more widespread and more bitter than are political feelings. In spite of these difficulties, the movement towards independence in East Africa cannot be halted. Kenya is the first of the African countries with a settled European population of an appreciable size with which the United Kingdom Government has had to deal in this matter, and the die is now cast for early self-government. The way to resolve the difficulty and to overcome the undoubted, but not insuperable, obstacles is the use of the settled European and Asian population in the emerging independent government. Mr. Nyerere in Tanganyika sees this as clearly as does Mr. Manley in Jamaica. Not many years ago, there were as many prophets of gloom in the West Indies as there are now in Kenya; yet today the Jamaican sugar planters are most prosperous, and though they do not have political power they exercise influence because they have earned it. They have earned it by their wisdom in selling land for settlement by small farmers and in consistently giving the Government economic help and good economic advice.

Naturally, there is no exact analogy with Kenya. The situation is more difficult there. There has recently been much violence in Kenya. Many Kenya Europeans are mixed farmers and not planters. All the same, what has happened in the West Indies might happen in Kenya. In politics, Africans and settled Europeans and Asians rub shoulders, know one another well, and can co-operate. In their hearts all African leaders know well that it is necessary to keep a number of Europeans and Asians in the country. There is little doubt that the European with a large farm who leaves, say, a third unused will find that a part of his land will sooner or later be taken. On the other hand, the writer of this article believes that the European who intensively farms his land will probably remain in possession of his farm; and there is no doubt that this is the intention of African leaders of both political parties.

In most countries which have achieved independence since the end of the last war, stability has depended on certain developments. One is the emergence of small farmers owning their own farms in the country; another is the development of good housing and house-ownership alongside factory development in the towns. In Kenya the first of these is already present in the vitally important Central Province. The consolidation of scattered Kikuyu holdings into compact farms, followed by the issue of individual title, subject to certain conditions designed to protect small farmers, and followed in

turn by an International Bank loan to provide finance, is a most important landmark for the future. Equally important are other developments in African farming, notably the organization of livestock farming among people such as the Samburu and the Tugen. The existing scheme for the settlement of Africans on 50- and 15-acre holdings on farms bought from European owners, with money provided partly by the International Bank and partly by the Colonial Development Corporation, provides an admirable opportunity for a further step forward for African farming. Smallholders usually need assistance to obtain the capital to develop their farms and help in processing and marketing their products. The presence of some larger farmers or a nucleus estate to act as a demonstration farm or as a place for experiment in new methods in the vicinity is also useful. All this is already being supplied in part of Kenya. For several years African coffee farms have been very successful both as to yield per acre and as to the price obtained for their coffee in the middle-altitude areas of Kenya. More recently, African growers of tea have achieved a more difficult success in the higher-altitude areas. The future here perhaps lies with the sort of scheme now instituted in the eastern part of the Meru district, where the tea factories and the marketing will be the responsibility of an organization for which the Colonial Development Corporation will provide some money and an experienced tea company will provide both other money and management, and the Africans themselves will be the third shareholding partner. The African District Council or Co-operative Society will, in the future, be able to enlarge its interest by purchases from the CDC when and as it wishes. The result is a partnership project after the model of the great Gezira Scheme of the Sudan.

### The Facts of Life

WITH this background, it can reasonably be claimed that in spite of much pessimistic talk, in spite of many difficulties and in spite of the story of recent violence, the task of transition in Kenya might be successfully accomplished. Changes in certain attitudes of mind are, however, essential to success and those who will the end must will the means. Europeans who hope to remain in their farms and businesses must help and not hinder the new African Government as it develops and as its need to build up confidence consequently increases. Africans who hope for economic growth and the retention of a European and Asian stake in the country must produce safety and stability for the Europeans and the Asians who stay.

In the main there are two requisites. One is economic and the other political. No government, whether colonial or independent, can avoid the economic facts of life in Kenya. The first of these is that a large African population of over six million lives in a country poor in mineral resources and, in many areas, very dry. The economy of that country depends in part on agriculture and forestry in the limited fertile area. It also depends, as does Great Britain, in part on invisible exports arising from Nairobi's being in the central position for commerce and factory production in East Africa and the fact that up to date these invisible exports have helped to correct an unfavourable balance of visible trade. The Government of Kenya strives

ceaselessly to find employment for the growing population. It must attack this problem in many ways. On one side there is the development of agricultural production. Tea, good quality coffee and pyrethrum are important cash crops. Kenya can feed itself and export some food. The future lies with the improvement of smallholder farming and with a number of larger farms in the higher-altitude areas, developed on the basis of ley farming. There has been a considerable increase in recent years in the number of secondary industries; and the Mombasa oil refinery is the largest productive unit ever to come to Kenya. Kenya is also a first-class forestry country and the ideal use of pine trees, which can be grown admirably in the central plateau, would be a pulp industry. In recent years, for the first time, irrigation has been developed in African areas and in places has given promising results. Finally, much research has been done on the basic problem of the proper cover of the Kenya mountains to prevent the drying up of streams as land is developed under the hot equatorial sun. But all this, the improved farming, the new factories, the growth of the forests, depends on maintaining a steady flow of investment. What the Nile water is to Egypt, that flow of investment is to Kenya. Without it, the country will begin to go backwards and the standard of living will fall, with an unavoidable effect on stability and security.

The second requisite is political stability and this, in turn, affects the economic position. Naturally, there will be plenty of political controversy and sharp political struggles. That is unavoidable and probably as it should be. What is essential, however, is to avoid in this country—with an economy as exposed and vulnerable as that of Great Britain—any sustained outburst of violence. If it becomes apparent that there will be no such outburst, many of the best European farmers and business men will stay. Many European civil servants who have given their lives very successfully to the country will also continue their work. Without them the prospect would be bleak. With them, there are signs of hope.

### The Problem of Jomo Kenyatta

THE most serious obstacle in the way of the developments sketched in this article is the problem of Kenyatta. The only useful way to approach this problem is to consider what the government can and cannot do. For this purpose it is necessary for everyone to make some mental adjustments. For some the adjustment is to consider what is needed for the future and not to be guided entirely by the horrible events of the past. For others, it is equally necessary to realize that too high a price can be paid for a transient popularity with African Nationalist leaders at any given moment. It is suggested that we in Great Britain should accept certain propositions.

The first is that we, ourselves, must cope with this problem, before we leave Kenya. That is, that it is our duty to organize Kenyatta's release and to deal with the situation following his release before our responsibilities cease. If we do not do this, we shall not be fulfilling our duty to the brave Europeans and still braver Africans who opposed Mau Mau in the days of its strength.

Secondly, we must recognize the gravity of the problem and realize that it

is not going to be easy for people who were close to the events to make the necessary mental adjustment. Kenyatta was convicted of managing and of being a member of Mau Mau. This was no ordinary nationalist movement which used violent means in order to obtain power. It relied on the use of witchcraft and superstitious fears to gain a hold systematically over the Kikuyu. The bestial ceremonies, the murders of potential witnesses and minor African officials, the attacks on the missions and the slashing of animals were all part of a piece. The movement led by intelligent and educated people deliberately took the Africans back into savagery and, in the process, frustrated for years the healthy political development of the country. The memories of terrible physical and psychological hurt which this movement inflicted on the country will not make the process of reconciling people to the thought of Kenyatta's ultimate release any easier.

Thirdly, it is worth remembering that many thousands of the followers of Mau Mau were successfully released without any serious recrudescence of violent trouble. This happened because a definite method was adopted. That method implied release step by step. It also implied the use of the persuasive power of Kikuyu on other Kikuyu as the Mau Mau detainees were gradually released. They were able to see that the Kikuyu countryside had improved during their period of detention and they were able to come in contact with a public opinion which had become exasperated by the violent movement.

During the period of transition, from a colonial government to an independent government, there is an important stage. It is the stage at which a Chief Minister has the powers to govern and exercises them in nearly all the ordinary work of government. Yet the Governor is still in a position to advise and has the right of re-entry in case of a collapse of law and order or of administration. During this period strain is put both on the Governor and on the Chief Minister. Yet, in other African countries, it is during these very years that new Ministers have learned lessons that have served them well once they stand entirely on their own. Kenya is about to enter this period. Before it comes to an end and before British control is entirely relaxed, a programme must be worked out by the Africans and the Europeans in the Government for Kenyatta's release in such a way that the least possible harm will be done. This is possible, provided the gravity of the problem is recognized and the lessons of the past are not forgotten. It is possible, the writer believes, because though Kenyatta is a far more remarkable man than were the Mau Mau detainees, fundamentally his problem is theirs. This treatment requires a series of actions over a period based on a prepared plan. Equally, it can reasonably be hoped that Kenyatta may be presented with an African public opinion which is looking to the future and not to the past and which, once Africans are in control, wishes to concentrate on economic development and the basic problems of the country.

### Signs of Recovery

**I**F this difficult, but not impossible, task is to be accomplished, it is essential that there should be no slackening in any form of economic aid given by Great Britain or by international agencies to Kenya. It is also most important



that all the East African territories should maintain the greatest degree of economic co-operation together and should expand the existing High Commission system. Fortunately, Mr. Nyerere appears to be well aware of this requirement. If the railways and harbours, the post and telegraphs and the vitally important fundamental research cannot continue to be conducted on an East African basis by an East African organization, which in the future it is hoped will at least obtain its own revenue, then the chances of successful government of the independent political units will be seriously endangered.

Up to date, Mr. Macleod and Sir Patrick Renison have dealt admirably with the difficult security problem. Elected Africans now hold important positions in the Government. Kenya has often been a country of violent events and exaggerated statements, yet it has also been a country which has demonstrated remarkable powers of recovery. Usually, the traces of a civil war are to be seen for very many years after the fighting has ceased. The story of the Deep South in the United States illustrates this, and so does English history for many years after the Restoration. Yet in Kenya only a few years after Dedan Kimathi, the most important terrorist leader, was caught, a Kikuyu Minister was doing very good work side by side with elected European ministers in the Kenya Government. All friends of Kenya will hope that, just as its people recovered from the effects of a period of violence, so they will recover from the doubts and fears of the last few months; and the first signs of recovery are already there.

# UNITED KINGDOM

## AN INNOVATING BUDGET

WHEN these Notes appear, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, will be spending the long summer nights defending much of the detail of his first Finance Bill. Some of the criticism will be coming from the Conservative ranks behind him, but this does not mean that his Budget affronted his backbenchers or even disappointed them when his handiwork was looked at whole. The remarkable thing about his achievement was that he brought in a counter-inflationary Budget that squeezed another £80 million out of the taxpayer but somehow not merely reconciled Conservatives in the Commons to it but gave them the feeling that here they had the most truly Conservative statement by a Chancellor of the Exchequer since the party came back to power in 1951. In small part the manner of Mr. Lloyd's presentation of his statement helped to produce this favourable impression. In the nine months since he left the Foreign Office for the Treasury Mr. Lloyd chose to keep out of the limelight, even in the Commons, and nobody had been able to catch any clues about the directions in which his thoughts had been turning during his months of "purdah". Remembering his more harassed performances as Foreign Secretary, not even rank-and-file Conservative members had any reason to expect that the new Chancellor of the Exchequer would stride out confidently on to the stage and for 90 minutes command the attention of the House with a statement delivered with ease and authority, and with a few touches of originality. It was a good start.

But what mattered more than the method, even the style, of the Budget's presentation was the ethos and tone of its content. Or, to put it another way, the flair with which Mr. Lloyd repeatedly echoed the mood of his party in the Commons. One Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer after another, for instance, has disappointed party hopes that something would be done, not to prevent an absolute increase in government spending (nobody believes that to be possible), but to take good care that the growth of public expenditure should bear a relationship to the growth of the national product. Mr. Lloyd was unable to go to the dispatch box and claim that he had already imposed such a firm discipline on his colleagues, but he did announce that the Government are studying new methods of achieving this desirable end and that from now on all public expenditure is to be looked at whole, instead of piecemeal, on a forward projection of several years. Meanwhile, the purposes of the Budget would be to restrain the growth of consumption, encourage investment and leave room for increased exports; improve the methods of regulating the economy; and provide additional incentives to effort and initiative. Above all, Mr. Lloyd emphasized, everything done must help to maintain confidence in sterling.

From the beginning Mr. Lloyd managed to give Conservatives an exciting sense that under his leadership new ideas are beginning to flow freely inside

the Treasury and that a reorientation of economic and fiscal policies has been set in process, and he had not gone very far in his statement before this impression was confirmed. Industry has been bitterly critical for some time about the jerkiness and unjust effects of "brake and accelerator" methods of regulating the economy in between the annual Budgets by such monetary methods as bank rate, special deposits by the banks to restrict credit, and changes in hire-purchase terms. Mr. Lloyd had been studying what substitutes there might be which could stimulate the economy or restrain it quickly, at any time of the year, and have rapid and widespread effects, and the outcome was a decision to take powers to allow him overnight (subject to Commons confirmation by resolution within 28 days) to apply two economic regulators. By the first regulator the Chancellor of the Exchequer could apply a special surcharge or rebate, up to 10 per cent, to all the main customs and excise revenue duties and to purchase tax, and thereby possess himself of a flexible weapon at the maximum to remove £200 million from home spending in a year or add £200 million to it. By the second regulator the Chancellor of the Exchequer could impose a payroll tax, up to a maximum of 4s. for each worker on the National Insurance weekly stamp, and thereby cream off rather more than £200 million.

### A Crude Instrument

NO Conservative went on record with a protest against these regulatory instruments, which at first sight have the smack of arbitrary measures of control of a socialist sort. On the contrary, even though the payroll tax regulator pleased nobody and immediately produced a torrent of criticism, Conservatives at least welcomed them as a sign that Mr. Lloyd is set on making a serious attempt to cut himself free from some of the deadweight of Treasury thinking and traditional practice. Undoubtedly, Mr. Lloyd and his colleagues in an important sense made the mistake of proposing the contingent payroll tax too hurriedly, before they had explored the many disadvantages of such a crude instrument of control; and they made a bad error in public relations and presentation technique when they failed to see that the City, industry and politicians had always been "sold" the payroll tax as a means of encouraging labour mobility and the concentration of effort in capital-intensive industries, and would therefore be bewildered when the Chancellor of the Exchequer mainly argued for the tax as a quick means of curbing home consumption. From the beginning this has led to confusion inside and outside Westminster, and hardly anyone believes that Mr. Lloyd has done more than fly a kite to test public opinion for a better-justified innovation which will be brought in next year. (The powers sought in the present Finance Bill will operate only for one year.) Unless any payroll tax is to be a very blunt and damaging instrument it must be far more discriminatory between industries, regions and types of workers.

The one major tax concession Mr. Lloyd has offered was one that shrewdly delighted Conservatives—the level at which surtax on earned income is to be levied from next year is to be raised from about £2,000 to £5,000. This

was a good deal more generous than anything the party had expected, but even so we are officially told that no more than 150,000 men and women are going to draw any benefit from it. Why, then, the general Conservative joy? The explanation must lie in the fact that Mr. Lloyd's audience for his Budget statement included an exceptionally high proportion of Conservative surtax payers; but it is also true that for many years Conservative conferences have been passing or pressing resolutions demanding a surtax concession, and now at last they have a Chancellor of the Exchequer who has answered their prayer. It is a concession that brought no electoral advantage to the Government, as two by-elections in Budget week, at Paisley and Warrington, promptly showed. In both instances the Conservatives lost ground to the Liberals; and in Paisley the Conservative candidate came a bad third. In Parliament and in the by-election campaigns Labour have been able to make much play with the juxtaposition of increases of contributions and charges for the Health Service and a "hand-out" of £80 million a year to 150,000 of the most highly paid men and women in the country. Labour do not tire of saying that the party of the better-off has now begun quite openly and callously to look after its own; the Conservatives say the surtax concession is an act of long-delayed justice to that class on whose energy and initiative the country disproportionately depends.

#### Pressures from Behind

ONE thing is certain: even though Mr. Lloyd's room for manoeuvre was cruelly limited by the poor balance-of-payments position and the signs that the year may not be without inflationary pressures, he had to give his party some modest satisfaction, if he could manage it, for political reasons. The Conservatives in Parliament are in a strange, not to say fascinating, mood. It was always predictable when the general election in October 1959 returned Mr. Macmillan to power with a majority of 100 that the point must come in this Parliament when the Conservative rank and file would put on pressure to get done some of the things that are closest to their instincts and their beliefs. There is no need to be mealy-mouthed about it. After the catastrophe of 1945 the Conservative leaders and party managers had the best of reasons for taking on the colour of the party that had hit the mood of the electorate, and Butskellism,\* as it is called, became the vogue. A cross-breed of Radical Toryism helped to bring the Conservatives back to power in 1951 on a fragile majority, with the Left wing (it is a loose expression) of the party tending to be dominant, at least to the extent that in the memory of '45 the Right wing (also a loose expression) knew the tide was not running their way. Conservative leaders were habitually careful to march in step with the fringe Conservative vote, rather than the hard core of party stalwarts.

At the 1955 general election the balance had been so nicely kept that the Conservative majority in the House became more than comfortable. Then, in the autumn of 1956, there came the catastrophe of the Anglo-French Suez

\* The word fuses the names of Mr. R. A. Butler, the principal representative of progressive Conservatism, and Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, the present leader of the Labour Party, who comes from its more moderate wing.—*Editor*.



military operation. Once again, with Mr. Macmillan now Prime Minister, the Conservative Party had to restore public confidence. No leader could have done this more brilliantly, for Mr. Macmillan, whose supreme political gift is pragmatism, or, as his critics in the party would say, his flair for expediency, survived ministerial resignations and a disastrous series of by-election setbacks to lead his party back to its present unchallengeable position in the Commons.

But a majority of 100 is at once a comfort and a danger. It means that an Administration need have no worries when the division bells ring, but it also means that any group of Conservative backbenchers with a grievance or an unsatisfied demand may feel that they can work against policy without committing the unforgivable sin of bringing down the Government. Similarly, they may feel that a party which has won three general elections in succession, each time with an increased majority, can afford to be "true" to itself.

This goes far to explain what is happening inside the Conservative Party in the Commons just now. On a series of unrelated issues the Government are being put under pressure from their flank. The rapid advance of black Africans to power in Central Africa; the "softness" of the Home Office towards the violent criminal, particularly the murderer; government financial help to private industry; the policy of successive Ministers of Defence and their refusal to admit that recruiting will not provide adequate conventional forces for Britain's commitments; the Government's acceptance of the departure of the Union of South Africa from the Commonwealth—all these are questions that disturb sections of the Conservative Party, and they have begun to show an increasing tendency not to restrict their criticisms to private meetings on the Committee floor of the Commons but to declare themselves in public, not least in the House.

### Colonial Policy

EASILY the most serious Conservative demonstration against the Government has occurred over Mr. Iain Macleod's constitutional plan for Northern Rhodesia. At one time a motion which in effect repudiated Mr. Macleod and demanded the vindication of the Lennox-Boyd proposals of 1958 commanded nearly 100 Conservative signatures. It had Mr. Robin Turton, a former Minister of Health, as the main signatory, and many of the Conservative knights who are the stabilizers of the party in the Commons subscribed their names. Lord Salisbury, the former leader of the Conservatives in the Upper House and with Sir Winston Churchill the main influence in Mr. Macmillan's elevation to the leadership in 1957, soon revealed that he stood at the head of the revolt; and he made an attack of extraordinary bitterness on Mr. Macleod in the House of Lords. This strong and not uninfluential group of rebels were, and are, making two main points. First, they accept the need for African advance to power but they believe that Mr. Macleod has set too fast a pace. Secondly, they believe that the Government have not treated Sir Roy Welensky with the frankness that he deserves and was entitled to. Those who listen to Central African white politicians see Mr. Macleod as the villain of

the piece (he ranks next to Mr. Butler among the Tory Radicals) and their theory runs that he has been too cleverly playing off the whites against the blacks. But this is asking too much. Ever since his "wind of change" speech at the beginning of 1960 Mr. Macmillan's responsibility for the pace of the black African advance to power has been beyond doubt, and it was always assumed that he chose Mr. Macleod as Colonial Secretary precisely because of his intellectual qualifications and his personal commitment for this task. But the mutinous group have singled out Mr. Macleod to be the scapegoat, and one might easily assume that Mr. Macmillan has no responsibility at all. Certainly they have succeeded in checking Mr. Macleod's rapid progress in party influence (no doubt only temporarily), but it is possible to think that their caution in not including Mr. Macmillan in their attack is an admission that they do not feel so strong as their numbers might suggest on paper. More probably they hope to chasten the Prime Minister by punishing his deliberately chosen lieutenant, because they know in their hearts that if they openly attacked Mr. Macmillan a lot of their Commons support would evaporate.

Nor is it possible to review these events without reflecting on the decline of Lord Salisbury's influence within the party. When this very able Cecil resigned in 1958 as Lord President of the Council and Government leader in the Lords over Mr. Macmillan's policy for an independent Cyprus Republic, it seemed to be just about the heaviest blow that could have been struck against the Administration. But the waters closed over his head, and his rare interventions since have carried no great authority. It is hard to believe that Mr. Macmillan has any need to compromise in an attempt to keep Lord Salisbury's support, or even tolerance, although the power of the Cecils behind the scenes should never be underestimated.

If developments in Central Africa have brought into being a strong internal opposition within the Conservative Party in the Commons, it cannot be said that the critics of the Government's attitude towards the withdrawal of the Union from the Commonwealth is either numerically significant or influential. There is still in the Commons a handful of Conservative members, all that is left of the original Right-wing Suez group, who let no chance go by for taking a stand that the overwhelming majority of the party consider to be completely out-dated in its extremism. Their nominal head is Lord Hinchings-brooke, with Mr. Anthony Fell and Mr. John Biggs-Davison as the readiest spokesmen just now on African questions. But the Government has no need to fear their speeches—or, until their numbers considerably increase, their votes.

### Migrants from the Commonwealth

ANOTHER current Conservative issue that involves parts of the Commonwealth is coloured immigration. Here the pressure comes not (as may be sometimes thought) from the orthodox Right wing of the party but from a number of members who happen to represent constituencies in a few cities or areas of London where in recent years West Indian, Indian and Pakistani immigrants have heavily concentrated and have created local social

problems. In London, West Indians in Brixton have received vastly more attention in the last few years than the old coloured settlement in Limehouse ever had; and other cities affected are Birmingham, Nottingham, Leeds and Liverpool. The figures showing the inflow of immigrants in the first months of this year show an extraordinary increase, and the Government admit that the restrictive agreements with India and Pakistan have completely broken down and that pressure is being put on the West Indian governments to introduce some form of control.

At present the Government obviously hope that the countries from which the immigrants are coming in enlarging waves will see the political advisability of keeping down the numbers; and on his recent visits to Washington and Ottawa, immediately after talks with West Indian Ministers, Mr. Macmillan broached the possibility of a bigger American and Canadian quota for West Indian workers. But the likelihood is strengthening that within the next year or two the United Kingdom Government will have to act on their own account, probably by imposing for the first time a condition (fairly general in the rest of the Commonwealth) that immigrant workers must have a job in Britain to take up or some established citizen who will accept responsibility for them. Ministerial thinking is also moving towards new measures to enable the deportation of undesirable immigrants, not because coloured immigrants are on the average less law abiding than anybody else but because one undesirable West Indian, say, is always likely to rouse dangerous prejudices against all his perfectly lawful compatriots who have been driven to Britain by their need for work and who can expect to find it in a country with full employment and with a Welfare safety-net to catch anybody who takes a tumble.

For the Government it makes a very delicate and complex problem, not least because it is politically impossible for the centre of the multi-racial Commonwealth to legislate against West Indian immigrants without legislating against, say, the Irish immigrants who nowadays make up a large proportion of the workers engaged on heavy manual labour. Any measure of control will have to apply equally to white British citizens and black British citizens.

### Into the Common Market?

THE sternest test of Conservative loyalties lies ahead, perhaps less far away than is sometimes thought. Since Mr. Macmillan came back in April from his meetings with President Kennedy and the leaders of the new American Administration in Washington there have been many indications that the Government are thinking afresh about a reconciliation with the six countries of the European Economic Community. No new formal negotiations are yet proceeding, but there seems to be little doubt that if President Kennedy prepares the way for a political decision by France to welcome a British approach, then the British approach will be made. Some observers have gone beyond the evidence with a suspicion that Ministers have already decided in favour of adhering to the Treaty of Rome, and avoid saying so only to make sure that they will not be rebuffed by French opposition and

to keep some of their counters in reserve to get the best deal they can on Commonwealth trade, home agriculture and their obligations to the rest of the European Free Trade Association.

The turning-point for the British Government came in Washington when, in the course of a general discussion about the need for the western alliance to hold the line against Communist pressures, President Kennedy made clear that his Administration did not share some of President Eisenhower's fears about the effect on American trade of a unified European economic block. As the private conversations are understood in London, President Kennedy foresaw the economic difficulties that might be created for the United States, but he thought the political advantages of a united Europe were more important. This revelation of a change of American attitude gave Mr. Macmillan a chance to make a new start with his colleagues when he returned home.

But nothing that was said in Washington, of course, could remove Britain's own political difficulties about entering the Common Market. Canada and New Zealand, as large food producers much dependent on the British market, have interests that need to be protected; the Government committed themselves in their 1959 general election manifesto to the continuance of domestic agricultural support; and Britain could not go into E.E.C. unilaterally after playing the lead in the creation of the European Free Trade Association. Conservative backbench members of the agriculture committee have lately been intensively studying how British agricultural support could be adapted to the Treaty of Rome, and they seem to have reached an interim conclusion that the reconciliation might well be possible.

### Conservative Divisions

**B**UT there is no gainsaying that any government decision to go into the Community would inflict hurt upon some interests—and they are likely to be interests that are well represented on the Conservative side in the Commons. So far as one may judge, the rank and file of the Conservative Party outside Parliament is about equally divided on the issue whether Britain should go in or stay out, and there will have to be a period for the preparation of public opinion before any new government approach is easily accepted. In fact, during the last few years the Government have been obliged to confuse the public opinion on which they may soon have to rely. That is to say, they had to defend their refusal to go into the Treaty of Rome by establishing a case that it would be harmful to British interests; and now it would be hard to sign the Treaty unless its provisions were visibly seen to have been amended to meet Britain's particular needs. But nothing in the French attitude suggests that any substantial amendment is a possibility. Meanwhile, the E.E.C. has made so much progress that the British case for amendment, or adaptation, has notably weakened. There is a danger that if new formal negotiations are opened Britain will stand as a suppliant in relation to the Six and will get something less than the best terms.

There are all the makings of internal party trouble in this situation. But it is something the Opposition may not be able to profit from fully. The



Parliamentary Labour Party is as much divided as the government side of the Commons on the need for or advisability of reconciliation with the Rome Treaty. Both sides are made nervous when they think of the loss of sovereignty that would be involved and of the political implications of being bound up by Treaty with countries that could flood Britain with cheap horticultural produce, manufactures and even cheaper labour. In the Commons, support for joining E.E.C. crosses party alignments. So does opposition to it.

### Peerless Campaign

THE second Viscount Stansgate, or Mr. Anthony Wedgwood Benn as he prefers to be known, has provided over the last few months an extraordinary example of what can be achieved by one really determined and single-minded radical when he pits himself against all the formidable inertia of tradition, Establishmentarianism, the Government, parliamentary procedure and the Constitution. It is by no means necessary to sympathize with all, or any part of, his campaign to renounce his peerage and continue to be eligible to stay in the House of Commons in order to admire the courage and ability with which he has fought.

At the time of writing, Lord Stansgate's eligibility to take his seat in the Commons once again after winning the by-election at Bristol South-East by an overwhelming majority is still in suspense. The defeated Conservative candidate, himself heir presumptive to a peerage, has petitioned the High Court to determine Lord Stansgate's eligibility as a peer to stand for election. There is no question that Conservative leaders were badly shaken not merely by their candidate's low poll but by the evidence that many ordinary Conservatives, particularly the young, sympathized with Lord Stansgate's campaign.

Although Lord Stansgate fails in the short term, everybody expects that eventually at least his point—the renunciation of a peerage—will be conceded. Because Lord Stansgate had succeeded in drawing the national limelight upon his case and had proved that the House of Lords as it now is cannot hope to be acceptable to some opinion in all parties, the Government had to recognize that they could not leave the issue, as they at first hoped, to be settled as an isolated case by a Select Committee of the House of Commons (who rejected Mr. Benn's petition to renounce his succession to the peerage). When Lord Stansgate, officially backed by the Opposition as well as by a mixture of Conservatives, Liberals and non-political sympathizers, refused to take as the final answer the Commons majority's decision in favour of the Select Committee's report, and accepted nomination as Labour candidate in the by-election at Bristol South-East the Government were obliged to have second thoughts. Midway through the by-election campaign they announced their decision to set up a Joint Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament to consider the reform of the composition of the Upper House, including the renunciation of peerages.

This was a considerable personal victory for Lord Stansgate, if a slight embarrassment to the Parliamentary Labour Party, who have never been

able to agree on what future the House of Lords should be allowed to have. Labour's general position for ten years or more has been that any reform of the composition of the House must be accompanied by a reform of its powers, so that there will never again be the chance that the legislative policies of a Labour Government may be frustrated by the Second Chamber. (Since the Parliament Act of 1949, a by-product of the party clash on the nationalization of the steel industry, the Lords' delaying powers have been effective for only one session, which for practical legislative purposes means nine months. But it is true that the overwhelming preponderance of Conservative backwoodsmen peers, who hardly ever turn up in the House but retain their right to sit, speak and vote, makes the present House of Lords a latent threat to a Labour Government and something of an anachronism even to some Conservatives.)

For their part, the Conservatives have been committed to reform of the Second Chamber ever since the three-party agreement of 1948, but reform only of membership, not of powers. When the three-party agreement was aborted by Labour's later refusal to co-operate, Conservatives went on alone to introduce such gradual reforms as life peerages, the admission of women members and the payment of attendance allowances of three guineas a day; and now Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Butler have decided to turn Lord Stansgate's campaign to account by preparing the way for further changes in composition. First, the path, which is set about by many legal and constitutional pitfalls, will have to be thoroughly blazed by the Joint Select Committee, but there is some reason for thinking that the Government within the next few years will act to bring the Second Chamber into tune with what seems to be fairly widespread public opinion. It is not unrespectable for Conservatives nowadays to speculate about a House of Lords reduced from its present membership of more than 900 (the largest senatorial or revising Chamber in the free world) to about 200 peers of Parliament, in which there would not be a guaranteed overwhelming majority for any one party. One suggestion is that hereditary peers (the Government will be determined to preserve the hereditary principle) might elect a proportion of their number to serve in Parliament, much as the Scottish peers now elect their representatives to sit,\* and that the rest of the members could be life peers, perhaps sitting only for the term of one Parliament.

This, or something like this, is the prospect that Lord Stansgate has managed to bring nearer, in spite of massive efforts to frustrate him. The truth is that the public image of the House of Lords in Britain today is not favourable enough to enable it to bear too much exposure to criticism, perhaps partly because its practice is different from what it can be made to seem to be in theory as it is now composed. The moment Lord Stansgate showed that he was prepared to campaign to the logical limit and invite the electors of Bristol to stand up to be counted in his cause the Government had to concede something to public opinion. But Labour may well find in

\* Under the terms of the Treaty of Union, 1707, the Crown renounced the power to create new peers of Scotland, and the holders of the Scottish peerages then existing elect, at the beginning of each Parliament, sixteen of their number to sit in the House of Lords.

the end that the House of Lords will not have been weakened; it could very well emerge, in the next few years, more efficient and more attractive to the people. That, at least, is what Conservatives hope. It is perhaps what Labour fears.

Great Britain,  
May 1961.

#### NORTHERN IRELAND

THE problems of devolution, discussed in *THE ROUND TABLE*\* on the 40th anniversary of the Government of Ireland Act, do not grow less. In March a group of Ministers met in London to examine economic relations and future policy, but they failed to redefine the division of responsibility for development between the British and Northern Ireland Governments. Almost at once Mr. Selwyn Lloyd's Budget posed afresh the undeniably difficult question of how such remoter and more backward areas can be sheltered from measures, like the credit squeeze, called for by over-employment elsewhere.

In this instance the National Insurance surcharge, designed to secure greater mobility of labour, has no logical application to Northern Ireland, and if it had to be enforced could become a heavy extra load on industry. Only after great pressure from the Minister of Finance, Captain Terence O'Neill, and the Ulster M.P.s at Westminster, was the Chancellor of the Exchequer persuaded to say that if the surcharge is imposed the proceeds would be payable to the Northern Ireland Exchequer and used as the Government saw fit. Captain O'Neill at once indicated that the money would be refunded to certain industries, including shipbuilding, aircraft and textiles. In the same way the proceeds of any surcharge in customs and excise duties or purchase tax can be spent on industrial development in Northern Ireland, but a section of the Ulster Unionist members is continuing to press for a total exemption.

In the earlier negotiations, the British Government had shown a new reluctance to differentiate between Northern Ireland and other development areas. The change of attitude dates from the Local Employment Act, in which the under-employed districts in Great Britain were given direct inducements much on a par with those already available in Ulster. Since last year it has no longer been possible to say that Northern Ireland offers the most advantageous range of assistance in the United Kingdom to industrialists planning expansion. This change in the situation can hardly be warranted by the economic progress that has been made. Despite the attraction of various new industries, unemployment this month was as high as 7.3 per cent, proof that with a growing population and a drift from the land (the full extent of which is about to be established by the census) Northern Ireland has to keep running to stand still. At this moment, too, the weakness of the economy has been re-exposed by the forthcoming closure of the largest unit in the linen industry, employing 1,700 workers, and by the plight of shipbuilding. In

\* See *THE ROUND TABLE*, No. 198, March 1960, pp. 180-4.

Belfast between 7,000 and 10,000 shipyardmen will be idle by midsummer, and judging by the state of the industry nationally it would seem that many of these can never hope to return. Already the Ministry of Labour is seeking to train displaced workers for other forms of engineering, but it will be some years before a better equilibrium can be organized.

It was under the shadow of the shipbuilding slump that the Prime Minister, Lord Brookeborough, led his principal ministers to London for the first round-table conference of its kind since 1955. A number of proposals had been submitted three months before, and the meeting took place in an atmosphere of some impatience. Disappointment was of the same order when the results proved to be largely negative. It has since appeared that the British ministers declined to commit themselves further to the principle which Lord Brookeborough has addressed to the President of the Board of Trade, viz. "that when determining the amount of assistance to be given in Great Britain and the areas to which it will apply, it will be recognized that Northern Ireland needs to maintain a higher level of incentives to new industry to match what is an infinitely greater need". It is true that approval was given to a four-year extension of the Capital Grants to Industry Act, under which £4 million a year is spent on grants for modernization of buildings and machinery, and to a loan of up to £6 million to Short Brothers and Harland, Ltd., the Belfast aircraft constructors. The much overdue reassessment of Northern Ireland's ability to reach a state of full employment, the Governments have left to a joint study group of civil servants under Sir Herbert Brittain, and pending its report the proposals put forward by Lord Brookeborough are in abeyance. As a debate at Westminster on May 12 was to show, nothing more is likely to be done until the investigation, one in which industrialists might well have been invited to take part, has been completed.

It is too soon to say that public opinion has been roused by the slowness to secure new remedies. Unemployment, since it covers many unskilled workers and is constantly being tempered by emigration, is not so crucial an issue as might appear. In Northern Ireland other questions have a higher political importance, the maintenance of an impregnable pro-British majority most of all.

In the same way few are disturbed by the numbers of workless in Nationalist areas, so long as the Welfare State takes the edge off hardship. Heavy unemployment in Belfast, however, is a different matter, and there have been signs of an unrest that too readily turns to sectarian friction. Many of those who are now being paid off have been in regular employment throughout the post-war years: the loss of it, and of relatively high earnings, causes a resentment which could have unknown consequences for the Government. As for the Unionist Party, closely allied as it is to the Conservatives, there is some sense of disillusionment that promises of support have not been matched by more positive intervention. Similarly, there is an underlying fear that the Northern Ireland Government has come to an end of its resources in policy-making and that the Cabinet is unequal to the immediate task of quickening the rate of development. This is not to say that pride is not taken in the



achievements of the new industries drive: these have been considerable and are continuing, as shown by the latest acquisition, a nylon factory at Antrim to employ 2,000 workers when full production is reached in 1965. Rather there has been lacking the powers of advocacy and example necessary to convince the British Government on the one hand and to stimulate local capital and labour on the other. Cabinet changes announced in January have hardly altered the picture.

After eight years as a persevering Minister of Commerce, Lord Glentoran was elevated to the Senate: his successor is Mr. John Andrews, whose success as Minister of Health and Local Government has not necessarily been proof of his capacity to sell Northern Ireland to the work of business on the basis of the existing inducements. Other government appointments and the filling of vacant seats in the House of Commons have underlined the fact that Ulster politics are no longer the line of duty and ambition they were to the natural leaders of the community in the early days of self-government. The need to attract men and women of greater potentiality in government is frequently talked of: it has yet to produce an evident effort by the party to cure the condition, chiefly the extreme partisanship in constituency associations, which deters them.

Since the murder of a police constable in Co. Fermanagh\* there have been no terrorist outrages of a major order. But explosions along the border continue to be daily occurrences and the danger to life is always present. On its own side the Royal Ulster Constabulary, which still requires the help of Army units in patrolling, is in control of the situation. The same cannot be said of the Civic Guards in the Republic, who have not been armed with the extraordinary powers necessary to suppress a subversive organization that has been actively attacking Northern Ireland for nearly five years. The effect of this on Irish relations has been noted in previous articles. In London, Ulster Unionist M.P.s have again asked the Commonwealth Relations Office to bring greater pressure on the Irish Republic, but how far this has been done has not been disclosed. A general impression is that the British Government agrees with the Dublin view that public opinion is not ready to support rigorous action against the Irish Republican Army, the illegal body responsible for the campaign of violence. Neither has there been any suggestion that this issue has influenced the Anglo-Irish trade negotiations, which incidentally have been aimed *inter alia* at lowering some of the tariffs operating against goods made in Northern Ireland. On this field Lord Brookeborough has said that he would not stand in the way of manufacturers who would benefit from any system of preferential tariffs adopted in Dublin, a slight but significant concession to the view that trade between North and South should be encouraged.

Northern Ireland,  
May 1961.

\* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 202, March 1961, p. 172.

# IRELAND

## A CONSTITUTIONAL RECOIL

**T**WENTY-FIVE years ago Mr. de Valera, then President (Prime Minister) of the Irish Free State, decided in his wisdom that we needed a new Constitution. Four years before he had been returned to power after ten years in the political wilderness and had proceeded to carry out his policy by repudiating the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921, removing the parliamentary oath of allegiance it required, abolishing the Senate, which had refused to support his policy, and refusing to pay over the land annuities to Great Britain. To crown these achievements he abolished the existing Constitution based on the treaty of 1921, substituting a new version which he believed would not only enshrine his political theories but permanently discomfit his opponents. He assured the people that within its framework domestic peace could be assured and, in the words of its preamble, "the unity of our country restored".\* Although it should have been obvious that in our national circumstances it was essential that there should be power to amend the Constitution quickly and easily he provided that it could only be altered by an Act of Parliament endorsed by a referendum.† In a plebiscite held on July 1, 1937, his constitutional proposals were endorsed by the slender majority of 158,160. Had it been possible to submit his proposals to a vote of the whole country including Northern Ireland, which the new Constitution claimed to be part of the State, it would have been decisively rejected. Designed to enforce Mr. de Valera's political philosophy in perpetuity, it made possible the shameful Republican somersault of Mr. Costello, fortunately prevented Mr. de Valera from carrying out his belated decision to abolish P.R., and has now recoiled on his successor.

### The Northern Impasse

**P**ROOF of the manner in which Mr. de Valera's Constitution has permanently affected our national progress is best afforded by the relations between the Republic and Northern Ireland. Mr. Lemass, unlike his doctrinaire predecessor, is a political pragmatist. He is rightly anxious to establish good relations with our Northern neighbours. He said in a recent interview:

My view is that progress towards a solution of the problem of Partition must follow on some lessening of misunderstandings, tensions and old hostilities. . . . Any approach must be in the direction of encouraging contacts at every level, and creating an atmosphere in which—at some future time—the whole situation can be discussed on a new basis.‡

\* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 107, June 1937, p. 590.

† The First Constitution of 1922 contained provision for its amendment by Act of Parliament during sixteen years from its enactment.

‡ *Belfast Telegraph*, Jan. 27, 1961. The same edition contained the news of Constable Anderson's murder by the I.R.A. The murderers are still at large.

He has even offered to discuss the special exemption from our tariffs of goods made in Northern Ireland. But he also speaks perforce with another voice. On February 19, in a recorded broadcast from Cologne, he said

By every test Ireland is one nation with a fundamental right to have its essential unity expressed in its political institutions. The unit for self-determination is the whole country and we do not accept that a minority has the right to vote itself out of the nation on the ground that it is in disagreement with the majority on a major policy issue. We cannot and will not depart from that position.

Having regard to such claims it is perhaps natural that Lord Brookeborough should have replied to Mr. Lemass's overtures by stating that while his Government was quite willing to co-operate with that of the Republic on an equal basis when necessary it could only do so if its rightful status and jurisdiction were acknowledged. This necessary prerequisite of any friendly relationship unfortunately is impossible for Mr. Lemass to concede, because Article 2 of the Constitution declares that "The National territory consists of the *whole* island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas." Having regard to the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921 and the Boundary Agreement of 1925, both of which explicitly recognized the existence and jurisdiction of Northern Ireland, and were ratified by the British, Irish and Northern Irish parliaments, this declaration is patently untrue both *de facto* and *de jure*. In order to dodge these unpleasant facts Article 2 is qualified by Article 3, a masterpiece of equivocation, which declares that "pending the re-integration of the national territory, and without prejudice to the right of the Parliament and Government established by this Constitution to exercise jurisdiction over the whole of that territory, the laws enacted by that Parliament shall have the like area and extent of application as the laws of the Irish Free State and the like extra-territorial effect'. In other words they shall not apply to Northern Ireland. Even if Mr. Lemass desired to do so, which seems unlikely, it would probably be impossible for him to secure the revocation of these equivocal and contradictory constitutional declarations which embody the fantastic, but long established, doctrine of Irish nationalism that national unity is determined by geography. We are thus condemned by our Constitution to a final condition of checkmate so far as the possibility of achieving any policy of reconciliation between North and South is concerned.

Moreover the Constitution can be cited as justification for his conduct by every silly boy disguised in battle dress who ventures across the Border for a few hundred yards in order to blow up a Customs shed or murder a policeman. There has been a recrudescence of these senseless outrages in recent months, and innocent people have been injured. The Irish Government persists, however, in its policy of leniency towards the perpetrators, for, even since the foul murder of Constable Anderson in January, which was denounced by Mr. Lemass, young men arrested on the Southern side of the border with ammunition and explosives in their possession, presumably for use in such criminal enterprises, have been sentenced to only six months imprisonment. No doubt the Irish Government fears that harsher measures

would tend to make martyrs of these deluded boys while their sinister leaders and their Irish-American paymasters escape punishment. Yet as Mr. Ernest Blythe, who was a cabinet minister in Mr. Cosgrave's Government and is himself an Ulsterman, has recently pointed out,\* our Government should in such matters co-operate at least as fully with the police of Northern Ireland as they do with those of Great Britain. Unless they do this they will, he feels, contribute to the likelihood of further border killings and give ground for questioning their attitude. He adds that if the murderers of Constable Anderson are in the Republic wilful failure to arrest them would be condonation of the most blatant kind, and that if arrested they should be handed over to the Northern authorities for trial. This honest statement illustrates quite clearly the dilemma in which Mr. Lemass has been placed by the constitutional changes of Mr. de Valera, but unless his Government punishes such crimes adequately and co-operates for this purpose with the Northern Government, its own claim to govern would seem questionable.

### The Electoral Jigsaw

THE Government has again been hoist with its own constitutional petard by the Electoral Act of 1959, which effected a redistribution of parliamentary representation. This measure has now been declared repugnant to the Constitution as the result of proceedings instituted by Mr. John O'Donovan, who is the vice-chairman of the Senate and a lecturer in University College, Dublin. Although Mr. O'Donovan is a member of the principal opposition party, Fine Gael, it is understood that in this matter he acted on his own responsibility. Under Article 16 of the Constitution the Dail constituencies must be revised every twelve years having regard to changes in the distribution of population, but the total number of Dail deputies must not be fixed at less than one member for each 30,000 of the population, or at more than one member for each 20,000. To complicate the matter further it is also provided that "the ratio between the number of members to be elected at any time for each constituency and the population of each constituency as ascertained at the last preceding census, shall, *so far as is practicable*, be the same throughout the country". Although the Constitution was obviously drafted in English and then translated into Irish, it provides that in the case of conflict between the English and Irish versions "the text in the national language shall prevail". Much time and argument, based on the evidence of learned professors, was devoted by the Court to ascertaining the exact meaning in Irish of the words italicized above. Senator O'Donovan's complaint was that the Electoral Act of 1959 did not comply with the requirements of Article 16, and he produced conclusive evidence to show that the sparsely populated Western regions, where the Government party has most support, were over-represented as compared with the eastern cities. Mr. Justice Budd, who heard the action, found that Senator O'Donovan's complaints were justified, and that the legislature had not in the Electoral Act of 1959 maintained the ratio of members to population required by the Constitution, nor did it have due regard to the changes which had

\* *The Leader*, Feb. 1961.



taken place in the distribution of the population. It was, therefore, he held, repugnant to the Constitution. This decision placed the Government in a Gilbertian dilemma. Under the same Article 16 they are bound to hold a general election during the next twelve months, unless the Dail extends that period by legislation, but it is clearly in the Government's interest that the election should not be long delayed, as might well be the case if an appeal against the decision was taken to the Supreme Court. Accordingly, with somewhat bad grace, they decided to accept the High Court's decision and have introduced a new Electoral Bill to give it effect. Under this measure Dublin City and County will gain four seats and Cork City and County two seats. Six constituencies in rural areas will lose one member each because their populations are too small to justify the present representation. No deputy will represent less than 19,294 voters compared with the 20,000 provided in the Constitution. The new Dail will consist of 144 members from 38 constituencies, divided into 17 electing 3 members, 12 electing 4 members and 9 electing 5 members. In order to secure these results the geographical areas of several constituencies have been altered. The position is, however, further complicated by the fact that the population of each constituency must be as "ascertained at the last preceding census", and although a new census has just taken place on April 9, the final result will of course not be available until some time next year. This makes it nearly impossible to base the new Electoral Act on "the preceding census" and the Government are proceeding on the basis of the most recent figures available.

The new Bill is also probably unconstitutional because it is not based on the present census, nor even on the last population estimate which would only allow a total of 142 deputies, and because the period of twelve years, during which under the Constitution the constituencies should have been revised, has now expired. Should this prove to be the case we shall have reached a complete impasse, and a *reductio ad absurdum*, so far as the Constitution is concerned. It is a sad commentary on our political life that it should have been left to a private individual to assert our constitutional rights and that the Fine Gael Party, whose predecessors fought the Civil War in support of the principle of majority rule, should have now so signally failed to challenge a measure which was not only unconstitutional but contrary to the fundamental principles on which this State is based.

The High Court has also decided that courts appointed *ad hoc* to hear election petitions are unconstitutional, because the Constitution provides that justice shall be administered only in public courts established by law and by judges appointed in the manner provided by the Constitution. This decision may involve the constitutional position of other bodies, such as the Adoption Board, which discharge judicial or semi-judicial duties. But our constitutional problems do not end there, for the European Court of Human Rights, sitting at Strasbourg, has just been considering the case brought by one Gerard Richard Lawless against the Irish Government. Mr. Lawless was arrested in July 1957 on suspicion of belonging to an illegal organization and detained in an internment camp without charge or trial for six months.\*

\* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 199, June 1960, p. 293.

He claims damages on the grounds that his detention was contrary to the Constitution and to the Convention on Human Rights to which our Government is a signatory. The Commission on Human Rights, who first dealt with the matter, decided by a majority that, having regard to the state of public emergency existing at that time in Ireland, the Irish Government was entitled to take special precautions, and accordingly the detention of Mr. Lawless did not violate the Convention; but in view of the fundamental importance of the legal issues involved the Commission also decided to refer the case to the Court of Human Rights for final decision. Hence the present hearing, which raises another constitutional conundrum. The question for decision is in fact whether the condition of Ireland in 1957 justified the Government in keeping Mr. Lawless interned without charge or trial for several months. Whatever the result Mr. Lawless can pride himself on being the first private citizen to bring a charge against a Government before an international court. It may also cause the Irish Government to think twice before it signs any more international conventions.

### Labour Troubles

THE Government has also been indirectly involved in serious labour trouble. On February 18 some 6,000 bus employees of C.I.E., the national transport authority, began a series of week-end strikes to enforce their claim for additional pay in respect of work on Saturday afternoon and Sunday. The transport authority retaliated by a complete lock-out, and, after some abortive negotiations, the matters in dispute were finally referred to a special tribunal consisting of Mr. Justice Carrol O'Daly, a judge of the Supreme Court, Mr. Leo Crawford, Secretary of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, and Mr. Frank Lemass, brother of the Prime Minister, who is secretary of C.I.E. After hearing both sides this tribunal unanimously granted the bus employees an increase in pay of time and a quarter for Saturday afternoon, and time and three-quarters for Sunday. The original claim had been for time and a half for Saturday afternoon and double time on Sunday. The tribunal suggested that any further claim for an increase of wages should be postponed until the transport undertaking as a whole was paying its way. On a ballot of the men the award of the tribunal was accepted by a large majority.

Strikes have taken place at the German crane factory in Killarney consequent on a dismissal of workers, at the Dublin Gas Company and also at the new Verolme (Dutch) shipyard in Cork Harbour.\* In this latter case the employers by employing the members of a few Irish-controlled unions are seeking to reduce demarcation problems to a minimum, and the older British controlled unions are trying to upset this arrangement. This dispute, which still continues, may well dislocate the rather fragile settlement which was negotiated three years ago between the British- and Irish-based unions and resulted in the creation of the Congress of Irish Unions. These strikes have forced the Government to re-examine the present methods of dealing with labour disputes. The record of the existing Labour Court has been reasonably

\* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 193, Dec. 1958, p. 74.

satisfactory, about 75 per cent of its recommendations having formed the basis of settlements; but there is now a marked tendency to make its decisions, which are not binding, a springboard for further demands. The bus strike has shown that in the case of disputes affecting national interests on a large scale there should be power to appoint special tribunals for the purpose of mediation.

Two recent developments have a bearing on this question. The Irish Congress of Trade Unions and the Irish Labour Party have just joined forces to establish a new organization, which will be in effect a national council representing political and industrial labour interests. More important still is the liaison recently established between the European Productivity Agency (a branch of O.E.E.C.) and the Congress of Irish Unions, which has resulted in the establishment of a labour educational service. This service, which will operate through week-end schools, the training of whole-time officials, and other educational activities, aims at giving the trade-union members the confidence and ability to solve their own problems and to deal intelligently with the complexities of modern industry. The Congress has appointed Mr. Barry Desmond, a young commerce graduate, as its education officer, and he has already visited Sweden, France and Belgium in order to study their methods of dealing with this important problem.

#### **Economic and Political Trends**

**E**CONOMIC trends continue to be favourable. Recent official figures show that the national income increased by 5 per cent, to £528 million, in 1960, and the volume of output for all industries increased by 6 per cent. Taking the last four years together the balance of external payments is in equilibrium.

Emigration continues to be our most serious problem. It is estimated that the population has decreased by 146,000 during the last decade, and the present census will undoubtedly reveal a serious decline.

During the last year the most encouraging feature has been the rise in the export of manufactured products, which has reduced to some extent our dependence on the export of live cattle. This has been due largely to the new industries, many of foreign origin, which aim at production for export. If this trend is to continue Irish goods will have to be competitive in price and quality in order to meet competition in the British market, which absorbs four-fifths of our industrial exports.

Thirty years of industrial expansion have trebled the volume of output from our transportable goods industries and more than doubled the employment therein, but agriculture remains the largest employer of labour and the major exporting sector of our economy. Mr. Lemass has recently stated that we may expect the creation of at least 7,000 new jobs in 1961, but at least three times this number is necessary if our population is to be stabilized. The development of industries ancillary to our agricultural production, and the full use of our fertile soil, which have not yet been achieved, would seem to be the real solution of this vital problem. It involves the consolidation of our scattered rural communities into viable and self-sufficient units, and a drastic

overhaul of our educational system directed to creating an integrated and properly educated rural community with a proper sense of spiritual and cultural values. This is a work in which all parties might usefully combine, but there is little sign of their doing so.

Political trends show little change in party attitudes or forces. The recent Sligo-Leitrim by-election, in which the Fine Gael (Opposition) candidate had a majority of 1,319 over his Fianna Fail (Government) opponent, showed no real change in the political situation. Both parties polled almost the same number of votes as at the last general election, and the supporters of other parties, who did not run candidates, apparently abstained from voting. If there was any gain it would seem to have been by Fianna Fail, which increased its poll by 290 votes. Mr. James Dillon, the leader of Fine Gael, in his address at his party's recent annual convention charged the Government with having broken the undertakings on which they had been returned to power. Instead of lowering the cost of living, as promised, they had, he said, increased it; instead of the 100,000 new jobs they had promised there were 50,000 fewer people at work today; and instead of arresting emigration nearly 200,000 young people had emigrated since the Government was elected. His own programme for the future differs little from that of the Government, who, he claims, with some truth, have in fact adopted the Fine Gael policy. "Governments in a free society, can", he declared "achieve more by consultation and co-operation with vocational interests than they can ever hope to do by the big stick and bureaucratic coercion." He said also that while his party gladly welcomed the investment of foreign capital and technical skills in our industrial development they observed with growing anxiety the large-scale acquisition of agricultural land by foreign investors and regarded it as undesirable both socially and economically. Mr. Dillon has now introduced a Bill which provides for the registration of such foreign purchases.

Irish political life is rich in humorous incidents, the most recent being the publication of an official booklet which purports to be a history of the Fianna Fail Party. Appropriately entitled *The Story of Fianna Fail*, it maintains a calculated and comical reticence about matters which do not redound to that party's credit. For instance, no mention is made of Mr. de Valera's failure to abolish P.R., nor of his campaign against his successors in title, the I.R.A., but it does not fail to criticize Mr. Cosgrave's Government for dealing firmly with these same "heroes". Fianna Fail has in short been responsible for everything worth while that has happened here since 1921, and its opponents for all our misfortunes! Anyone who would believe this would believe anything.

### A Good Budget

**D**R. RYAN's fifth budget, which he presented to the Dail on April 19, reflects the growing prosperity of the Republic and is both fair and satisfactory. Starting with a surplus of £2,700,000, to which he added new taxation amounting to £930,000, he proceeded to make a reduction of 8d. in the standard rate of income tax, to increase social welfare benefits and old-



age pensions by 5 per cent, to allocate £800,000 for the assistance of agriculture, to raise the earned income relief limit to £2,000, to raise the surtax limit to £2,500, to adjust the lower death-duty rates and reduce the maximum rate from 51 to 40 per cent, to abolish stamp duty on receipts and increase it on cheques, and to put an increase of one penny on a packet of cigarettes. The total sum budgeted for was £143,500,000, with an additional sum of £55,000,000 for capital development. He announced further restrictions on foreigners' buying land save for industrial purposes. Income-tax law is to be consolidated and the civil service is to be reorganized. The remaining import levies, 14 in all, are to be made permanent. His reference to the "slow and unsteady growth of agriculture" disclosed our Achilles heel. The efficient marketing of our agricultural produce and the education of our farmers must receive more attention before we can feel that economic progress is assured. Dr. Ryan was, however, justly entitled to claim, as he did, that the foundations for future progress seem to have been soundly laid.

Ireland,  
May 1961.

# PAKISTAN

## THE ROYAL VISIT

A SUPERFICIAL assessment of the significance and importance of an occasion which has aroused frenzied popular enthusiasm is as convenient as it seems inevitable. It is precisely this which could conceal the real worth of Queen Elizabeth II's visit to Pakistan last February. The spontaneous and wildly enthusiastic reception accorded to Her Majesty and the Duke of Edinburgh throughout the country was as unprecedented as it was lavish and spectacular. Thinking of it so many instances come rushing to one's mind. It will be obviously impossible to refer to them. They cannot be recounted even briefly in the course of this article. Nevertheless, to substantiate the foregoing statement it will be appropriate to give some account of just one of them—the Queen's triumphal progress from Peshawar, the largest city in Pakistan's North-west Frontier, to Saidu Sharif, the capital of Swat State lying at the foothills of the Himalayas.

On February 7 the Queen and the Duke drove through the green fields of the lovely vale of Peshawar, on to the Malakand Pass into picturesque Swat, for a well-deserved two-day rest, and got a most fantastic and utterly unforgettable reception *en route*. It was a bitterly cold grey morning and the overnight rain had not only added to the rigours of the severe winter, it had made access from numerous villages to the royal route difficult. Yet such was the enthusiasm of the people that tens of thousands of them left their hearths and home, much before sunrise, to trudge many miles on foot, just to have a glimpse of royalty.

The 110-mile route from Peshawar to Saidu Sharif has been aptly and happily described as the route of triumphal arches. There were over 1,500 of them in all their incredible designs and patterns. The common people of this far-flung part of Pakistan had marshalled all their resources to give a fitting reception to the royal couple. They brought their cooking utensils and put them upside down on the arches to make them look like cupolas, a characteristic of Muslim architecture. Alongside the arches they put anything they could lay their hands on—a table, a chair, a basket of eggs or oranges, a tea set, a looking-glass or a photograph of the royal couple neatly cut from the newspaper supplements brought here to mark the great event. The royal procession had virtually to crawl its way almost throughout the entire route and at many places the crowds were within handshake distance of the royal car.

There were abundant manifestations in other parts of Pakistan of similar popular fervour aroused by the royal visit. The vast and cheering crowds, the dazzling illuminations, the scintillating fashion parades, the colourful civic receptions, enactment of scenes from the Moghul Court at the Shish Mahal (the Palace of Mirrors) in the Lahore Fort and tableaux depicting the

lives of the people of the country, all read like an enchanted fairy tale. One gets obsessed by their colour and splendour and is too apt to regard the event as nothing more than a carnival on a countrywide scale.

To say this is certainly not to suggest that the royal visit had any specific political objective to achieve. Quite on the contrary: such tours are invariably and inevitably non-political in their nature. But in broader terms they cannot help bringing their own impact.

Perhaps the most vital significance of the royal visit was to provide an opportunity to reaffirm the ties of a free and equal partnership which now bind republican Pakistan with monarchical Britain, a country which little more than a decade ago presided over the destiny of this sub-continent. One has only to look at the bitter reactions of the emergent countries of Asia and Africa to their erstwhile rulers to regard this partnership as an incredible phenomenon of contemporary history. Notwithstanding occasional stresses and strains Pakistan and the United Kingdom have all through maintained remarkable solidarity with each other. Such a happy state of affairs has been brought about by enlightened statesmanship of both countries as well as the impact of British traditions and institutions, which have appreciably conditioned several aspects of Pakistani life.

Testimony to it came from President Ayub in his speech on the occasion of the State Banquet given in honour of the royal visitors in Karachi, on February 1. He spoke of the "admiration" with which Pakistanis learnt the forms and appearances of British institutions "so much so that any modification of their form to suit our own conditions is regarded by some as nothing short of sacrilege". He added: "Like you, we firmly believe in democratic ideals and in the dignity and sanctity of the human individual", and referred to the system of the Basic Democracies "to give these ideals the widest possible base in our conditions".

The President considered these as "strong ties which are, fortunately, further strengthened by our continued association with you in the Commonwealth of Nations" which he characterized as "a bold enterprise in international understanding and goodwill". He recognized that for geographical reasons and for linguistic, religious, racial and cultural differences among Commonwealth countries it was not possible "to secure a complete identity on all major issues; but our hopes and aspirations are the same". And finally he expressed the belief that the more effective the Commonwealth becomes "the more pronounced will be the influence that it can cast on the affairs of the world at large".

Her Majesty's reply showed a genuine understanding of Pakistan's position and problems. She spoke of the unique place that this country occupied as "one of the great nations of the Commonwealth" and as "one of the powers of the world of Islam". Saying that each Commonwealth country "will work out for herself how best to organize her affairs according to the needs and talents of her people", the Queen observed that it should cause no surprise if the forms which Britain has "slowly evolved" "are found after trial and consideration to need modification to meet circumstances far different. The forms are not sacred: the ideals behind them are."

The Queen's speech made an instant and deep impression in Pakistan which was reflected not only by public reactions, but in highly appreciative newspaper comments. "The Queen's Lead" was the caption of the first editorial in Karachi's leading English daily. It expressed pleasure that Pakistan's "unique position should find such sympathetic understanding from the royal lips of the Head of the Commonwealth". It hoped that the "discordant notes sounded now and then by some publicists in Britain and elsewhere based on a misunderstanding of the 'great experiment' that is going on here will now cease and the Queen's lead will be heeded and followed throughout the Commonwealth in determining attitude and approaches to Pakistan".

It has been necessary to quote at such length from the President's and Her Majesty's speeches and from newspaper comments if only because of widespread feelings here that the British press gave far from adequate coverage to the Queen's tour of this country, certainly by comparison with that given to her Indian itinerary.

But more than that, it is to show how certain foreign circles have made it their particular business to distort everything that is said or done in Pakistan.

While the royal tour was in full swing several Indian papers gratuitously commented on some of the remarks that Her Majesty made in her various speeches here. An influential Indian paper found it "surprising that the Royal visitor should have found virtue in what goes by the name of democracy in our neighbourhood". What seemed to have upset the paper most was that so soon "after expressing admiration for Mr. Nehru and all that he stands for the Queen paid a tribute to the 'great experiment' launched by Field-Marshal Ayub Khan which shows the great elasticity of which Britain is capable in attempting to square a circle". Seen from Pakistani eyes the insolence of such utterly uncalled for and unwarranted remarks beggars all description. One would have very much wished that Indian chauvinists should have let this occasion pass without having their fling at Pakistan, and should have gracefully accepted that the Head of the Commonwealth is above politics and that any remarks she saw fit to make should not have been construed in such a light.

Naturally enough such Indian arrogance caused much resentment in this country. But the whole unseemly episode was further aggravated by a section of the British press which dutifully re-echoed Indian arguments, thus lending them further weight. Still worse, all this came at a time when the people of Pakistan could not have been showing greater goodwill to Her Majesty which, in the words of the British High Commissioner to Pakistan, "exceeded all expectations".

Unfortunately the story does not end here. After the resentment created by such palpably absurd comments had passed into the background, a further exasperating display of ignorance, if not of calculated insult, damped the fervour and goodwill aroused by the Queen's sympathetic understanding of Pakistan and the grace and charm with which she conducted herself during her stay in this country. In their film on the royal tour, a leading British film company has lumped historical events in Pakistan as an incidental part of the Queen's visit to India. Pakistan is sandwiched between the two phases



of the royal tour of India in such a manner that viewers cannot help regarding this country as an appendage to India.

Such callous treatment of Pakistan by a reputable British company was most unbecoming, to say the least. It caused so much distress here that the British High Commissioner had to issue a statement of apology. An official film giving a correct interpretation of the royal tour to Pakistan has since been screened. Nevertheless there is a general realization that the official film can never hope to have so wide an audience as the controversial commercial venture has already had. So the bad taste remains.

All this may sound rather childish, but a "bad taste in the mouth" is not a pleasant legacy. It is symptomatic of something very much more serious which may eventually poison the whole system.

In Pakistan's case the diagnosis is clear. She is fed up with always getting the "thin edge of the wedge"; of finding her friendliest approaches ignored or fobbed off; of being treated as a poor relation when her richer neighbour always gets the "more favoured nation" treatment.

The cure lies in a proper appraisal of Pakistan's true place in the Commonwealth, her genuine goodwill receiving the recognition which is long overdue.

Pakistan,  
May 1961.

# CANADA

## THE GOVERNMENT UNDER FIRE

WHEN the Federal Parliament reassembled after a brief Easter recess, the hopes of its members, that the early start of the session on November 17 last would make prorogation possible before the sultry summer vapors of Ottawa had to be endured, had waned. It is true that a substantial part of the Government's heavy program of legislation had been disposed of, but a great deal of time had been wasted in petty squabbles over points of procedure and partisan wrangles about trivial matters, and Mr. Fleming, the Minister of Finance, is still engaged in a stiff parliamentary battle with both the parties in opposition, who are fighting clause by clause Bills designed to make operative certain fiscal provisions of his so-called "baby" budget of last autumn on the grounds that they are an attempt to raise tariffs for the benefit of certain manufacturers by surreptitious devices, and that arbitrary powers to be conferred on the Minister of National Revenue violate the right of Parliament to control financial and tariff policy. So Mr. Fleming has postponed the submission of his regular Budget beyond the normal date and it is quite certain that he will have a sorry tale to unfold about the state of the national finances and lose all credit as a forecaster. In his last Budget speech he predicted a surplus of 12 million dollars for the fiscal year 1960-61, but the prospect of achieving it had long ago vanished under a flood of supplementary estimates. A huge batch submitted in March, totalling 172 million dollars, suggests that instead of a small surplus he will have to admit a deficit of at least 350 million dollars. Inevitably the Budget will produce a long controversial debate and a large volume of legislation has still to be tackled, while only a fraction of the departmental estimates has been passed. So there are today gloomy forebodings that the session will be prolonged well into July and the Prime Minister fortified a proposal to lengthen the daily sittings with a warning that "it may be necessary to convene a clean-up session in the fall".

The Liberals are in a more cheerful mood than the Tories, the latest gallup poll having revealed that their percentage of popular support had risen by a point to 45, while the quota of the Tories, who had counted on a rise, had remained stationary at 38 per cent. For the latter a drop of their percentage of support in Quebec to 29 was particularly ominous, for it indicated that, if an election were held in the near future, they would be able to salvage very few of the 51 Federal seats which they now hold in that Province. Fresh tests of public sentiment will be supplied on May 29 by the results of by-elections for four seats held by the Government and all but one of them, the Esquimaux-Saanich division, are regarded as very vulnerable to the attack of the Opposition.

Since the year began both the Liberals and the Tories have held what were called "national rallies" at Ottawa. The gathering of the former clan was the livelier affair, but some political commentators thought the delegates attending it acted unwisely in committing the party to an elaborate program of reform, which involved heavy fresh expenditures, because it induced

many voters to feel that they were as recklessly extravagant in their commitments as their rivals had been. By contrast the Tory meeting gave little consideration to policies and its avowed objectives were a stimulation of the party's morale and education in the need for improving its organization. So the delegates were subjected to exhortations by Mr. Diefenbaker and other leaders to avoid complacency and gird themselves for a tough fight in the next election. The Prime Minister indicated that the dominant issue in it would be free enterprise, which his party would champion, versus socialism, which he said the Liberals had adopted in their program.

Meanwhile, no real improvement in the economic outlook, which might raise the political stock of the Government, is visible. It is true that the latest report about employment shows that unemployment has passed its peak, for it discloses that the number of unemployed, which had been 719,000 in mid-February, had fallen at mid-March to 705,000; but at that figure it was still 96,000 higher than at the same date in 1960 and amounted to 11.1 per cent of the civilian labour force. Moreover, the figure for railway carloadings between January 1 and April 7 was, at 806,197 cars, 11.3 per cent lower than the figure for the comparable period of 1960; and the output of newsprint fell in the first quarter of the year. Mr. Coyne, the Governor of the Bank of Canada, has been continuing to expound his thesis that Canada has been living beyond her means and has been promoting the expansion of industries by dangerously heavy foreign borrowing, when adequate markets are not available for their output, and that drastic measures of austerity are required to rectify the situation. He has now been summoned to appear before a special committee of the Senate which is investigating the problem of Canada's manpower and its most effective use, and explain the remedial policies which he feels to be imperative.

### Difficulties of the Railways

A SERIOUS effort is now being made to tackle the critical situation of Canada's railways. Ever since the close of World War II, the two major railway systems, the Canadian Pacific and the State-owned Canadian National Railways, have been struggling with the difficulties created by the increasing competition of trucks, motor cars, aeroplanes and water transport, by repeated concessions of higher wages to their employees, and by rising costs of equipment. In 1960 the volume of freight which they carried dropped from 16 to 13.5 million tons and the number of passengers from 1.7 to 1.5 millions, with the result that their joint net operating income dropped from 65.1 to 51.5 million dollars; the Canadian Pacific Railway was able to maintain its dividends only through revenues derived from interests outside its railway operations, like the profits of the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company, which it controls. But the Canadian National Railways showed a record deficit of 67.5 million dollars, which had to be met by the Federal Treasury. Undoubtedly the managers of the railways strove hard to effect economies in their operations by closing unprofitable branch lines and other measures; and today the membership of the non-operating railway unions, which was 170,000 in 1948, has fallen to 110,000.

Meanwhile, between 1948 and 1957 the Board of Transport Commissioner had tried to ease their financial difficulties by granting ten increases in freight rates, totalling 121 per cent, and in 1958 it authorized a further increase of 17 per cent; but it evoked such protests from a variety of interests that the Federal Government by granting a special subsidy of 20 million dollars achieved the reduction of the rise to 7 per cent and in 1960 a further increase of 2 per cent was authorized and the subsidy cut to 15 million dollars.

Faced with the prospect of a heavy annual drain upon the Federal Treasury the Diefenbaker Ministry appointed last year a Royal Commission, headed by Mr. M. A. Macpherson Q.C., of Regina, a recognized expert upon railway problems, and instructed it to make an exhaustive examination of the critical situation which had developed and recommend remedial measures. But last December, before the Commission had completed its work, the non-operating railway unions threatened to call a strike unless they received immediately an increase of 14 cents per hour in their wages, which a Conciliation Board had recommended. Thereupon the Diefenbaker Ministry intervened to freeze both freight rates and wages and compel a postponement of the strike, which had been called for May 16, until the Macpherson Commission produced its report.

Part of its report has now been submitted to Parliament and, while it proposes some long-term remedies, it offers little help to the Government for coping with the immediate crisis. It advocates a complicated system of subsidies for the railways, which will total 97½ million dollars in 1961, but decrease progressively during the next 15 years. Their purpose is to enable the railways to eliminate unprofitable passenger traffic and branch railway lines and to compensate them for what they allege to be heavy annual losses in hauling grain for export at low rates, fixed as far back as 1897 by a pact known as the Crows' Nest Pass agreement. By it the Canadian Pacific Railway agreed to these rates, which were later extended to the Canadian National system in return for a large subsidy for the construction of a line through southern British Columbia. The agreement became such a sacred cow for the western farmers that no Government has dared to propose its alteration. The sum of 97½ million dollars looks very large, but it is not much larger than the Canadian National deficit of 67½ million dollars. However, the leader of the non-operating unions says that the railways have no longer any excuse for refusing the increase of wages by 14 cents per hour, which will cost them 35 million dollars per annum and, if the operating unions who are pressing for a similar rise secure it, the bill for increases of wages will mount to 50 million dollars. Accordingly it is plain that, when the subsidies fall sharply after 1962, the financial difficulties of the railways will be revived unless there is a substantial increment of their revenues through a marked resurgence of economic activities.

### Finance of Water Power

THE Diefenbaker Ministry is also confronted with another serious problem through the emergence of obstacles to further progress with the projects of a huge power development on the Columbia River in partnership



with the United States. It has signed with the Government of the United States a treaty about the terms of co-operation, and it has been ratified by the American Senate. But parallel action at Ottawa has had to be postponed because the provincial Government of British Columbia, whose acquiescence in the treaty is essential, has expressed strong dissatisfaction with it. For one thing, it does not believe that power from the Columbia can be delivered in the area of Vancouver at the price named by the experts of the Federal Government and demands more detailed information about the workings of the project. It has rejected as completely inadequate an offer of the Diefenbaker Ministry to contribute a loan of 172 million dollars towards Canada's share of the total cost, estimated at 458 million dollars, and it has proposed two alternative plans. One of them is that the Federal Government should assume the whole responsibility for Canada's share of the cost and the other is that the Provincial Government should undertake it; but apparently neither of these schemes finds favor at Ottawa and the negotiations between the two Governments are at a deadlock. Another complication, however, has developed through the violent opposition of the people of the West Kootenay region of British Columbia to one feature of the bargain sanctioned by the treaty. The Americans insisted upon the construction of a dam at the southern end of the Arrow Lakes, which are an expansion of the Columbia River, designed to store water and feed it downstream into the huge generators of the power plants at Grand Coulee in the State of Washington. But this High Arrow dam, as it is called, will raise the waters of the Arrow to a level that will submerge eighteen communities and 40,000 acres of fertile land, mostly fruit farms, and cause the loss of over 60 years of work in development. Not only will the dam wipe out civilization on the shores of the Arrow lakes, but it will make the town of Revelstoke at their northern end virtually an island and create a barrier to its expansion.

Major-General A. G. L. McNaughton, the head of the Canadian section of the International Joint Commission, which regulates waters crossing the international frontier, is opposed to the High Arrow dam on the ground that the United States will be the sole direct beneficiary of the water stored in it. He has pronounced himself in favor of an alternative scheme of a series of dams at Mica Creek and other places north of Revelstoke, where an even greater amount of water could be stored. But the construction of this series of dams would take at least five years and, as the Americans are in urgent need to get more water for their power plants at Grand Coulee, they have insisted upon the construction of the High Arrow dam, which can be built in about a year and a half. Naturally the people whose home and properties are now threatened with inundation are furious, and at a meeting held in Revelstoke indignant representatives of all the municipalities and chambers of commerce passed a unanimous resolution, which strongly condemned the High Arrow dam and urged the Government to begin the construction of the dams comprised in an alternative plan. Mr. H. W. Herridge, the C.C.F. member for East Kootenay, in a vigorous attack upon the project in the House of Commons told the Government that the protests against it were backed by many of its local supporters; and the financial authorities at

Ottawa have also good reason to be worried by the estimates of the amount of compensation which will have to be paid to the dispossessed owners of properties on the Arrow Lakes. So it is plain that the treaty, for whose ratification at Ottawa the Kennedy Administration is pressing, was signed without any adequate consideration of its consequences.

### Fiscal Federation

SINCE 1947 there has been operating in Canada a system of tax collection based upon the report of a Royal Commission which had made a comprehensive investigation of Canada's constitutional, financial and economic problems. Under it the provincial governments ceded to the Federal Government the right to collect income tax from individuals and corporations and to levy death duties, and in return received from the Federal Treasury annual rentals for these rights, determined by the respective populations of the Provinces and some other factors. The agreements which made this plan effective were revised and readjusted at intervals of four years and achieved one of their basic objectives, which was to enable the poorer Provinces to maintain the same standards of social services as the richer. But it involved the Federal Government in odium with the public as exactors of onerous taxation and exposed them to continuous pressure from provincial ministries for increases in the rentals.

The existing agreements are due for renewal in April 1962 and, when it became plain that most of the Provinces would demand increases, the Diefenbaker Ministry, faced with evidence of serious erosion of its popularity, decided that it could not contemplate the additional taxation, which a concession of the increases sought would involve. So, when the conference met, Mr. Diefenbaker surprised the delegates and the whole country by proposing the abandonment of the pacts and their replacement by a new system whose obvious object is to lessen its responsibility for the unpopular task of collecting taxes. Under it the provincial ministries would resume the responsibility for levying income taxes and death duties, but the Federal Government would agree to continue as the agency of collection for any Province which desired this help. It will ask the Federal Parliament to pass during the present session legislation providing that after April 1, 1962:

- (1) It will pay to any Province which does not impose a death duty or similar tax 50 per cent of the yield secured from time to time from the Federal death duties collected in that Province.
- (2) It will reduce the rate of the corporation income tax by about 22.5 per cent.
- (3) It will reduce the rate of the income tax on corporations by the following progressive steps—for the first year, by 16 per cent of its rate at that time and by further decreases of 1 per cent each year until in the fifth year the reduction is stabilized at 20 per cent.

But the commitment to what are called "equalization payments" to the poorer Provinces is not repudiated, and Mr. Diefenbaker explained that the formula for them would be framed on the national average of *per caput*

returns from a combination of standard taxes at the progressively decreased rates now proposed and half the three-year average of the annual revenues from natural resources. No Province entitled to an equalization payment under the national average will draw from the Federal Treasury a smaller sum than it received on the average during the last two years of the existing agreements and be left worse off than if they were renewed.

In the fiscal year 1960-61 just ended the receipts of the Provinces from the Federal Treasury totalled 7,882 million dollars. It is estimated that if the present system was retained they would rise in the fiscal year 1962-63 to 866.5 million dollars and, if the new plan becomes operative, to 883.4 millions, which would be an advance of 16.9 millions. Cognizance, however, is to be taken of the special handicaps and needs of the four economically backward Atlantic Provinces, and a separate subsidy of 25 million dollars per annum will be distributed among them.

#### Mr. Macmillan in Ottawa

MR. MACMILLAN during his brief visit to Ottawa discussed a wide range of current problems with Mr. Diefenbaker and his Ministers, and apparently their views on them were in harmony save on one issue. Mr. Macmillan informed his hosts that, if certain objections of the French could be overcome, Britain would secure admission to the European Common group of six nations and gave assurances that in working out an economic alliance with them every effort would be made to protect the interests of the other partners in the Commonwealth. But at a press conference in Ottawa he declared that Canada ought to join Britain in a bid for admission; we should, he said, "be jumping into this with both feet". Mr. Pearson, the Liberal leader, has given his blessing to this suggestion and both he and his chief lieutenant, Mr. Paul Martin, have been advocating the formation of a North Atlantic trading block, which would include Canada, the United States and the countries of Western Europe.

But the idea of Canada's entry to a large free-trading block makes no appeal to the present Government of Canada. In 1957 it rejected offhand Mr. Thornycroft's proposal for a free-trade union between Canada and Britain, and it is now under continual pressure from many domestic manufacturers to give them better protection against a damaging inflow of foreign imports, and is still engaged in a bitter parliamentary battle over measures designed to give them some relief. So Mr. Diefenbaker, evading any comment upon Mr. Macmillan's proposal, has contented himself with expressing a vague hope that economic co-operation between the Western democracies would continue to grow. But Mr. Hees, his Minister of Trade and Commerce, in discussing the Liberal proposal for the creation of a North Atlantic trading block, has accused the Liberal Party of advocating reciprocity with the United States and argued that if the tariff wall across the border were demolished, the great industrial plants of the United States would immediately increase their production of goods by 10 per cent, which they would pour into Canada at cheap prices and "we would have here mass unemployment and suffering".

But Mr. Pearson has pointed out that if Canada, with her relatively small population and her great dependence upon the prosperity of her export trade, elects to plough her own economic furrow, she can hardly hope to fare well in competition with the powerful economic blocks, which have now emerged in Europe on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and that she may well be forced into closer economic ties with her mighty neighbor, whose capitalists continue to grab control of Canadian enterprises at an alarming rate. Moreover, Canada's export trade, although its volume has been rising lately, is in a very vulnerable position. The Minister of Finance has estimated that 70 per cent of Canada's exports to the countries of the European market, valued in 1960 at 438 million dollars, are in jeopardy and if, under British leadership, the nations of the European free-trade area joined the Common Market, another 10 per cent of Canada's export, valued at 1,048 millions in 1960, would be in equal danger. Accordingly the Diefenbaker Ministry is in a desperate quandary about its trade policy. It is quite possible that Mr. Macmillan by his proposal may have injected into Canadian politics invigorating health, which is badly needed, by providing the two senior parties with a real divisive issue for the next Federal election.

### Race Relations

PRIME MINISTER DIEFENBAKER'S firm stand at the recent Commonwealth meeting for the principle that racial equality must be accepted by its members and his strong condemnation of South Africa's policy of *apartheid* was in conformity with his lifelong zeal for the safeguarding of basic human rights and has won general commendation from the Canadian press and public. But the praise has also been accompanied by exhortations that, since Canada has proclaimed herself the champion of all whose color condemns them to an inferior status, she must match her words with deeds and, as *Toronto Saturday Night* wrote, "see to it that her own backyard gets cleaned lest we belie the elegance of our new façade".

So, while there is no suggestion that Canada should throw open her doors to indiscriminate immigration, proposals are being made that she should abolish her present restrictions upon immigration from the West Indies, revoke the gentlemen's agreement which restricts to a small annual quota the inflow of immigrants from India and Pakistan and give freer entry to Chinese and Japanese people. Mr. Diefenbaker has also been encouraged by the apprehension created by the Russian threat of intervention in Cuba to make a strong pronouncement in support of the policy adopted by the Government of the United States. The Prime Minister said that Canada could not afford to be unconcerned about the possibility that Cuba would become a bridgehead for promoting the spread of Communism in the Latin-American countries. But there is also a widespread feeling that the crisis was handled ineptly by the United States and that a rose has fallen from President Kennedy's chaplet through his unfortunate reliance upon the reports of his Central Intelligence Agency.

Canada,

May 1961.



# AUSTRALIA

## A REVIEW OF FOREIGN POLICY

THERE are a number of unanswered questions in the public mind about Australian foreign policy. The brief visit by the British Chief of Defence Staff, Lord Mountbatten, in February was generally assumed to relate to the willingness and ability of Australia to take a bigger part in the Commonwealth strategic planning in South-East Asia. Even more prominent have been the questions raised by the withdrawal of the Union of South Africa from the Commonwealth and the Australian attitude to that withdrawal.

In the "colonial" phase of Australian thinking, which extended into the early years of Dominion status, there was a general readiness to leave the shaping and implementing of foreign policy to Britain in return for the protection of the British Navy. There was some qualification of this view from the political left. Early in this century, the Australian Labour Party held that isolationism was possible and desirable. This rested on the fact that much of Asia was colonial territory, controllable by gunboats, and that international crises could arise only from the military and economic rivalries of the European Powers. What emerged as the broadly accepted outlook by the time of World War I was that Australia should conform to the foreign policy of Britain while establishing a claim to be heard on matters of regional importance.

The part played by Australia in World War I and in the subsequent settlement tended to increase its influence on British foreign policy and give it some voice in international affairs generally; but in most respects Britain retained the responsibility of initiating policy, particularly since so many of the major issues arose in Europe.

Nevertheless, there was in Australia a growing awareness of these regional matters, which in the Pacific area and the Near North (as it came to be called) were of special significance. Thus in May 1939, for example, Mr. Menzies, then newly installed as Prime Minister, said:

We will never realize our destiny as a nation until we understand that we are one of the Pacific Powers. And, of course, as a Pacific Power we are principals; we are not subordinate. We have no secondary interests in the Pacific; we have a primary interest in it.

With the fall of Singapore in 1942 and the collapse of British power in South-East Asia, Australian thinking had to accommodate itself to the reality that the United States and not Britain possessed the power to defend Australia. This reassessment of the position coincided closely with a change in Government. The isolationism of some of the Labour Party was made hopelessly out of date by the onrush of events, but the Labour Government found it perhaps easier to adjust itself to the new dependence on the United States than the former Government might have done. None the less, Australia did not entirely discard deference to British views on foreign policy, nor did

Britain cease to be important for Australia's defence, even if to a much lesser degree.

In the reassessing of Australian policy after World War II, the question seemed to be whether the emphasis should be placed upon the continuance of the war-time American partnership, plus supplementary arrangements with Britain, or the adoption of a role of friendly, independent go-between in the new era of Asian-Western relations, or security through membership of the international organization of the United Nations.

In fact, no choice was made. Australian diplomatic activity spread itself over all courses, with an emphasis shifting from one to the other.

These courses have been pursued as exercises in persuasion. They reflect the fact that Australia cannot too vigorously assert what Mr. Menzies called her "primary interest" in the Pacific, for Australia maintains no nuclear power and small conventional military strength, and by character as well as political considerations is disinclined to maintain impressive peace-time task forces. Her method has been to seek a persuasive influence on the policies of her more powerful friends.

The main agreements negotiated were the ANZUS and SEATO defence pacts. Although three of the eight SEATO partners—Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines—are Asian countries, these are, in substance, Western arrangements. But while they identify Australia with Western thinking, and particularly with American thinking where future risks in Asia are concerned, these agreements can scarcely be solidly based on the permanent needs of United States strategy. They are useful to the United States for just so long as the close containment of Asian Communism remains American policy. But they are not essential, in these days of rocketry, to the defence of the North American continent.

It was partly in recognition of this limit to the value of military planning, partly from friendly interest in the growth of the under-developed countries, and partly from the realization of the long-term interest to be gained through co-operation with Asian countries, that the Australian policy of cultivating Asian goodwill took form. In the 1950's, while Lord (then Mr. R. G.) Casey was Minister of External Affairs, it began to give positive character to Australian international relations. It aimed to aid the advance of South-East Asian living standards by technical and other assistance. For example, Australia has contributed some £A37 million to the Colombo Plan. In relation to the size of the problems of such a country as India, Australia's contribution has been insignificant; but the assistance has been of greater value to some other Asian countries. There is a body of opinion in Australia which believes that the scale of assistance of this kind should be enlarged considerably. However, from the point of creating goodwill in Asia, Lord Casey's personal effort as ambassador-at-large has proved a valuable supplement.

There were other aspects of Australian policy which tended to discount gestures of friendship to Asia. From time to time there were incidents which reminded Asia of the colour bar in Australia's immigration rules. In Asian eyes, there is some contradiction between Australia's "good neighbour" declarations and her opposition to Indonesia's claim to Dutch New Guinea.

This New Guinea issue, which becomes more provocative to Indonesia as both Australia and Holland prepare their adjoining New Guinea territories for self-government, exposes an awkward gap between the ANZUS and SEATO shields. As far as ANZUS commits the United States to anything more than "consultation" in a crisis, it commits only where the impending threat to Australia is Communist in origin. SEATO, designed to attract Asian members and contain Asian Communism, also fails to ensure American support for Australia against Indonesian pressure in West New Guinea.

### The External Affairs Department

**P**ARALLEL with these developments in Australian foreign policy has been the development of the Department of External Affairs and the other forms of political machinery for dealing with problems in this sphere of foreign affairs. Until 1908 the miniature Department of External Affairs was administered as a matter of course by Prime Ministers, who could handle most of the business involved when they attended Imperial Conferences. In 1916, External Affairs was merged in the Prime Minister's Department. It re-emerged to separate life in 1921, but had little real growth until 1935—when it had a permanent staff of 12. Then attempts were made to strengthen it and expansion was a little faster. It was in the post-war period however that rapid growth really took place. It was not surprising that such speedy development produced its troubles. It took time to build up a body of trained, experienced and capable career diplomats.

Today, Australia claims diplomatic or strategic interests in regions stretching virtually from the Equator to the Pole—from Manus Island, off New Guinea, to the Mawson base in Antarctica. Almost half of her 40 diplomatic and trade commission posts are in Asia. This range of activity is not matched by a corresponding parliamentary activity. It is the frequent criticism of Opposition members and Government back-benchers that Parliament is given few and inadequate opportunities to debate and influence foreign policy. The grounds for this criticism are probably diminishing as debates on foreign affairs tend to be more extensive and, with some exceptions, higher in the standard of the contributions from members.

There is a Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. The Opposition has repeatedly declined to share in its work, on the grounds that the committee, as now constituted, is answerable only to the Minister and may discuss only matters referred to it by the Minister.

Today, while External Affairs has its elaborate complex of embassies, high commissions and U.N. delegations, and a dual pattern of defence alliances and goodwill programmes to administer, it is without a full-time Minister. The Prime Minister took over the office when Lord Casey retired from politics in 1960.

The change of Minister has turned the spotlight upon the divergence between the two strands running through Australia's official thinking on foreign policy. To some extent these two strands were represented by the difference which seems to have existed between the opinions of the Prime Minister and those of Lord Casey. Mr. Menzies was for the Eden policy

over Suez. Mr. Menzies, by character and professional background, does well in Western conferences. Lord Casey, built on leaner lines and perhaps better able to withstand Asian temperatures and understand Asian temperament, was always more warmly accepted and understood in Delhi, Kuala Lumpur—and even Jakarta.

The divergence must not be exaggerated. On the administrative level for example, Mr. Menzies has shown much evidence of his interest in the policy of goodwill towards Asia through such matters as help to Asian students and the welcome extended to General Nasution, the Indonesian Chief of Staff and Minister for Security, in his now current visit. The goodwill side of Australia's policy remains. But it no longer has quite the same warmth, now that it lacks the close personal attention of a Minister for External Affairs who associated easily with his opposite numbers in Asian countries.

This side of policy has, in fact, been chilled as a result of the Prime Minister's participation in the United Nations Assembly in October 1960.

This was the session attended by Mr. Khrushchev, Mr. Macmillan and other Heads of Government. When Mr. Menzies took over temporary leadership of the Australian delegation, it was widely assumed that he had been asked to present the Anglo-American viewpoint. There was a motion before the Assembly from India, Indonesia, Ghana, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia, calling for "immediate" talks between President Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev. Mr. Menzies proposed an amendment, changing this to a recommendation that there should be a Big Four meeting at "the earliest practicable date".

Apparently the support for such an amendment was not canvassed in advance. It was defeated by 45 votes to 5, with 44 abstentions. But more important than the votes of U.N. was the reaction of the Asians to what Mr. Nehru described as the "rather trivial" approach of the Australian Prime Minister to what they had been trying to do.

Whether or not Mr. Menzies had actually placed Australian foreign policy at the disposal of President Eisenhower and Mr. Macmillan for use in the Western tactics of summitry, Asia assumed that he had done so. The disinterested "good neighbour" role of Australia lost, through one speech, much of the value that others had painstakingly put into it.

### South Africa and the Commonwealth

**I**N relation to South Africa, Mr. Menzies had in the events of 1960 taken a more cautious line than many other leaders in Australia. He had in no way supported the *apartheid* policy of the Union Government (in fact he had been frankly critical of it) but he had, at the same time, laid stress on the difficulties of the South African situation and had been conscious of the possible dangers to other countries, including his own, if the boundaries of domestic jurisdiction were broken down. In this latter point he was following the same line as had been adopted earlier by Dr. Evatt when Minister for External Affairs in the Labour Government.

At the London Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference of March 1961 it seems that Mr. Menzies was more concerned with the importance of



this consideration as to domestic jurisdiction than were some of his colleagues at the Conference. He was also reluctant to see the break up of the "club" as he had known the Commonwealth to be in the past. At the same time he was impressed by the personal integrity of the South African Prime Minister.

When the attempt to retain South Africa in the Commonwealth failed it seems that Mr. Menzies, while making it clear that he did not approve of Dr. Verwoerd's internal policies, felt obliged to state the disadvantages of the course which had been adopted.

Many in Australia disagreed with the Prime Minister's actions. Some felt inclined to be more outspokenly critical of South Africa's policy. Others felt that, while there were disadvantages in setting a precedent in which the internal policy of a member of the Commonwealth was criticized, on the other hand *apartheid* was inconsistent with the concept of a multi-racial Commonwealth. The advantages of preserving such a Commonwealth outweighed the disadvantage of the precedent and the loss of South Africa itself. Still others felt that whatever might have been the merits of the decision as to South Africa it was inexpedient for the Prime Minister to say what he did: by doing so he lost our share of the goodwill which would have accrued to the member of the Commonwealth of European race and went out of his way to focus attention on Australia's migration policy. Many feel that this migration policy is not any longer a matter upon which Asian countries are sensitive but that the Prime Minister's action had tended to revive the bitterness. Some support for this view was given by the fact that after the Conference the Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, made a statement supporting the Australian migration policy even when called by the unofficial and more offensive name of "white Australia".

Since his return to Australia, Mr. Menzies has, at press conferences and in the House, strongly defended his course of action. He has repeated that he thought the precedent was dangerous and he would have preferred to retain the Union in the Commonwealth. At the same time he has vigorously stated his own strong disapproval of the *apartheid* policy. He has said: "I think that the policy will, if it continues to be applied as it is now, end in the most frightful disaster."

Immediately on his return the Government was faced with the question how it would vote in the United Nations on the alternative resolutions proposed in condemnation of South Africa. In similar instances earlier Australia had abstained. This time Australia decided to vote in favour of the resolution condemning the *apartheid* policy (although it would oppose the more extreme alternative resolution proposing sanctions). Some have thought this decision was inconsistent with the Prime Minister's actions when he was overseas, but Mr. Menzies has argued that once the Union had withdrawn from the Commonwealth then Australia could properly join in condemnation of its policy in a vote in the United Nations. There seems little doubt that the other members of the Government and practically all political leaders were in favour of having the Australian vote exercised in the way in which it was.

On his way back to Australia, the Prime Minister also took part in the

SEATO Conference at Bangkok on the Laos crisis. The Government has been consistent in its support of SEATO as being as effective a security system as possible in the Pacific. It was therefore the more important that the organization should not fail in the present crisis. It seems that Australia strongly supported the policy of firmness but avoidance of provocation adopted by the British Government and was opposed to any more immediate intervention by the United States or anyone else.

It is interesting that both in this and in the United Nations discussion of South Africa, Australia is again in accord with the policy of the British Government.

Like most other small countries Australia cannot afford to have too definite a long-term foreign policy. It must trim its sails to the winds of change, whether those winds are the gales of major upheavals or the lighter breezes of changes in current events. This consideration explains some of the apparent lack of clarity and consistency in Australian policy.

Australia,  
May 1961.

# NEW ZEALAND

## THE BREACH WITH SOUTH AFRICA

FOR most New Zealanders emotion plays a significant part in their attitude towards the Commonwealth. This is due in part, perhaps, to the very strong ties of sentiment between New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Thousands of New Zealanders leave every year on a visit to Britain, which is treated as the natural mecca for the New Zealand tourist and which is, even among second- and third-generation New Zealanders, still frequently referred to as the "old country" or "home". Pervading the mystical folklore of the New Zealander is a strong loyalty to the Crown, not so much to the monarchical concept (for, if the paradox will be pardoned, New Zealand is really a republican monarchy), as to the person of the sovereign. Such a national attitude makes it difficult for New Zealanders to sympathize with the aspiration of some Commonwealth countries to adopt the forms of republican government. An intellectual appreciation of the motives behind such constitutional changes is one thing: a feeling of solidarity with other members of the Commonwealth embarking upon those programmes is another. Of all the countries in the Commonwealth the compulsive urge displayed by the Union Government in South Africa to discard the outward symbols of the monarchy has roused the greatest interest and the least sympathy.

The newspapers have anxiously traced every step along the path towards republican forms. It is difficult, if not impossible, to explain this sensitivity on the part of New Zealanders towards events in South Africa. It is compounded of many elements, none of which lends itself to precise estimation. Perhaps some New Zealanders may be affected by a kind of race sub-consciousness which leads them, if of predominantly British stock, to identify themselves with the English-speaking white citizens of South Africa and to see in the erosive policy of the South African Government towards monarchical symbols a challenge to one of the basic mystiques of their group. Certainly New Zealand has had few direct dealings with South Africa in the arena of international trade. Her chief contacts have been on the field of battle and on the field of sport. There are still alive some New Zealanders—a valiant if dwindling band—who fought with the New Zealand forces in the South African War at the turn of the century. That war excited as much patriotic fervour in New Zealand as it ever evoked among Conservatives and Unionists in the United Kingdom. At one great recruiting rally a Judge of the Supreme Court, later the first New Zealander to sit as a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, cast aside judicial caution and in a highly emotional (but successful) speech appealed for men to serve Queen and Country by joining the expeditionary force for South Africa. The experience of the war itself, New Zealand's first oversea engagement, must have left a deep impression on the attitude of New Zealanders towards

South Africa. An ambivalent attitude, perhaps: kinship, on the one hand, towards the South Africans of British stock; and suspicion, if not antipathy, towards the Boers. The remarkable post-war settlement in South Africa, which resulted in the creation of the Union and led to a feeling that the seeds of eventual concord had been sown, has been impressed on the New Zealand consciousness not only by the fact itself but also by the consistent emphasis placed upon it in history textbooks over three or more decades. The average New Zealander, like Macaulay's omniscient schoolboy, knows something about constitutional developments in South Africa. Then, the experience in two world wars has had its effect: first a feeling of anxiety whether South Africa would remain aloof from the struggle and finally a feeling of relief that the Commonwealth family was united. In this phase of New Zealanders' attitude towards South Africa a significant part was played by Smuts, who was frequently described in New Zealand newspapers not as a South African but as a Commonwealth statesman. This foe turned friend seemed to be a symbol of the basic solidarity of South Africa with the Commonwealth. His policies had the effect of inducing the belief that the straining for constitutional independence from the imperial ties which was such a significant feature of the Imperial Conferences in the inter-war years had satisfied South Africa's legitimate aspirations, and that there would be no further constitutional demands. All of these feelings were rarely articulate. They cannot be measured: but they are none the less real.

The only actual experience which most contemporary New Zealanders have of South Africans is in the field of sport. South Africa and New Zealand are the only two countries in the world in which rugby football is incontestably the dominant winter sport. Sharing such an interest it was inevitable that sports teams from the two countries should exchange visits. The clashes of Springboks with All Blacks on the football field have become national events arousing vast interest and enthusiasm in New Zealand and, no doubt, in South Africa too. The essential harmony, which apart from minor and mostly superficial skirmishes over tactics is usually a characteristic of sporting contests, was shattered in 1959-60 over the New Zealand Rugby Football Union's decision not to include Maoris in the representative team to tour South Africa in 1960. A large number of New Zealanders were opposed to that decision. Their attitude was a reflection of their attitude on discrimination against persons on the grounds of colour or race. And it is that issue which seems to be the last but certainly not the least important of the elements in the New Zealanders' sentiment towards South Africa.

The New Zealander approaches questions of racial discrimination against the presuppositions of his own environment. Whatever shortcomings he may be conscious of in the relationships between Maori and European in New Zealand, he holds certain basic beliefs about the equality of all citizens before the law. Such faith in mere equality before the law may seem to some to be inadequate and redolent of the optimism and liberal thinking in the nineteenth century about political and legal rights. Perfect or imperfect, those rights appear to the New Zealander to have been denied to the majority of South African citizens. The local newspapers have displayed a keen interest



in legislative developments in South Africa since the Nationalists came into power. An equal interest has been shown in other events: in the treason trial, which has just ended after 2½ years of hearings, and in the Sharpeville riot and its repercussions. Nor must it be forgotten that New Zealand's membership in the United Nations has confronted it each year since 1945 with the unavoidable responsibility of coming to a decision when casting its vote on a variety of issues affecting South Africa in organs of the United Nations: such as the question of the treatment of persons of Indian racial origin in the Union; the question of the former mandated territory of South West Africa; and the question of racial discrimination in South Africa. With the first and third of those issues it has been possible, on a somewhat strict interpretation of the Charter provisions reserving questions of domestic jurisdiction from United Nations action, for the New Zealand representatives to abstain from voting. The justification of that decision for home consumption has never been easy. In the light of South Africa's hardening attitude and under the pressure of international realities it has become increasingly difficult for New Zealand to maintain an attitude of legal aloofness. New Zealand no longer abstains from voting, but votes in favour of motions criticizing South African policies. In doing so New Zealand has registered a moral gain at least in the eyes of most members of the United Nations, and, more important, particularly among the nations of the South-East Asia region, to whose attitudes towards New Zealand the Government is acutely sensitive.

### The Prime Minister at the Conference

IT was obvious to most New Zealanders that South Africa's decision to remove the last symbol of monarchy would bring to a head the question of South Africa's membership of the Commonwealth. Opinion seems to have been divided in New Zealand. Some, perhaps not a majority, took the view that the refusal to accept South Africa's application to continue within the Commonwealth on becoming a republic (a strange legalism in a community where almost half of the members are themselves republics) would vindicate the moral basis of the Commonwealth. The expulsion of South Africa, as it would undoubtedly be in substance, would have a cathartic effect. The majority opinion, at least as expressed in the newspapers, recognized the weight of those arguments, but emphasized the desirability of attempting within the Commonwealth to influence South Africa towards a new policy. The task of reconciling the two divergent views, each of which had adherents among the Governments represented at the Commonwealth Conference, was recognized as calling for statesmanship of a high order. More than that, it would require some indication from South Africa itself that it would be amenable to the softening influences which would be brought to bear upon it.

On his first visit to London as Prime Minister to attend a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, Mr. Holyoake was acutely aware of the gravity of the issues involved. His task of reflecting New Zealand's attitude must have been extremely difficult. Since his return he has stated in a national broadcast that he personally had urged an amelioration of South Africa's

racial policy and some willingness to modify its attitude so that there could be a bridge between it and the rest of the Commonwealth. Mr. Holyoake had also urged that there should be no irrevocable break in South Africa's membership in the Commonwealth. The decision of the South African Prime Minister to withdraw his country's application for continued membership was clearly, to Mr. Holyoake, a matter for deep regret. But in losing one of its oldest and most powerful members, the Commonwealth had, he said, gained in moral stature by expressing itself clearly on a question of principle. The pessimistic view expressed by the South African Prime Minister that the attitude adopted by members in submitting the internal policies of one member to such a devastatingly critical examination would mark the beginning of the disintegration of the Commonwealth was certainly not shared by Mr. Holyoake. On the contrary, he considered that if it had failed to express its moral condemnation of South Africa's policies its disintegration as a Commonwealth would have been much more likely.

The consequences of the departure of South Africa from the Commonwealth cannot be forecast. In New Zealand itself the effects will not be readily discernible. The mental image of South Africa in the minds of New Zealanders will change and the attitudes based upon the emotive factors of the past will slowly fade, to be replaced, perhaps, by a somewhat firmer and more critical and certainly less sympathetic, attitude in the future.

So long as South Africa remained a member of the Commonwealth, critics used to ask ironically where was the basic principle which held this unique association of sovereign States together. All that sceptics could find was the accident of history that at one time all the members had been British possessions. Now at least all the members share a common repugnance towards a State-imposed system which discriminates so harshly between persons on the ground of colour or racial origin. In the New Zealand view, the vindication of that principle even to the point where a member State felt obliged to withdraw from membership may well prove to be a major event in the development of the Commonwealth and of its influence in world affairs.

### The Maori in New Zealand Society

NEW ZEALAND is well-known for its bi-racial society: Maori and European (or *Pakeha*, to use the Maori term for the European). The long-accepted pattern of Maori-Pakeha relationships has been the basis for the established measures of public policy and legislation towards the Maori. The norm is equality of all before the law. Maoris enjoy the same opportunities as others in education, medical services, labour, housing and the professions. In addition, the law has created safeguards in certain fields of human activity to ensure that Maoris are not overreached by those who might take advantage of the somewhat ingenuous attitude which some of them display in business matters. Furthermore, in an effort to guarantee recognition by the State of the independent identity of the Maori people it is provided by statute that they are entitled to vote, on a separate electoral roll, for four representatives, who must themselves be Maoris, in a Parliament of eighty members.

Within the last two decades there have been an increasing number of New Zealanders who have doubted the continued validity of the basic concepts. The older Maoris, however, might resent any policy changes which would challenge the concept of the separate identity of the Maori race. Although equality has been the keystone of racial relations, there have been genuine doubts about the wisdom of making integration or total assimilation the national goal. Within the Government, and especially within the Department of Maori Affairs, there has been a reappraisal of the place of the Maori within New Zealand society. The results of that survey were contained in a report by Mr. J. K. Hunn, the Secretary for Maori Affairs. Shortly after assuming office as Minister of Maori Affairs in the new National Government, Mr. J. R. Hanan took the somewhat unusual course of publishing that report, because, as he said, it covered matters of great public importance on which the public had a right to be informed. The national press gave full publicity to the contents of the report, setting out in considerable detail, and sometimes verbatim, the more important passages. Editorial opinion seems to have been favourable, not only to the Minister's decision to give the general public an insight into the Maori situation, but also to the recommendations of the report and, more significant still, to the philosophy underlying its whole argument. For it was clear that the author of the report accepted the early integration and eventual assimilation of the Maori people as an inevitable outcome. From that premise Mr. Hunn treats the question as being chiefly one of easing the transition so that both Maori and Pakeha suffer a minimum of tension in the process. In his view the transition will be the easier the sooner it comes. It remains to be seen whether the Maori elders reject that policy—and the Minister has promised to take the Maori people into his confidence and discuss major changes in policy with them. The only vocal criticism of the report and of the Minister's apparent willingness to carry out most of its recommendations has come from the Maori Advisory Committee of the Opposition Labour Party, which holds the four Maori seats in Parliament.

Based as it is on the actual situation of the Maori, the report provides a full picture of the contemporary situation of the Maori people. And not an altogether flattering picture for New Zealand either. It is possible only to deal here with the three important topics of education, land-ownership and crime. In education, which for the generality of New Zealanders has since 1877 at the primary level been free and compulsory, much is to be desired: not in its quality so much as in the demand for it. The opportunities for Maori and Pakeha children are equal and every encouragement is given by the Government to Maori parents to take advantage of those opportunities. But there is still more parental apathy among Maoris about education than among Europeans. That indifference chiefly affects post-primary and university education, but in 1950 it appeared that 4 per cent of Maori children between the ages of five and fifteen (about 1,200 children) did not attend primary schools. The explanation for this appears to be in difficulties of administration and supervision in some of the remoter parts of the country where there are small isolated Maori communities. But at the other end of

the educational scale, the university, Maori representation is only about one-eighth of what it should be.

Although accurate figures are not available, because complete statistics are not kept by the universities, the proportion of Maoris who take a university education is appallingly low. If the brightest of Maori young people were to study at the university in the same ratio as Europeans, there would throughout the whole of New Zealand be 741 Maori undergraduates instead of about 90, as at present. As the report recognizes, "the school is the nursery of integration". So is the university. But so long as there are separate Maori schools, 157 all told providing for 29 per cent of Maori children of primary school age, so long will the nursery of integration remain only partly effective. Complete abolition would not at present be feasible because of Maori population distribution. Some of those schools will gradually pass away by the effluxion of time and some of them are attended by Pakeha children, but there seems to be a good case for what the report calls "a measured policy of liquidation".

In spite of a steady stream of Maoris into urban areas in search of employment the main Maori population is still to be found on the land, where conditions are often backward and sometimes primitive. To the Maori his land is more than an endowment which may provide him with a means of livelihood: it gives him status and prestige. The land itself has a mystical quality, which he calls *mana*. But the legal restraints upon alienation of Maori land and the excessively minute fragmentation of titles have combined to produce a most unsatisfactory situation. The result is that large numbers of Maoris retain an interest in the same block of land. Absurdity is reached when, as in the Wanganui district, there is one title with 5,000 owners. But of a total Maori population not exceeding 25,000 in the North Auckland district there are said to be 1,242,200 title-owners of Maori land, that is to say, an average of 177 owners for each title. The report urges as the objects of title reform the achievement as a general rule of sole ownership and a ban on the disintegration of titles. The simplest and easiest device for securing a large measure of sole ownership is the "trustee" principle, which is already at work to a limited extent among Maoris: first with the Maori Trustee and secondly with Maori incorporations, land-owning groups which are by statute given legal personality. These last are an interesting development. There are 123 active incorporations in New Zealand with an average assets-value of £62,289 and an average revenue of £11,779. In view of the uneasiness felt by some that the affairs of these incorporations are frequently mismanaged, it is noteworthy that the general average ratio of administration and committee expenses to gross revenue is 10 per cent. The growth of incorporations would retain the essential qualities of the Maori's interest in land and at the same time would simplify the whole system of land title. More important than that, it would give the Maori valuable experience in modern techniques of organization.

One of the features commonly discussed in the context of the general increase in crime is the inordinately high incidence of law-breaking among Maoris. The report states the sombre facts that not only is Maori crime almost



three and a half times as high as the European rate, but it also rose by 50 per cent in four years from 1954 to 1958. An analysis of the criminal statistics seems to show that among Maoris offences against property are by far the most prevalent and account for nearly half of all Maori crime. The common explanation for that phenomenon is that it is largely a survival of the communal way of life. It is as difficult to discover the real causes of crime among Maoris as it is among Pakehas. Clearly, home environment and parental upbringing play an important part in moulding a young Maori's attitude towards others and to society. The disintegration of the traditional structure of the Maori community also imposes unusual stresses upon the younger generation of Maoris. The basic equality of all before the law allows no latitude to be extended explicitly to Maoris simply because they are Maoris. Inquiries as to the causes of crime are important, particularly in the context of the relationship between Maori and Pakeha. But equally important is the need to make the periods of imprisonment as effective as possible in the rehabilitation of offenders. To that end an apparent reversal of the trend towards integration has been advocated. In the Report Mr. Hunn suggests that prisons where Maori offenders serve their sentences alongside Europeans all too frequently produce hardened criminals. Classification, it is suggested, is the beginning of reformatory treatment, and, as they tend to be different psychologically from European prisoners, Maori offenders should form a separate group either with the one institution or in an independent reformatory. That view has been vigorously challenged: it is not generally approved by editorial opinion in the newspapers. The problem is intractable.

Some encouragement can be drawn from the fact that the Government appears to be making an imaginative attempt to re-examine all traditional policies in the light of the present situation.

#### External Affairs

THE continued vacancy of the top New Zealand diplomatic posts in London and in Washington throughout the whole of the Labour Administration from 1957 to 1960 was a cause for strong criticism throughout the country and considerable embarrassment abroad. The present Prime Minister has fulfilled his party's election undertaking to fill those positions at an early date. A career diplomatist, Mr. G. R. Laking, previously Acting High Commissioner in London, has been selected as ambassador to the United States, and Mr. T. L. Macdonald, a former Minister of External Affairs, who retired from politics in 1957, is now High Commissioner for New Zealand in London. The Government has not shown any disposition to increase the number of legations overseas. It has recently raised the status of its representative in Indonesia to that of Consul General and appointed Mr. D. M. Rae, a former Member of Parliament, to that post. It continues to play its part in various regional organizations which provide a new forum for diplomacy.

New Zealand,  
May 1961.

# RHODESIA AND NYASALAND

## AFTER THE CONFERENCES

**T**HERE is much uncertainty and fear amongst Europeans in Central Africa today. Events in the Belgian Congo, unrest in Portuguese territories, the departure from the Commonwealth of the Union of South Africa, all challenge our way of life. We say that partnership is our policy, but our actions show that it is a limited type of partnership which refuses to allow political power to pass into the control of the majority.

On the economic side, our greatest satisfaction comes from a record year in mineral production. The output was valued at £154,464,000, Southern Rhodesia's total being £26,343,000. Industry made progress with a 10 per cent increase in production, and electricity production was raised by 18 per cent. Net immigration has fallen but more than balances emigration.

The slowing down of development has seriously affected the building industry and allied interests. The Federal Minister of Commerce and Industry says that 80,000 Africans are unemployed, and the four Governments have recently conferred on this subject. The Southern Rhodesian Government has decided to introduce a tax of £1 per month to be paid by employers on every non-Federal citizen in their employ. This will probably lead to the dismissal of thousands of Portuguese Africans and will conserve employment for local workers.

A recent amendment to the Southern Rhodesia Land Apportionment Act makes it legal for Africans to purchase land on freehold title in certain urban African areas, and in Northern Rhodesia housing loans for Africans can receive a government guarantee of up to 90 per cent. Together with such progressive moves goes a campaign to increase African wages.

In Southern Rhodesia the Civil Service has recently been opened to Africans, but the qualifications demanded for admission are high. Although great progress has been made in providing five years of teaching for almost every child, there is urgent need for more advanced schooling. The lack of high schools is even more serious in Nyasaland, but the Government there is determined to find local employees. Mr. Adu, head of the Ghanaian Civil Service, has advised the Nyasaland Government to establish a school of administration, a Technical College and an extension to the Colby School of Agriculture, to speed up and expand local recruiting for the Civil Service.

The overriding interest in Central Africa, however, is centred upon constitutional changes.

### Problem of the Constitution

**W**HEN the Federal Prime Minister returned from London talks in January last, he hoped that "the position of the Federation would be settled by May". By April 11, however, Sir Roy Welensky had recognized

that no solution was in sight and prophesied "tougher and more difficult months" ahead than we have so far experienced.

The Monckton Report stated that there was no future for a continuing association of the three Territories unless the African people concurred, and Dr. Banda put the matter tersely by saying that a viable Federation would require the support of three black Prime Ministers.

If Federation is to continue in any form, it must be supported by the three States, and the Governments of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland must be supported by majorities in each Territory. Our first concern, then, should be to solve the constitutional problems of Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia, so that each Territory may be governed with the consent of its peoples, black and white.

This all seems simple and straightforward, but it is not a theory acceptable to most white people in Central Africa. Some months ago Sir John Moffat stated that Europeans in Northern Rhodesia could not change their views on political matters quickly enough to safeguard their own best interests, and he appealed to the British Government to impose a new Constitution which would give Africans wide representation and so ensure stability of government. Although Sir John spoke of Northern Rhodesia, his statement is equally true of the situation existing throughout Central Africa. The crux of the problem is that we whites have been made judges in our own case. Eight million Africans in Central Africa claim that there is a dispute between themselves and 300,000 whites; but the whites in the Rhodesias, and in the Federal State, demand to make their own decisions, holding that Europeans are civilized and responsible people and that Africans are not.

In Nyasaland there were so few Europeans that the British Government eventually acted firmly, and imposed a new Constitution which will produce a Legislature chosen by the people. Although the Colonial Office will hold the balance of power for a further period, the people of Nyasaland are satisfied that self-government is within their reach. Their willingness to co-operate is shown, not only in the easing of tensions, but also in the way people have thronged the registration offices to prepare for the coming election. The Legislature will be controlled by the people for, although there are two rolls, the lower roll, upon which most of the electors are registered, will elect twenty of the twenty-eight members to be chosen. While the lowest qualification for registration in the Rhodesias is £10 per month and two years of secondary education, the lowest qualification in Nyasaland is literacy in a vernacular and the payment of tax for ten years or more.

In Northern Rhodesia there are 8,000 African voters, and in Southern Rhodesia 4,000. In Nyasaland the lower qualification, together with an enthusiastic drive by Government, has resulted in the enrolment of 114,000 Africans in just over a month. The retiring Governor has stated that Nyasaland is now poised for advance. There is no doubt that this remote country has serious economic problems, but there is good reason to believe that the people will co-operate in attempting their solution.

While the people of Nyasaland have agreed upon a new Constitution,

Northern Rhodesia is still in travail. The United Federal Party has the major representation in the Legislature and, with officials of the Colonial Office, formed the Government until recently. However, when the Constitutional Conference opened in London, neither United Federal Party nor Dominion Party delegates attended. Mr. John Roberts, Northern Rhodesian leader of the United Federal Party, did fly to London and held private meetings with Mr. Macleod but would not attend the Conference. The effect of this boycott upon African opinion was marked. At the December Federal talks at Lancaster House, various African delegates walked out of some sessions of the Conference. Sir Roy Welensky and Sir Edgar Whitehead roundly criticized this boycott and termed it irresponsible. Sir Edgar Whitehead went further and excluded the National Democratic Party delegates from the final session of the Federal Conference, and said that he would not permit them to attend the Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Conference, though he was later persuaded to relent.

#### Welensky v. Macleod

IN the light of these judgments, it was difficult to understand the boycott of the Northern Rhodesian talks. It came as a surprise to many people that Sir Roy Welensky, in December, could condemn Africans for walking out of a Conference and then himself advise, or at least agree to, a complete boycott of a Constitutional Conference in February. While the Northern Rhodesian delegation from the United Federal Party and the Dominion Party, with the exception of Mr. John Roberts, did not go to London, Mr. Julian Greenfield, Federal Minister of Law, did go. This action inflamed African feeling in the Federation, for it has been widely held that the Federal Government interferes in the affairs of the Territories, and here was interference for all to see. It was followed by a statement from Sir Roy Welensky that he was negotiating personally with Mr. Macmillan upon the Northern Rhodesian crisis. In a press interview the Federal Prime Minister said his Government's intention was to enshrine merit as the criterion of public life, and not race. This was Mr. Macmillan's declared policy, and if the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Macleod, did not subscribe to it, there was obviously a clash between Sir Roy and Mr. Macleod and between Mr. Macleod and Mr. Macmillan. Sir Roy said that if the British Government enforced purely racial representation in Northern Rhodesia, it would indirectly weaken the Federation.

The Prime Minister went on to state that feelings were running high in Northern Rhodesia and that if Her Majesty's Government tried to impose a Constitution unacceptable to the Europeans and gave way to the demands of extremists, then the British Government must be responsible for any reaction. He believed that Europeans would conduct themselves with responsibility to the end. However, men of achievement and courage could not be expected to throw away all they had worked for, he said.

It is now quite apparent that the attempts made by the Federal Prime Minister to break Mr. Macleod have failed. The broad plan for Northern



Rhodesia envisages a Legislature in which there are forty-five elected members. There would be fifteen African seats, fifteen European seats, and fifteen Members of Parliament would be chosen by the two rolls voting together, but with their power so adjusted as to achieve approximately equal participation of black and white.

The African people could justifiably criticize this plan because it gives 70,000 Europeans equal say with 2½ million Africans. Europeans can criticize it only if they hold that a new Constitution should continue to leave dominant power in the hands of whites. A majority of whites believes with Sir Roy Welensky that only if power is kept in their hands will there be any future for them in Africa. It has become the practice to twist words and phrases to support white racialism and portray it as partnership. Extreme statements are made by both black and white, and the races draw farther apart, although the best hope for whites lies in reaching agreement with their fellow Africans.

Sir Roy Welensky says that the crux of his disagreement with Mr. Macleod is that the United Federal Party wishes to enshrine merit as the criterion of public life, while Mr. Macleod is determined to enforce purely racial representation. To support such statements the Federal Prime Minister constantly uses what might be termed "the fallacy of the percentage". Sir Roy states that a large part of the African people have little education or knowledge of the workings of democracy while all Europeans in Central Africa are educated and responsible. On this basis, he argues that the overwhelming proportion of power should remain in white hands. This seems not only fair but also to be in the best interests of both black and white. However, if percentages are to be used to sharpen truth instead of obscuring it, the first percentage which must be stated is that of white people in the population of Northern Rhodesia. That figure is 3 per cent. In what circumstances, then, should 3 per cent of the people be allowed to dominate 97 per cent? Present feeling is that as 3 per cent are white, they must be given decisive authority; but the argument is put more subtly, and it is suggested that as all the 3 per cent are educated and responsible, they must be given authority, for it can be demonstrated that a large part of the 97 per cent are not only black but also uneducated. What is not stated is that it would take only 4 per cent of the 97 per cent to outnumber all the whites.

The attitude of the United Federal Party and the Federal Prime Minister himself to the Northern Rhodesian talks has done further damage to relationships between black and white. Talks continue in Lusaka and the United Federal Party Ministers have resigned. Into their places have come Sir John Moffat and his Liberals, men who denounce the interference of Federal Ministers in the affairs of Northern Rhodesia.

The Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia intended to have the restrictions removed from the country's Constitution in 1960, following discussions with Her Majesty's Government; but worsening race relations have ruled out any easy passage for such intentions.

The African people in Southern Rhodesia have been deeply stirred by the events of the past three years and today the National Democratic Party is a national movement. The arrest of five hundred people early in 1959, and the

declaration of a State of Emergency when no violence threatened, opened a new and unhappy chapter in the history of the country.

When Sir Edgar Whitehead left for London in December last to discuss changes in the Constitution, he refused to include members of the National Democratic Party and the Central Africa Party in his team, since these parties had no representation in Parliament. Fortunately, in London, wiser counsels prevailed and wider delegations were invited. Later, when Mr. Duncan Sandys presided over the Conference in Salisbury, decisions were reached. These were, however, quite unacceptable to the Dominion Party, who have the support of about half of the white population.

### A Bill of Rights

IT was agreed that a Bill of Rights should be included in an amended Constitution; that most of the present restrictions should be removed; and also that a new electoral law should be passed which would give Africans fifteen seats in an enlarged House of sixty-five members. The National Democratic Party demanded one man, one vote, but agreed to the findings as an interim measure. Unfortunately, two things happened immediately after the Conference which made it most difficult for the National Democratic Party President, Mr. Joshua Nkomo, to persuade his party to support the proposals. Sir Edgar Whitehead stated that the changes to be made would not be an interim measure, but must stand for all future time. The second difficulty came when the Federal Prime Minister hailed the new proposals as a statesmanlike agreement, far better than he could have hoped for.

The Southern Rhodesian Government is now preparing a white paper and will put the matter to a referendum later in the year. In the meantime, the Dominion Party is calling for the rejection of the Government's proposals and the secession of Southern Rhodesia from the Federation. The Dominion Party promises that if it were placed in power it would maintain political power in the hands of whites.

Feelings are rising in Southern as well as Northern Rhodesia, and while intimidation decreases in Nyasaland it increases in the south. In Southern Rhodesia a few Europeans have accepted the invitation of the National Democratic Party to join their ranks; but these whites receive threats by telephone and letter. Some Africans are members of the United Federal Party and are also threatened by their fellows. More whites would join the National Democratic Party but they are afraid of losing their employment. There is no significant group in the Federation today which has wide support from both the main races.

In Southern Rhodesia the United Federal Party warns voters that a rejection of government proposals at the referendum will lead to an immediate general election. In such circumstances, it appears that the Dominion Party would be elected: this would be a final provocation to the African people and would probably result in bloodshed.

Unfortunately, an acceptance of the proposals does not provide any clear solution to our racial problems. If the Government's plan is accepted, then the electoral law will be changed and provision made for two rolls, the

upper being almost entirely European and the lower almost entirely African. Each roll will have a limited influence of up to 20 per cent on the other, and there will be fifteen lower-roll candidates and fifty higher. In Nyasaland there will be eight higher-roll candidates and twenty lower. Sir Edgar Whitehead says that at the election which would follow he would "knock the living daylight out of Joshua Nkomo" and would win the black seats; but this is unlikely in the extreme, and the result of the election would probably not give Sir Edgar more than twenty-five of the white seats.

Any party, to govern, would have to win more than thirty-two seats and a practical minimum would be at least thirty-five. The Dominion Party could not expect any African seats and would therefore have to gain thirty-five out of the fifty European seats, an almost impossible achievement. Sir Edgar's statement regarding winning African seats shows that he recognizes that he could not gain a working majority without winning a substantial number of the fifteen lower-roll seats.

If no party wins enough seats to govern, there would have to be an understanding with another group. A large number, if not the majority, of the United Federal Party members today would say that in such an event they would look to Joshua Nkomo. It seems possible that Sir Edgar Whitehead, left to himself, might do just that, but Sir Roy Welensky is the real leader of whites in Central Africa and recently, when the United Federal Party was in trouble regarding the Northern Rhodesian Constitution, they accepted the support of the Dominion Party. Mr. van Eeden and his followers became Welensky supporters. It was the most natural alignment in the world, and would be just as natural in Southern Rhodesia—white against black, fifty members against fifteen, and another, but final, five years of white rule spelling the doom of Federation.

The Monckton Report said that Southern Rhodesia may yet break the Federation: Southern Rhodesia, the last country in the Commonwealth where the law upholds racial divisions and practices, where we have 76,000 white voters and 4,000 black, where the white people, who are 8 per cent of the population, hold 95 per cent of the votes.

We have come to a time in our history when we speak in extremes, act in extremes, legislate in extremes. The Acting Prime Minister of the Federation, in a carefully prepared speech, timed to catch the United Kingdom papers as Sir Roy Welensky arrived in London in December for the Federal Review talks, said that the red flag would be flying from the Cape to Cairo within ten years if the Federation was sold out in 1961. His statement did not define the term "sold out" but makes it quite clear that only Federation under white domination can save Africa from Communism. This statement stands out very starkly against the findings of the Treason Trial Judges in Pretoria, who discount the power of Communism in this part of Africa.

In Southern Rhodesia we have added a Vagrancy Act to our Statutes, and this gives the Government wide powers in apprehending and holding men. Besides this, under the aegis of the new Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, the Government has instituted a régime in which political meetings are not permitted in African rural areas, special-branch police attend meetings with

tape-recorders in the towns, and such restrictions are placed upon the liberty of the individual that the Chief Justice of the Federation, Sir Robert Tredgold, has resigned his position in protest.

Sir Robert Tredgold said that he had resigned so that he could protest, publicly, against the Law and Order (Maintenance) Bill, which, he said, outraged almost every basic human right. The General Secretary of the United Federal Party commented: "We are entitled to be very doubtful about his political judgment or his understanding of the present political situation."

The lengths to which the law goes are illustrated by two recent cases in which Africans were prosecuted for taunting the police. It was said that an African had called blue-uniformed police reservists "girl guides". He was fined £20 and when a second case appeared, the magistrate said that such sneering at the police must stop and imposed a fine of £25: three months' pay for an African.

Relationships between the British South Africa Police and the African people in general used to be remarkably good, but the situation has now changed so radically that in 1960, in Salisbury alone, there were thirty-eight cases of assault upon, and nineteen cases of stoning of, the police.

This is our crisis year. Already we have mobilized troops, enacted a Currency and Exchange Control Act to stop the flight of capital, heard with dismay that our British South Africa Company is investing Rhodesian profits in Canada and Australasia, but we are still unwilling to recognize that the only way to evade impending tragedy is to share political power and responsibility with the African people. A United Kingdom newspaper correspondent recently said in Salisbury that things were going very well in the Federation and that the Government was to be congratulated. He concluded his statement, however, by saying that there was still one small matter which should be attended to: the vote should be given to every literate citizen!

If this were done, and there is no substitute for it, white domination would cease but white participation would continue; present governments would fall but black and white, together, would rule; tensions would be relaxed and crippling security expenditure would diminish. Our problems would not disappear overnight, but a way would be opened along which people of all races could walk in mutual respect; there would be hope in Central Africa.

Central Africa,  
May 1961.



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